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In the debate about semantic context dependence, various truth-
conditional frameworks have been proposed. Indexicalism, associated with
e.g. Jason Stanley, accounts for contextual effects on truth conditions in
terms of a rich covert syntax. Truth-conditional pragmatics, associated with
e.g. François Recanati, does not locate the mechanisms for context depen-
dence in the syntactic structure but provides a more complex semantics.
In this dissertation, the hypothesis that indexicalism and truth-conditional
pragmatics are empirically equivalent is explored. The conclusion that the
hypothesis is correct emerges, when claims and accounts in the debate are
made formally precise, within the framework of model-theoretic semantics.
The dissertation shows that the frameworks of indexicalism and truth-
conditional pragmatics allow for the formulation of two similar, but yet
sharply distinct, formal semantic accounts of a set of linguistic examples
central to the debate. The semantic accounts are model-theoretic, in the
tradition of event semantics. The indexicalist and the truth-conditional
pragmaticist semantics are applied to the following linguistic phenomena:
quantifier domain restriction, transfer, binding, colour adjectives, mean-
ing negotiation and enrichments of thematic roles. For each linguistic phe-
nomenon, one indexicalist account is put forward, and one truth-
conditional pragmaticist account. It is concluded, on these grounds, that
indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics are empirically equivalent.
The formal accounts are also developed to accommodate a broader range
of linguistic phenomena. In particular, context-dependent dimensions of
the English present perfect are examined. An indexicalist account of this
puzzling linguistic phenomenon is provided, as well as a truth-conditional
pragmaticist variant. The dissertation also develops a previously underde-
veloped combination of Reichenbach’s and Jespersen’s early accounts of the
present perfect. The proposal provides further evidence that indexicalism
and truth-conditional pragmatics are empirically equivalent, but it also en-
hances our understanding of the present perfect and tests the viability of
the model-theoretic, event semantic accounts.
The dissertation ends with a discussion of the results. It is argued that
central aspects of alternative accounts of context dependence – relevance
theory, radical contextualism and semantic minimalism – are in fact com-
patible with indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics. In addition,
questions about simplicity, and how far the hypothesis about equivalence
can be generalized, are addressed.
Whenever you are confronted with an opponent, conquer him
with love.
Mahatma Gandhi

Preface
The topic of this book is context dependence and formal semantics. My
understanding of the theoretical problems associated with this area, and
with the philosophical frameworks developed to deal with it, had begun
to take shape in 2012, when I participated in the summer school Theo-
ries of Communication (organized by Sandra Lapointe and Jurgis Skilters),
in Pumpuri, Latvia. I had great discussions with Deirdre Wilson, who
also provided constructive feedback on my course paper about relevance
theory and metaphor. The same summer, I participated in The 2nd East-
Asian School on Logic, Language and Computation, in Chonqing, China.
Dag Westerståhl’s and Pauline Jacobson’s courses on compositionality were
impressively clear, and helped me forming a more formal perspective on
semantics. Here I also got the possibility to present some preliminary
thoughts about the semantics of the present perfect.
The year after, in 2013, I attended Robin Cooper’s comprehensive and
well-structured graduate course on Montague grammar in Gothenburg.
This clearly sharpened my reasoning and writing about linguistic phenom-
ena, and I felt that tools of model-theoretic semantics had not been suf-
ficiently paid attention to in the debate about context dependence. This
hunch turned into a deeper conviction in 2014, when I attended The 26th
European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information (organized
by Gerhard Jäger), which took place in Tübingen, Germany. Among a
plethora of short courses on logic and language, Lucas Champollion’s in-
spirational course on compositional event semantics is the one I remember
most vividly.
From 2015 and onwards, I regularly had meetings with my supervisors
Dag Westerståhl and Robin Cooper. First we discussed the main theses,
arguments and methods, and then more detailed portions of text. The
main points of the thesis, for instance that reasonable indexicalist and truth-
conditional pragmaticist fragments, for the main examples in the debate,
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are empirically equivalent, seemed clear to me quite early on. The formal
semantic accounts took more time to develop, and the forming of an ap-
propriate style, apt for formal semantics and philosophy of language, took
more than a few single moments. The supervision meetings with Dag and
Robin were pivotal moments. They influenced my work more than any of
the other events mentioned above. I knew beforehand that my supervisors
had a deep and comprehensive knowledge of the fields of relevance for my
dissertation. I discovered that they were also skilled from a pedagogical
perspective. I always had the feeling that things will work out, after our
encounters. Furthermore, I felt that I could trust them. Despite the delays
in the writing process, due to, for instance, parental leaves and financial
matters, Dag and Robin always encouraged me and put me back in the
saddle.
In addition to the supervision meetings, my interactions with philoso-
phers in Gothenburg were mostly concentrated to the Higher Seminar in
Theoretical Philosophy, led by Anna-Sofia Maurin. The seminar broad-
ened my knowledge of philosophy, and discussions with Martin Kaså, Felix
Larsson, Anna-Sofia Maurin and Anders Tolland, among others, inspired
and helped me to acquire a broad knowledge of logic, speech act theory,
metaphysics, and other areas of philosophy. The final seminar, where Sara
Packalén was opponent, provided excellent feedback and suggestions of de-
velopments, and, as importantly, it was great fun.
Everyone mentioned above has played a significant role in my develop-
ment as a philosopher during my doctoral studies. I express my gratitude to
you for this. I would also like to thank Elisabet Engdahl, who served as sec-
ondary supervisor during my first years as a graduate student. Our discus-
sions about grammatical theories and linguistic methodology played an im-
portant role in the evolution of my current philosophical standpoints. My
PhD-student friends and colleagues deserve praise for supportive and con-
structive comments and discussions. Rasmus Blanck, Ellen Breitholtz, Alla
Choifer, Paul Gorbow, Martin Filin Karlsson, Peter Johnsen, Pia Nord-
gren, Susanna Salmijärvi, Ylwa Sjölin Wirling and Alva Stråge: thanks for
good informal chats about philosophy and life generally. A warm thank
you goes to the researchers and lecturers Arvid Båve, Elizabeth Coppock,
Palle Leth, Benjamin Lyngfelt, Zachiri McKenzie, Filip Radovic and Su-
sanna Radovic, with whom I have had inspiring and thought-provoking
conversations over the years.
A special thanks goes to Rasmus Blanck, for helping out with type-
setting, and Monica Havström, who designed a wonderful cover for the
book. For good measure, I would like to thank Jesper Ahlström and the IT-
support at the faculty for fixing my crashed computer, and Agnetha Eng,
Martin Tuneberg and the staff at Campusservice Lorensberg for assisting
me by mounting whiteboards and numerous other tasks. The administra-
tive staff at the department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Sci-
ence has always been eager to help; a special thanks goes to Helena Bjärn-
lind, Matilde Eriksson and Linda Aronsson for helping out with forms,
room bookings, and a lot of other pieces of work. I owe a collective thanks
to everyone at the Department of Swedish, where I have worked during the
last two years. The positive work environment made it possible to write up
the final parts of the dissertation in my spare time. Finally, a thanks goes to
Kungliga och Hvitfeldtska stiftelsen and Stiftelsen Erik och Gurli Hultengrens
fond för filosofi vid Lunds Universitet for financial support.
Preliminary material from the dissertation was presented at the confer-
ence Knowledge, language and ideology, University of Valladolid (organized
by Cristina Corredor), in 2015, and The Swedish Congress of Philosophy,
Linköping University (organized by Fredrik Stjernberg), in 2015 as well,
and at Umeå University (organized by Per Sundström, Daniela Cutas and
Torfinn Huvenes), in 2019. I would like to thank the audiences at these
conferences for constructive discussion and feedback.
On a personal note, I would like to thank my wife, my love, and my
everything Rebecka Petersson. From an intellectual perspective, it’s clear
to me that I would have had completely different trains of thought, if I
hadn’t had the luck to meet you and to live with you and our amazing three
children. Your knowledge of religion, feminist theory and literature has al-
ways impressed and influenced me, and the encounters with people I hadn’t
met otherwise, made possible through your important ministry work, have
provided new dimensions and important insights. On the same note, I
am grateful to my parents, Christina Rosén and Lars-Olof Petersson, for
always supporting me. I somehow developed the confidence to pursue a
PhD in theoretical philosophy: I owe this confidence to my parents. And
thank you for helping us with the upbringing and care of the children. I
would also like to say thank you to my parents-in-law, Margit and Bengt
Olausson, for helping out with the kids, and for providing a relaxing and
joyful atmosphere at Hamburgö, where we have spent many summer days.
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1 Empirical Phenomena and Theoretical
Background
1.1 Introduction
Consider the following sentences:
(1) Let’s go to Ireland. We’ll stop in every bar and have a drink.1
(‘Basquiat’, 1996)
(2) The leaf is green.2
(3) She took out the key and opened the door.3.
A natural reading of ‘every bar’ in (1) is that the phrase concerns every
encountered bar in Ireland (or on the way to Ireland) and not every bar lo-
cated in Ireland (or every bar on earth). A leaf could be ‘green’ in several
ways: it could, for instance, be naturally green or painted green. And the
intuitive thought, or piece of information, acquired when hearing or read-
ing an utterance or inscription of (3) is that the referent of ‘she’ took out
a unique contextually salient key and opened a unique contextually salient
door with the key, although it is certainly possible to acquire some other
proposition, where, for instance, the door is opened in some other way, if
more contextual information is provided.
In the examples above, we can observe that the intuitive thought (or
proposition) conveyed can be made explicit by, as it were, filling in some
linguistic material. Binding constructions, where natural readings seem to
1See Peters & Westerståhl (2006, p. 46), Recanati (2004, p. 124-127), Stanley & Szabó
(2000), Stanley & Williamson (1995), and Westerståhl (1985) for similar examples.
2See Bezuidenhout (2002), Hansen (2011), Hansen & Chemla (2013), Kennedy & Mc-
Nally (2010), Recanati (2010a), Szabó (2001), and Travis (2008/1985b) for similar
examples.
3Recanati (2004, p. 23).
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be dependent on something like a quantifier binding an implicit variable,
illustrate a kind a context dependence of a different kind:
(4) This is how the world will be/ Everywhere I go it rains on me/
Forty monkeys drowning in a boiling sea/ Everywhere I go it rains
on me.
(Tom Waits, Chuck E Weiss 2006, ‘Rains on me’.)4
(5) Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains.5
The most natural reading of (4) can be paraphrased as follows: for every
location 𝑙 and every time 𝑡 , such that I go to 𝑙 at 𝑡 , it rains at 𝑙 at 𝑡 . And
(5) can be paraphrased by the following expressions: for every time 𝑡 and
location 𝑙 , if John lights a cigarette at 𝑡 , at 𝑙 , it rains at 𝑡 , at 𝑙 . In these
cases, the intuitive readings of ‘it rains’ are not easily construed as adding
extra information about the context.
In the examples considered so far, we hardly need any information about
any particular context of use in order to capture what a speaker, using the
sentences in some situation, likely would intend to convey. In contrast,
there are cases where the natural readings seem to be more dependent on
further contextual information about conversational topic, speech partici-
pants, location etc. Consider the following cases of metonymy:
(6) (Pia has called the IT-support because of problems with the new
computer system called ‘Dafgu’. An IT-technician opens the door
to her office.)
Pia: Hi, are you Dafgu?
IT-technician: I am Dafgu.
(Observed language use, Gothenburg, 2013).
(7) (Elevator repairman on phone:) I don’t know what to do with that
order. I’ll send André street over to you.
(Observed language use, Gothenburg, 2016).6
4See Bourmayan & Recanati (2013), Recanati (2002), and Recanati (2004, p. 98-111) for
similar examples.
5Pagin (2005), Stanley (2000), Stanley (2005), Zeman (2011b).
6Example (6) and (7) are translated from Swedish. The observed dialogues were formu-
lated as follows:
2
empirical phenomena and theoretical background
(8) (A waiter:) The ham sandwich left without paying.7
In these examples, the contributions to the intuitive truth conditions made
by ‘Dafgu’, ‘André street’ and ‘ham sandwich’ are, arguably, not what these
expressions conventionally mean. Intuitively, ‘Dafgu’ does not, in this case,
denote a new computer system but rather the property of being a techni-
cian working with that system. The contribution of ‘André street’ to the
proposition intuitively expressed is not a street but an order concerning an
elevator in a house located on André street. And in (8), ‘ham sandwich’
intuitively denotes the property of being an orderer of a ham sandwich.
Context dependence can also bear on temporal dimensions of readings:
(9) IFK Norrköping has won Allsvenskan.8
In 2017, an utterance of (9) could be true: the football team IFK Nor-
rköping won the Swedish premier league, Allsvenskan, in 2015. However,
a speaker who uses the sentence in (9) could also mean that IFK Nor-
rköping is the winner of the 2017 competition (if, say, the sentence is ut-
tered after the last match). In the latter case, an utterance of the sentence
would be false.
Relatedly, consider an utterance of (10), a sentence in the present perfect
like (9) above, in a context where it occurs as an answer to Would you like
to have dinner?, or a similar question.
(10) I have eaten.9
In interpreting an utterance like that, there are at least two dimensions of
context dependence (over and above the obvious context dependence of
the indexical ‘I’). First, the speaker has a restricted time period in mind,
(6b) Pia: Hej, är det du som är Dafgu?
IT-technician: Det är jag som är Dafgu.
(7b) Hur vi ska göra med DEN ordern vet jag inte. Jag skickar över Andréegatan till
dig nu.
7Pagin & Pelletier (2007), Recanati (2004, p. 26). See Nunberg (1995) for similar exam-
ples.
8See Higginbotham (2009), Mittwoch (2008) and Portner (2003) for similar examples.
9Recanati (2010b, p. 123-125).
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for instance the evening when the conversation takes place. Secondly, an
utterance of (10) intuitively conveys that the speaker has eaten dinner, or
at least a meal sufficiently like dinner, and not, say, some nuts, a fruit or a
candy bar.
Yet another kind of context dependence is related to meaning litigation.
We sometimes disagree with our interlocutors about how to use language,
and what the words we use mean. In such cases, our discussions are inter-
rupted by litigations, or negotiations, about meanings. Consider a conver-
sation where two astronomers disagree about the planetary status of Pluto.
(11) Astronomer 1: Pluto is a planet.
Astronomer 2: Pluto is not a planet.10
Arguably, disagreements of this kind differ from disagreements over non-
linguistic facts (for example, if Kim claims that some given restaurant closes
at 5 pm and Robin denies that). One could argue that the astronomers
in the example above use ‘planet’ to refer to different properties, and that
‘planet’, in sentence (11) thereby exemplifies yet another variant of context
dependence.
Even if the kinds of context dependence presented here may seem to
differ, they can be explained by similar mechanisms, or so I argue in this
dissertation. Moreover, it is argued that the accounts labelled ‘indexicalism’
(e.g. Martí 2006; Stanley 2000, 2007; Stanley & Szabó 2000 and Szabó
2001) and ‘contextualism’ (e.g. Carston &Hall 2012; Recanati 2004; Sper-
ber &Wilson 1995, 2012) offer two alternative, and equally viable, ways of
accounting for the various forms of context dependence shown above. In
particular, this holds of truth-conditional pragmatics, the variant of con-
textualism that we will be primarily concerned with, in this dissertation.
This becomes evident when indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmat-
ics are made formally precise, but is obscured when the two accounts are
described in informal terms, which is the standard in the literature. In
contrast to previous literature, this dissertation offers a fully explicit formal
semantics implementing and developing the insights of indexicalism and
truth-conditional pragmatics.
10See Ludlow (2014, p. 42-45) for examples of naturally occurring uses of language con-
cerning the planetary status of Pluto.
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Below, the framework of indexicalism is introduced first. After that,
truth-conditional pragmatics is presented, and an overview of some theo-
retical alternatives to indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics is pro-
vided. We continue with an introduction to the work on the present perfect
construction shown in the thesis. A section on methodological choices is
found near the end of this chapter, which closes with an overview of the
following chapters and a short elaboration of the main contribution of the
dissertation.
1.2 Indexicalism
Indexicalism is an approach to contextual effects on truth conditions pur-
sued by e.g. Martí (2006); Stanley & Szabó (2000); Stanley (2000, 2007)
and Szabó (2001). According to this view, contextual effects on truth con-
ditions are due to the logical form.
To illustrate the idea, consider the following sentence:
(12) Kim is short.
Suppose that Kim’s height is 1 meter and 60 cm. Intuitively, Kim is short
compared to some people, e.g. a group of basket ball players where the
mean height is 1 meter and 90 centimeters, but not short compared to oth-
ers, say, Hilary and Robin who are both 1 meter and 63 centimeters. More-
over, we don’t want our analyses of natural language to be inconsistent, at
least not obviously inconsistent. For these reasons, it seems problematic to
assume that (12) is associated with constant truth conditions; the problem
is avoided if we assume that the truth conditions of (12) vary contextually.
Indexicalists postulate a level of syntactic representation of sentences,
where such a representation may, but does not have to, contain expressions
that do not correspond to anything audible in utterances of the sentence.
This is the ‘logical form’ of the sentence, i.e. the input to semantic interpre-
tation. In the case of (12), an indexicalist solution is to provide a variable
for a comparison class in the logical form of (12):
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S
NP
Kim
VP
is short 𝑋
The idea is that the semantics assigns truth conditions to this form, where
the variable 𝑋 , which denotes a contextually salient comparison class, is
present. The truth conditions of the logical form above will, accordingly,
depend on the value of 𝑋 . But the denotation of 𝑋 does not bear on the
audible aspect of an utterance of (12), because 𝑋 does not correspond to
anything audible. The variable is present in the logical form, the syntac-
tic structure interpreted by the semantics, but invisible, as it were, to the
phonetic component of the language in question.
Applying the idea to (1) above, the indexicalist hypothesizes that the ob-
jects quantified over are somehow restricted, by means of a silent variable.
NP
every 𝑋 bar
If 𝑋 is assigned a contextually salient set of bars (e.g. the bars the speaker
expects to encounter on the way to Ireland), and the expression ‘bar’ is as-
signed the set of bars in the domain, one indexicalist solution is to let the
two sets intersect, and then let the quantifier denoted by ‘every’ range over
the set thereby formed (cf. Stanley & Szabó 2000, Westerståhl 1985 and
Chapter 2.2). The indexicalist strategy for (3) is similar:
VP
opened the door 𝑈
If 𝑈 is a variable over instruments, whose precise contextual value is as-
signed by the semantics, and 𝑈 does not, furthermore, correspond to any-
thing in the phonetic component of the language, we have the contours of
an indexicalist account of the sentence in question (cf. Chapter 2.7).
The semantic transfer (or metonymy) involved in (6), (7) and (8) has
been taken to be irrelevant to formal semantics by proponents of index-
icalism (notably Stanley 2005, p. 226-230). However, if indexicalism is
made formally precise, it is evident that it is possible for the indexicalist to
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account for these cases semantically, if she wants to do so. To illustrate,
consider the following tree displaying the logical form of the noun phrase
of (8) (cf. Chapter 2.3):
NP
D
the
N
N𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑛0
N
ham sandwich
If it is assumed that the phonologically covert variable 𝑛0 denotes a con-
textually salient function of a type that together with the denotation of
‘ham sandwich’ forms a function of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡 ⟩11, which is a standard type
for nouns, we have the beginnings of an indexicalist account, according to
which the denotation of ‘ham sandwich’ is a contextually salient orderer of
a ham sandwich.
Furthermore, indexicalism has been argued for on the basis of binding
data. As mentioned in the introduction, the most natural reading of (4)
involves quantification over locations and times, and one indexicalist option
is to provide logical forms for (4) and (5), where variables over locations
and times are present, at appropriate nodes, in the phrase structure trees
displaying the logical forms (cf. Stanley, 2000).
It is also possible to account for cases like (4) and (5) without postulat-
ing covert variables in logical form. However, alternative mechanisms for
context dependence, employed by contextualists, and introduced below in
Section 1.3, turn out to be unnecessary as well, for this kind of data. In
contrast to earlier accounts, the proposal in Chapter 2.4 suggests that bind-
ing data can be accounted for by using the mechanism of saturation, which
is available for both frameworks (the notion of saturation is introduced in
Section 1.3.1 below).
11In Montague grammar, functions of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡 ⟩ take objects of type ‘entity’ (‘𝑒 ’) and yield
objects of type ‘truth value’ (‘𝑡 ’). The function denoted by ‘ham sandwich’ thus takes
each entity to True if, and only if, the entity is a ham sandwich.
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1.2.1 Formal implementation and pragmatic processes
Indexicalism, especially Stanley’s proposal, is often contrasted to ‘contex-
tualism’ or ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ (Recanati 2010b, p. 9-12 and
p. 38-40, and Borg 2012, p. 19-23; see also Stanley 2007, p. 21-27 and
p. 231-246). The first key characteristic attributed to ‘indexicalism’ is then
that contextual effects on truth conditions are theoretically implemented in
terms of phonologically covert variables in logical form. However, there are
also a second and a third claim associated with ‘indexicalism’. The second
claim goes as follows. In an utterance situation, when the hearer interprets
an assertion of a context-dependent sentence, e.g. (1) or (2) above, the inter-
pretative processes are of a fundamentally different kind from the processes
involved in a situation where someone attempts to interpret non-linguistic
acts, such as taps on the shoulder or kicks under the table. In the former
case, the hearer assigns values to variables, apparent in highly structured
logical forms. In the latter case, neither variables nor highly structured rep-
resentations (like logical forms) are involved.12
Suppose my principal claim is true, that all effects of extra-
linguistic context on the truth conditions of an assertion are
traceable to logical form. Then, the effects of context on the
truth-conditional interpretation of an assertion are restricted
to assigning the values to elements in the expression uttered.
Each such element brings with it rules governing what con-
text can and cannot assign to it, of varying degrees of laxity.
The effects of extra-linguistic context on truth-conditional in-
terpretation are therefore highly constrained. If this picture
of truth-conditional interpretation is correct, then it is funda-
mentally different from other kinds of interpretation, like the
kind involved in interpreting kicks under the table and taps
on the shoulder. We do not interpret these latter sorts of acts
12This view is related to, although clearly distinct from, the claim that it is not in the scope of
indexicalism (or truth-conditional semantics generally) to account for sentences like (8),
where transfer (or metonymy) is involved and expressions are used non-literally. This
was still Jason Stanley’s position in 2015, when he argued that indexicalism assumes that
truth-conditional interpretation is highly constrained by conventions (Stanley, p.c.).
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by applying highly specific rules to structured representations.
(Stanley, 2000, p. 396)
To make Stanley’s point more concrete, consider the following case of non-
linguistic communication (see Sperber & Wilson 2012, p. 98-101, for sim-
ilar examples).
(13) Suppose that Kim is angry with Hilary. When Hilary tries to engage
Kim in conversation, Kim opens a newspaper and starts reading it.
Intuitively, Hilary will understand Kim to mean that Kim does not want
to speak to Hilary. But the process of interpretation involved here is fun-
damentally different from the process involved in grasping the context-
dependent truth conditions of an assertion of e.g. (1), where the contex-
tual domain restriction is dependent on a phonologically covert variable in
logical form. The main reason for this fundamental difference is that we do
not, according to the quote by Stanley above, apply “highly specific rules
to structured representations” in the former case, whereas it is clear that we
do so in the latter.
Stanley’s picture of communication is closely related to Grice’s well-
known account (Grice, 1975). Grice postulates a dichotomy between con-
ventional, linguistic meaning, on the one hand, and pragmatic meaning
in the form of conversational implicatures, on the other hand. For Grice,
the notion ‘what is said’, applied to an utterance, refers to the conventional
meaning of the uttered sentence, taken in context. On Grice’s account,
context dependence is sometimes involved in the conventional meaning of
a sentence: pronouns like ‘he’ and ‘she’, tenses and ambiguous expressions
have their meaning fixed contextually (Grice, 1975, p. 44). But pragmatic
competences of cooperation and joint action enter the picture in the case
of conversational implicatures and not in cases of context-dependent con-
ventional meanings (Grice, 1975, p. 47-49). Stanley’s and Grice’s accounts
are related in that they both make a sharp distinction between linguistic
and conventional meaning, on the one hand, and other pragmatic kinds of
meaning, on the other.
However, Stanley’s second claim, that the process of interpreting a
context-dependent assertion is fundamentally different from interpreting
non-linguistic acts, does not follow from the first claim, that truth-
9
disarming context dependence
conditional context dependence is formally implemented in terms of vari-
ables in logical form. When indexicalism is made formally precise, it be-
comes clear that it is perfectly coherent to account for truth-conditional
context dependence in terms of variables in logical form, while, at the same
time, assuming that the assignment of values to variables in logical form is
dependent on processes similar to, intertwined with, or even identical to
the interpretative processes involved in interpretation of non-linguistic acts
(such as kicks under the table or taps on the shoulder).
A third claim, closely related to the second one, concerns the distinc-
tion between two kinds of pragmatic processes. Recanati (2010b, p. 1-26),
a notable critic of Stanley’s approach, describes indexicalism, and similar
frameworks, in terms of linguistic constraints on context dependence:
On the currently dominant picture, pragmatics comes into
play in the determination of truth-conditional content but
does so only when the semantic rules of the language prescribes
it. […] Semantics marks the places where pragmatics is to in-
tervene, it sets up ‘slots’ that pragmatics is to fill. […] So prag-
matics comes into play, but it does so under the guidance of
the linguistic material. (Recanati, 2010b, p. 4)
Recanati contrasts this outlook with ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’, to be
introduced below. A pivotal difference between the frameworks is, accord-
ing to Recanati, that the latter allows for ‘free pragmatic effects’ or ‘mod-
ulation’, i.e. optional pragmatic processes not initiated by the linguistic
material but fully dependent on pragmatic factors, in addition to processes
dependent on linguistic expressions and their meaning.
But in what follows it will emerge that there is a possible version of in-
dexicalism, which denies that there is a fundamental difference between the
processes involved in uptakes of speech acts and the ones involved in inter-
pretations of non-linguistic acts, and which, furthermore, accommodates
the notion of modulation. A philosophical consequence of this disserta-
tion is, as the reader will see, that it is perfectly legitimate, coherent and
reasonable to adopt the framework of indexicalism, in the sense that syn-
tactic and semantic formalizations of context dependence postulate covert
variables in logical form, while, at the same time, accept that some prag-
matic processes are are optional. In fact, this will become clear when earlier
10
empirical phenomena and theoretical background
indexicalist formalizations are considered, or revised in order to be more
empirically adequate (see Section 1.3 below, and Chapter 4.1).
1.3 Truth-conditional pragmatics
Contextualists revise Grice’s dichotomy between conventional, linguistic
meaning, on the one hand, and pragmatic meaning in the form of con-
versational implicatures, on the other. Carston & Hall (2012), Recanati
(2004), and Sperber & Wilson (1995, 2012) argue that the precise distinc-
tions in Grice’s well-known proposal cannot be upheld, but let the general
contours of it remain unchallenged.
In contrast to the dichotomy of Grice (and Stanley), contextualism
claims that pragmatic competences related to cooperation, joint action or
general reasoning about events play a crucial role in settling ‘what is said’ (or
‘what is intuitively said’). Therefore, contextualists hold that the interpreta-
tive processes involved in assigning context-dependent truth conditions to
assertions are closely related to or intertwined with the processes involved in
interpreting non-linguistic acts, or cases like (8) where transfer is involved
(see Section 1.2.1 and example (13) above).
There are several different versions of contextualism in the literature. In
this thesis, I focus on truth-conditional pragmatics, which implements con-
text dependence by introducing novel semantic notions pertaining to the
interpretation of expressions.
A main theoretical difference between indexicalism and truth-
conditional pragmatics, as we will develop the frameworks here, is that
whereas the former postulates variables in logical form, and thus assumes
a more complex syntax, the latter postulates a more complex interpreta-
tion process, and, to some extent, a more complex semantics. According
to the explications of ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ and ‘indexicalism’ put
forward in this dissertation, expressions in the relevant fragments of English
have logical forms, which are translated into a type-theoretic language (the
simply typed lambda calculus), which, in turn, has a precisemodel-theoretic
semantics. The intuitive theoretical difference can thereby be made more
explicit: indexicalism postulates phonologically covert variables in the frag-
ment of English, whereas truth-conditional pragmatics accounts for context
dependence by variables or other terms in the type-theoretic language. The
11
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three levels of relevance for our discussion are, consequently, the following
ones:
• Logical form
• Type-theoretic translation
• Truth conditions of type-theoretic translation
The logical form displays the syntax relevant for semantic interpretation.
The role of the type-theoretic translation is to make the truth conditions
of the logical form perspicuous. The type-theoretic translation is, accord-
ingly, not a further level of logical or conceptual form; it does not belong to
the language under discussion (English). Turning back to the main focus
of our inquiry, on our construal, the framework of indexicalism develops
accounts with more complex logical forms, whereas truth-conditional prag-
matics is more concerned with the type-theoretic translations, whichmeans,
essentially, that they postulate a more complex interpretation process and a
simpler syntactic structure. As Montague (1974a,b) emphasized, the inter-
mediate language could, in principle, be dispensed with, and interpretations
could be provided directly to logical forms.13
Now consider the noun phrase [NP every bar], as it appears in (the syn-
tax of ) (1), according to truth-conditional pragmatics. In contrast to the
indexicalist account, there is no context variable in the noun phrase of (1)
(cf. page 6). But in translating this phrase into the simply typed lambda
calculus, and thereby spelling out explicitly precisely what it means, the
truth-conditional pragmatist ends up with a translation containing the fol-
lowing clause:
(14) 𝑂𝑁 (bar)(𝑥)
Truth-conditional pragmatics, on my construal of the position, assumes
that the modulation variable 𝑂𝑁 takes bar as argument, thus forming an
expression 𝑂𝑁 (bar), which has a modulated meaning in some contexts.
Among other possible modulated meanings, there are contexts in which
𝑂𝑁 (bar) denotes the property of being a bar in Ireland, and contexts where
13But note that whether you translate into an intermediate language or provide interpreta-
tions directly to the fragment is inessential to my purposes.
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it denotes the property of being a bar that the speaker will encounter on his
way to Ireland (see Chapter 2).14
Earlier accounts of truth-conditional pragmatics have been formulated
differently.15 Recanati (2004, 2010b) introduces, elaborates and argues for
truth-conditional pragmatics using an informal and intuitive vocabulary,
whereas Pagin & Pelletier (2007) provide a more formal characterisation of
the theoretical position. A difference betweenmy proposal and theirs is that
expressions of the fragment are not translated into a formal language before
interpretation. Another difference concerns the level of specificity. The aim
of Pagin & Pelletier (2007) is to illustrate the possibility and general archi-
tecture of a formal semantics implementing truth-conditional pragmatics,
focusing on one linguistic example. In contrast, my ambition is to set up a
fully explicit formal semantics, where truth-conditional pragmatics is one
variant, and to account for a larger amount of examples than has been done
before.
In the case of (3), truth-conditional pragmatics does not assume that
there is a variable over instruments in logical form (cf. page 6). The syn-
tax is assumed to be simpler and not, as it were, ‘forcing’ us to a context-
dependent interpretation. In contrast, the phrase [V open] is translated into
the following expression:
(15) 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 (𝑥)(open)
The term 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 , denoting a function of a suitable type, takes the variable 𝑥,
which denotes an individual, as argument. The result is a function, which
applied to the denotation of the term open yields the intuitive meaning
‘open with 𝑥’ (see Chapter 2.7). 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 denotes a so-called ‘variadic func-
tion’, i.e. a function whose role is to decrease or increase the number of
thematic roles associated with verbs and their meaning.
14The subscript𝑁 indicates that this specific modulation variable is associated with nouns
and their denotations.
15Pagin& Pelletier (2007) do not use the term ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ of their frame-
work but ‘moderate contextualism’. Recanati (2010b) uses it, however. Essentially, Pa-
gin & Pelletier (2007) and Recanati (2010b) argue for the same semantic machinery;
the difference is terminological rather than substantive.
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1.3.1 Saturation and modulation
In the illustration of truth-conditional pragmatics above, I focused on a
kind of context dependence labelled ‘modulation’. But there is an impor-
tant distinction in the truth-conditional pragmatic literature between two
kinds of context dependence: modulation and saturation.
Themain difference between these notions is that saturation ismandatory
whereas modulation is optional (Recanati 2004, p. 23-27, Recanati 2010b,
p. 4, and p. 42-43). These characteristics should be understood in the
following sense: saturation is needed in order for a sentence containing
some context-dependent expression to express a proposition (to have truth
conditions) in a context of utterance, whereas modulation could, but does
not have to, play a role in determining the intuitive truth conditions of a
sentence that contains expressions that can be modulated.
Consider the difference between (16) and the sentence in (3), repeated
as (17) below:
(16) She is smaller than John’s sister.
(17) Mary took out the key and opened the door.
If the pronoun ‘she’ and the relevant relation between John and the sister are
not assigned contextual meanings, the sentence in (16) does not have truth
conditions. In contrast, the intuitive meaning of (17), that Mary took out
the key and opened the door with the key, is not mandatory: it is possible
to assign more literal truth conditions to the sentence, with no reference to
the key (Recanati, 2004, p. 23-27).
Another way of illustrating this difference is to say that saturation is lin-
guistically driven, in the sense that it is initiated by (audible and phonologi-
cally overt) expressions and their meaning, whereas modulation is a free and
pragmatic process, which is not initiated, driven or constrained by linguistic
items in that way (therefore, the expression ‘free pragmatic effects on truth
conditions’ is sometimes used instead of ‘modulation’, in the literature).
I have often described saturation as a ‘bottom-up’ process in
the sense that it is signal-driven, not context-driven. A ‘top-
down’ or context-driven process is a pragmatic process which
is not triggered by an expression in the sentence but takes place
14
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for purely pragmatic reasons – in order to make sense of what
the speaker is saying. Such processes I also refer to as ‘free’
pragmatic processes – free because they are not mandated by
the linguistic material but respond to wholly pragmatic con-
siderations […] [W]e interpret an expression non-literally in
order to make sense of the speech act, not because this is dic-
tated by the linguistic materials in virtue of the rules of the
language. (Recanati, 2010b, p. 4)
From a more formal point of view, the distinction between saturation and
modulation can be described as follows, by the truth-conditional pragma-
tist. In the case of modulation, modulation variables or variadic functions
appear in the translation (cf. page 11 and Chapter 2). These allow for,
but do not necessitate contextual adjustments or contextual influences on
meaning.
In the case of saturation, we have indexical expressions, whose denota-
tions vary with, or are partly determined by, context. As an example of
the latter, suppose that the English expression ‘I’ is translated to 𝐶𝑠𝑝 , a
shorthand for ‘the speaker of the context’. Suppose furthermore that the
interpretation function 𝐹0 (for the formal, type-theoretic language) takes as
arguments expressions of the formal language, thus yielding functions from
contexts to denotations. We can then let the denotation 𝐹0(𝐶𝑠𝑝)(𝑐) differ
depending on 𝑐 : it is always the speaker in context 𝑐 .
Construed as above, modulation is optional whereas saturation is not.
This is the case, since the modulation variables can be assigned a denota-
tion with no impact on the denotation of the expression as a whole. A
modulation variable, for instance 𝑂𝑁 , can be assigned an identity function
which returns the denotation of its argument. If that is the case, 𝑂𝑁 (bar)
will have the same denotation as bar. The same manoeuvre is not allowed
in the case of saturation. ‘I’ always picks out the speaker of the context (cf.
Recanati 2010b, p. 43-46).
1.4 The present perfect
In contrast to cases of context dependence that are instances of modula-
tion, the present perfect construction, ‘has won’, in (9) is not optionally
15
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context-dependent but has a mandatory temporal anchoring in contexts,
or so it is argued in Chapter 3. Combining and modifying the core ideas
about tense in the classics (Reichenbach, 1947) and (Jespersen, 1924) into a
novel approach to the present perfect, and adapting them to the framework
developed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 offers the following translation of (9):
(18) ∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(i, 𝑒) ∧win(𝑒) ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(a, 𝑒) ∧ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺
𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
In the translation, i denotes IFK Norrköping and a denotes Allsvenskan
(the Swedish premier league). Furthermore, a contextually salient result
event, denoted by the indexical 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 , overlaps with the speech event, de-
noted by the indexical 𝐶𝑠𝑒 , which is located posterior to the event the sen-
tence concerns (in the case of 9, the event of winning the Swedish premier
league: win(𝑒)). This proposal for present perfect constructions is available
for both indexicalists and contextualists (cf. Chapter 3).
The indexical 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 , denoting a contextually salient event, plays a central
role in accounting for the context dependence of (9). It is easy to imagine
that the event or state16 of being a winner is contextually salient, when (9) is
uttered. This accounts for the reading that IFK Norrköping is the winner of
the 2017 competition. However, one could also be in the state of previously
having been a participant in an event or state. On one possible reading of
(9), the contextually salient event/state is that IFK Norrköping plays the
role of agent in a winning event, located before the speech event, where the
Swedish premier league is the theme. This accounts for the reading made
true by the fact that they won in 2015.
Regarding the sentence in (10), and its stipulated context (see page 3), the
time restriction is provided by the same semantic machinery as in (18). In
the translation above, the conjunct 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒) occurs. Its contribution
can be paraphrased as follows: the relation of result holds between the event
𝑒 and a contextually salient event. Now in the case at hand, the contextually
salient event is that the speaker is full or satisfied. This can only be a result
of events closely related in time (cf. Chapter 3.6.3), which explains the
intuitive restriction.
The other dimension of context dependence of (10), that the speaker has
16There is no distinction between events and states in the formal accounts (cf. 3.4.2).
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eaten dinner, can be accounted for by indexicalism and contextualism in
two separate ways. The indexicalist account provided in Chapter 3.6.1 lets
a phonologically covert variable 𝑃1 appear in the logical form of (10). For
ease of exposition, only the verb phrase is illustrated here:
VP
has eaten 𝑃1
In the translation, the phonologically covert variable provides a free vari-
able 𝑥 over contextually salient entities. The variable acts as argument in
the conjunct 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥), which is available in the translation of (10) and
accounts for the intuitive truth-condition that the speaker has some specific
meal in mind when uttering (10).
The contextualist account of this dimension of the context dependence
of (10) lets the logical form be without covert variables. Instead, a so-called
‘variadic function’ that adds the thematic role of theme, and, as it were, fills
it with a free variable, is appealed to.17
(19) 𝑇 ℎ𝑚(𝑥)(has eaten𝑡 𝑟 .)
The term denoting a variadic function, 𝑇 ℎ𝑚, takes a free variable 𝑥 rang-
ing over entities as argument, and the expression thereby formed takes
the translation of ‘has eaten’, resulting in a translation where the conjunct
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥) is present (cf. 3.6.2).
1.5 Alternatives
One of the central claims of the dissertation is that both indexicalism and
truth-conditional pragmatics can account for the semantically relevant in-
tuitions associated with utterances of (1)-(11) above. It is a further ques-
tion whether other accounts also provide explanations. My main claim is,
accordingly, not dependent on the viability and fruitfulness of the alter-
natives below. However, the basic techniques and results presented and
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 seem to be applicable to central aspects
17Variadic functions can be seen as a species of, or a special case of, modulation. The main
difference from modulation variables is that variadic functions make a more specific
semantic contribution (cf. Chapters 2.7.3 and s 3.6.2).
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of the alternatives as well, or so I will suggest in the closing discussion
in Chapter 4. Moreover, in order to understand indexicalism and truth-
conditional pragmatics, it is instructive to compare the positions to other
accounts. Three accounts of context dependence differing from indexical-
ism and truth-conditional pragmatics – relevance theory, radical contextu-
alism and semantic minimalism – are therefore briefly reviewed below.
1.5.1 Relevance theory
Truth-conditional pragmatics is one variant of contextualism, relevance the-
ory (Carston&Hall, 2012; Sperber &Wilson, 1995, 2012) is another. The
aspect of relevance theory that we focus on here is the account of intuitive
truth conditions of utterances.
On the relevance-theoretic approach there is, in addition to a logical form
and a surface structure (or a similar distinction) a further kind of represen-
tation: a ‘propositional form’ or ‘conceptual representation’, which varies
contextually (Sperber & Wilson, 2012, p. 10). Recanati (2010b, p. 127-
141), who argues for a truth-conditional pragmatic variant of contextualism
and not for relevance theory, but nevertheless discusses and elaborates the
relevance-theoretic proposal, calls the relevance-theoretic conceptual repre-
sentation lf*. I will follow that terminology here.
To illustrate the idea, consider (1) above. On the relevance-theoretic ac-
count of Sperber&Wilson (2012, p. 8-10), the logical form of this sentence
does not contain any variables taking contextual values that restrict the set
of bars referred to. But in the lf*s of the same sentence, in a context, there
could be a restriction. On one way of understanding the proposal, the lf*
of (1) could contain the expression ‘in Ireland’. On this way of fleshing out
the proposal, lf*s vary contextually: in one context the phrase ‘every bar’ is
associated with the lf* ‘every bar in Ireland’, or perhaps ‘every bar on our
way to Ireland’, in other contexts the same phrase could be associated with
the lf* ‘every bar in Sweden’, ‘every bar on this street’, etc. Importantly,
a truth-conditional semantics then assigns denotations to lf*s, and not to
logical forms (Sperber & Wilson, 2012, p. 10).
According to relevance theory, logical forms are developed into lf*s, in
contexts, by operations that follow pragmatic principles of relevance. Their
‘Cognitive Principle of Relevance’ (p. 103) is formulated as follows:
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• Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of rele-
vance.
The notion of ‘relevance’ is further elaborated in terms of two factors (p.
102):
• The greater the cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the
greater its relevance.
• The smaller the processing effort required to achieve these effects, the
greater the relevance.
The notion of cognitive effect is, in turn, spelled out as follows: an answer
to a question, the raising of a doubt, a confirmation or refutation of a hy-
pothesis, or a suggestion of a course of action are all (examples of ) cognitive
effects. Processing effort concerns the workings of memory, inference and
perception. Given two pragmatic operations that satisfy the condition on
cognitive effects equally well, the hearer chooses the one that requires least
strains on the psychological operations of memory, inference and percep-
tion.
To illustrate, take example (1) again. Suppose that the context is one
where the speaker addresses a potential fellow traveller. An operation that
follows the cognitive principle of relevance takes the phrase ‘every bar’ in
logical form and develops it into the lf*-expresson ‘every bar on our way
to Ireland’. The operation yields this result, since it suggests a course of
action to the hearer. The alternative development ‘every bar in Ireland’, or
‘every bar in Sweden’, would not suggest a course of action, at least not
without drawing heavily on inference and memory, and is therefore never
considered by the hearer, in that context.
1.5.2 Radical contextualism
According to Recanati (2010b, p. 17), radical contextualism is the view
that the communicated statement of an assertive speech act is the result
of a weak sentence meaning plus pragmatic factors. Radical contextualism
holds, furthermore, that most expressions have multiple related but distinct
meanings that rapidly change and get modified. On Recanati’s explication
of the term, a ‘radical contextualist’ holds that lexical expressions in natural
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language are not associated with senses (Fregean Sinn) and hence do not
have lexical denotations (or Bedeutung). In the context of a conversation or
a text, expressions acquire determinate senses and denotations, or at least
senses and denotations that are determinate enough for the purposes of the
discourse.
Ludlow (2014) develops and defends a variant of radical contextualism.
This variant explores the idea that lexicons are dynamic.18 The notion of a
dynamic lexicon is spelled out by Ludlow in terms of the notions of seman-
tic underdetermination and micro-languages. A meaning𝑚 is ‘underdeter-
mined’ with respect to an object 𝑜 , if there is nothing in our broad under-
standing of the meaning of 𝑚 that settles whether 𝑜 falls under 𝑚 or not
(i.e. if 𝑜 is a part of 𝑚’s extension). However, in communication, mean-
ings are sharpened and the underdetermination is thereby decreased. By
sharpening meanings, and by modulating (i.e. changing meanings), speak-
ers interactively construct micro-languages where expressions have (more or
less) determined meanings. Standard semantic theories that adhere to the
principle of bivalence and are formulated in terms of truth conditions could
thereby be developed, Ludlow claims, but, importantly, the bearers of truth,
falsity and truth conditions will be utterances in local micro-languages, dy-
namically built on the fly, and not e.g. sentences taken in context (Ludlow,
2014, p. 1-7, 72-89, 112-113).19
In Chapter 2.6, I will show that meaning litigations, where interlocu-
tors discuss what the meaning of some term should be, exemplified in
(11) above, can be straightforwardly explained by indexicalism and truth-
conditional pragmatics. In Chapter 2.5 I will show that indexicalism and
truth-conditional pragmatics can account for the semantic context depen-
dence of colour adjectives, exemplified by (2) above. These linguistic phe-
nomena are often discussed by proponents of radical contextualism. I will
conclude that one does not have to adopt radical contextualism in order
to explain these phenomena: indexicalism or truth-conditional pragmatics
are theoretical options as well.
18Ludlow labels his account ‘the dynamic lexicon’. The semantics he puts forward is, how-
ever, not ‘dynamic’ in the sense of ‘dynamic semantics’ associated with e.g. Kamp et al.
(2011).
19Other variants of radical contextualism are found in Davidson (1986/2005) and Travis
(2008).
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1.5.3 Semantic minimalism
Semantic minimalism, an approach pursued by Borg (2004, 2012, 2017),
Cappelen & Lepore (2005) and Lepore & Sennet (2010), is, in a sense, a
view opposite to radical contextualism. The central tenet is that, apart from
a short list of expressions whose semantic contents (or contribution to truth
conditions) vary with context, like ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘yesterday’,
‘he’, ‘she’, semantic contents of expressions do not vary contextually. In-
tuitive truth conditions that differ from the compositionally yielded truth
conditions of sentences, given a conception of syntactic structure where the
logical form (the input to semantics) is as simple as possible, are not relevant
to semantics, on this view. Onlyminimal propositions (or truth conditions),
i.e. the truth conditions of sentences, given the simplest possible view of
logical form, matter for semantics.
Applying the account to the examples of our interest, the sentence in
(2) on page 1 above is true if and only if the leaf is green, where ‘green’ is
assumed to pick out a determinate property. The contribution of the noun
phrase in (1), ‘every bar’, is not adjusted by domain restriction, but ranges
over every bar in the universe of discourse (e.g. the bars in Ireland). The
implicit instrument in (3) is not truth-conditionally relevant. Furthermore,
the metonymy in (6) does not bear on the truth conditions of the sentence:
it is trivially false.
Some minimalists, notably Borg (2017), distinguish between literal and
non-literal speech acts, in order to account for the intuitions associated
with e.g. (3), (6) and (8). According to this idea, intuitive truth conditions
(or propositions), which differ from minimal ones, can be associated with
non-literal speech acts. When a non-literal speech act is performed, the
intuitive truth conditions are expressed, in addition to the minimal truth
conditions. The minimal truth conditions of a sentence (in context) are al-
ways expressed. To illustrate, suppose that a speaker utters (8) in a context 𝑐 .
Theminimal truth conditions (theminimal proposition) that a contextually
salient ham sandwich left without paying are then expressed. But in virtue
of the speech act being non-literal, a related proposition is also expressed,
namely the proposition that the orderer of the ham sandwich left without
paying. This proposal could be contrasted to truth-conditional pragmatics,
where a sentence in context conveys a single content/has a specific set of
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(possibly modulated) truth conditions.20
1.6 Intuitive truth conditions and implicatures
Our inquiry primarily concerns examples (1)-(11) and their associated in-
tuitive truth conditions. The attribute ‘intuitive’ and cognates are discussed
below, in Section 1.7.1. But first, our approach will be very briefly com-
pared to that of Grice (1975), where ‘what is said’ is distinguished from
various forms of implicatures.
A starting point, and an assumption shared by indexicalists and contextu-
alists, which I have no reason to question, is that something like Grice’s dis-
tinction between the notion of what is said and implicatures of various sorts,
as well as his famous cooperative principle, are central, although not ex-
haustive, concepts in frameworks of communication. The picture of Grice
is, however, incomplete, in many respects. One problem, pointed out in
the literature by e.g. Recanati (2004, p 1-37), is that, if we followed Grice
dogmatically, our examples and similar ones would be given cognitively
or psychologically implausible treatments.21 For instance, consider (6). It
seems implausible that the IT-technician first assumes that Pia’s question
concerns whether he is a computer system, and, equally implausible, that
Pia, in trying to grasp the IT-technician’s answer, first considers the absurd
information that the IT-technician predicates this property of himself, be-
fore the intuitive, natural, immediatemeaning, that the question and the an-
swer concern the property of being an IT-technican working with Dafgu, is
entertained by the interlocutors. Given this problem with applying Grice’s
framework dogmatically, one may wish to revise and develop some aspects
of the proposal, which is, furthermore, presented in a very informal style,
and in a somewhat different theoretical context, prior to the development
of the field of formal semantics, as we know the enterprise today.
The notion of ‘intuitive truth condition’ is meant to avoid this problem
of assigning too literal or minimal truth conditions. Recanati (2004, p. 14)
puts forward the principle that if a speaker understands a (declarative) utter-
20Other minimalists, e.g. Cappelen & Lepore (2005) are skeptical towards systematic ac-
counts of modulation and take a more pessimistic stance towards theories about non-
literal truth conditions.
21Cf. (Bach, 1994, p. 143-144).
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ance, she intuitively knows “which state of affairs would possibly constitute
a truth-maker for that utterance, i.e. knows in what sort of circumstance
it would be true”. If we start from this assumption, the contrast between
‘what is said’, understood as the intuitive truth condition of an utterance in
a context, can still be contrasted with e.g. conversational or conventional
implicatures, along the lines suggested by Grice. Moreover, the cooperative
principle (or some development of it) can still play a role in accounts of pro-
cesses of grasping propositions intended to be conveyed by utterances and
processes of working out associated implicatures.
1.7 Purpose and method
In this dissertation, the hypothesis that indexicalism and truth-conditional
pragmatics are empirically equivalent is explored. I will argue for the cor-
rectness of this hypothesis by showing that, for the main kinds of sen-
tences discussed in the literature, and intuitions about their contextual truth
conditions, there are formally precise versions of indexicalism and truth-
conditional pragmatics, which account, in a satisfactory way, for the truth-
conditional intuitions associated with the sentences. A related claim is
that indexicalism, as it is developed in the subsequent chapters, and truth-
conditional pragmatics are viable and fruitful research programmes, which
explain a vast range of context-dependent phenomena by the postulation
of a few simple semantic mechanisms.
1.7.1 Intuitions
What kind of phenomena or data should we account for? In the debate on
context dependence relevant to us, it is commonly assumed that intuitions
are evidentially important. Stanley (2005, p. 6) compares native speakers’
intuitions about grammaticality in their first language to intuitions about
the truth and falsity of sentences in their mother tongue, relative to situa-
tions. Just as the syntactician develops theoretical accounts of syntax and
grammar using the intuitions of speakers as evidential basis, philosophers of
language and semanticists can use semantically relevant intuitions in their
accounts. Recanati (2004, p. 14) also discusses the relevance of intuitions
for accounts of context dependence. As was mentioned above in Section
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1.6, he assumes that a speaker who understands an utterance, intuitively
knows when it would be true. In this dissertation, I accept these method-
ological choices. A central aim is to account for the truth-conditionally
relevant intuitions associated with (1)-(11), i.e. to provide a formal seman-
tics consistent with native speakers’ intuitions about the situations in which
utterances of the sentences (1)-(11) would be true.
But what are ‘intuitions’? For Chomsky, they are judgments made after
reflection. Just as Socrates’s discussion partner Meno is guided and ques-
tioned by the philosopher in his claims about the common denominator of
all virtues, the language theorist may have to add contextual information
in order to guide the informant’s judgments (Chomsky, 1965, p. 21).
[I]t may be necessary to guide and draw out the speaker’s in-
tuition in perhaps fairly subtle ways before we can determine
what is the actual character of his knowledge of his language
or of anything else. (Chomsky, 1965, p. 24)
ForMaynes &Gross (2013), linguistic ‘intuition’ is a kind of judgment that
differs from other judgments in the following way: one simply finds oneself
with the judgment, after “attending to the matter” (Maynes & Gross, 2013,
p. 716):
It can take some time and reflection for someone to get into or
imaginatively construct conditions that enable a particular in-
tuitive judgment – for example, to notice an ambiguity, to hit
upon a scenario in which one would use a certain sentence,
or to concoct a counter-example to a would-be entailment
claim.…[S]uch judgments are not based on conscious reason-
ing, past or present, ones own or another’s – in particular, not
based on conscious reasoning from hypotheses one would like
to support! (Maynes & Gross, 2013, p. 716)
‘Linguistic intuitions’ are, according to the authors above, and to the view
taken in this dissertation, judgments about language, which do not follow
from conscious reasons, but which may involve some cognitive effort in
terms of imagination and similar mechanisms. The linguistic judgments
of interest to us are semantic intuitions: we focus on intuitive judgments
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about what the world is like, when a given utterance, taken in context, is
true.22
Note that the question of what intuitions native speakers have is an em-
pirical one. An empirical investigation of intuitions could use question-
naires with descriptions of situations and questions about the truth of utter-
ances in those situations (or about them). E.g. Hansen & Chemla (2013)
adopt precisely that methodology. However, my aim, in this dissertation,
is not to question or confirm claims about what intuitions native speakers
have. I will assume that there are certain semantically relevant intuitions to
be explained, reported in the literature, and rather focus on the theoretical
side of explanation than the empirical side of data gathering, data analysis
and similar tasks.
1.7.2 Frameworks, formal semantic accounts and empirical
equivalence
A framework, as I will use the notion here, contains all concepts necessary for
formulating and investigating a given set of scientific research questions or
problems.23 We are interested in semantic intuitions pertaining to contex-
tual effects on truth conditions, and will start from the concepts developed
within the philosophical frameworks indexicalism and truth-conditional
pragmatics.
The philosophical frameworks of our interest contain methodological
concepts and principles, research questions, informal contrasts between
central terms (e.g. ‘saturation’ and ‘modulation’), etc. The frameworks
also allow the formulation of formal semantic accounts. A formal semantic
account, according to our use of the notion, contains definitions of syn-
tactic and compositional rules, translations to a formal, type-theoretic lan-
guage, and truth conditions formulated in terms of model-theoretic seman-
tics. In Chapter 2, it is shown that the frameworks of indexicalism and
truth-conditional pragmatics allow the formulation of two different formal
22See (Cappelen, 2012) for a critical discussion of the notion of intuition and its role in
philosophy, and (Boghossian, 2014) for a response to the criticism. It is not my ambi-
tion to defend intuition-based methodology here. It suffices for my purposes that it is
possible to conceptualize the methodology in the debate of our interest as I have done
here, and that this is in accordance with a common view in the relevant literature.
23Cf. (Carnap, 1950).
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semantic accounts, which both yield intuitive truth conditions for the same
sentences of English.
Two frameworks will be said to be empirically equivalent, if they both
account for the same empirical data. The data for our philosophical frame-
works are semantic intuitions, as was mentioned and discussed above (Sec-
tion 1.7.1). But what does it mean that a framework accounts for a given
set of semantic intuitions? This should be read as follows: if native speakers
associate a given sentence with a given set of truth conditions, in some con-
text, the formal semantic account of the framework assigns that set of truth
conditions, or a more formal variant of that set of truth conditions, to that
sentence, in some context. This principle will be elaborated in more detail
in Chapter 2.2.
Empirical equivalence: comparison to earlier proposals
The claim about equivalence can be juxtaposed with earlier prominent
claims about the relation between indexicalism and truth-conditional prag-
matics. Stanley (2007, p. 225-230), a central proponent of indexicalism,
has argued extensively against the empirical adequacy of truth-conditional
pragmatics. According to Stanley, truth-conditional pragmatics predicts
that there are certain readings of sentences, which are in fact unavailable to
native speakers. Consider the following example:
(20) Every Frenchman is seated.
According to the argument, this sentence cannot have the reading that every
Frenchman or Dutchman is seated. But given that modulation can oper-
ate on every constituent, it seems that the truth-conditional pragmaticist is
committed to the flawed prediction that it can have that reading, Stanley
argues. Indexicalism, in contrast, does not have this empirical consequence,
or so Stanley claims. This example, and the discussion about it, will be ad-
dressed again in Chapter 2.3. My point here is not to discuss the example,
but to juxtapose my claim with Stanley’s. There is a clear contrast here:
whereas I say that indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics are em-
pirically equivalent, Stanley holds that truth-conditional pragmatics is less
empirically adequate than indexicalism, since truth-conditional pragmatics
over-generate readings.
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Stanley’s assertion above is explicit about the empirical difference be-
tween the frameworks. Other authors have given more indirect reasons
for assuming that truth-conditional pragmatics is better supported empir-
ically. Kennedy & McNally (2010) is sceptical towards the predictions of
the indexicalist account of colour adjectives put forward by Szabó (2001).
Kennedy and McNally’s proposed account is neither indexicalist nor truth-
conditional pragmaticist, but one could argue that, if the reasoning in
Kennedy&McNally (2010) is correct, indexicalism about colour adjectives
is not a theoretical option, whereas truth-conditional pragmatic accounts
of the same phenomenon are still alternatives (Kennedy and McNally do
not discuss truth-conditional pragmatics).
A similar indirect reason for assuming that there is no equivalence of
the sort I suggest, could be related to the phenomenon of meaning liti-
gation. There is previously no indexicalist or truth-conditional pragmati-
cist account of this phenomenon, as far as I am aware. The only well
known account, in the philosophical debate about context dependence, is
(Ludlow, 2014), where the framework of radical contexualism is applied
to several examples of meaning litigation. But radical contextualism and
truth-conditional pragmatics are often thought of as closely related (Reca-
nati 2010b, p. 17, describes both frameworks as variants of “contextual-
ism”). The close relation between the two could lead one to believe that
truth-conditional pragmatics is better suited than indexicalism for cases of
meaning litigation. In Chapter 2.6, I will argue that this is not the case:
both indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics are suitable for mean-
ing litigation data.
Finally, a prominent statement about the empirical status of the frame-
works is Recanati’s remark that the conflict between Stanley’s indexicalism
and truth-conditional pragmatics is a case of “genuine empirical disagree-
ment” (Recanati, 2010b, p. 14). An important premise for this conclusion
is that indexicalism allows for saturation but not for modulation, whereas
truth-conditional pragmatics allows for both pragmatic processes. There-
fore, indexicalism cannot account for cases of optional context dependence,
Recanati argues. Again, we see that the claim I put forward is strikingly dif-
ferent from the outlook in works central to the debate.
There are, however, earlier remarks in the literature that point in the direc-
27
disarming context dependence
tion I take here. According to Martí (2006), some variables in logical form
are optional, whereas other are mandatory. Saturation depends on manda-
tory variables, whereas modulation depends on optional ones. In (Martí,
2006), the conclusion that (some variant) of indexicalism and Recanati’s
truth-conditional pragmatics are empirically equivalent is not drawn.24 But
in a discussion of the proposal of optional covert variables, Recanati (2010b,
p. 138-141) tentatively suggests that an indexicalist framework allowing for
a distinction between optional covert variables and mandatory covert vari-
ables might have the resources for formulating the difference between sat-
uration and modulation: “the resulting view sounds diametrically opposed
to TCP, but appearances may be deceptive” (p. 141). However, there are
differences between this comment and my aim. In the formal semantic ac-
count put forward on the indexicalists’ behalf in this dissertation, the notion
of optional variables is not the central suggestion: the indexicalist semantic
accounts I propose do not develop that idea.25 Furthermore, the formal-
izations in the following chapters attempt to show rigorously that there is,
indeed, an empirical equivalence, at least concerning the main examples dis-
cussed in the debate. A systematic comparison of the frameworks, on the
basis of detailed syntactic and semantic accounts, has not been presented
previously, as far as I am aware, even if the possibility has been mentioned
or noted.
A key premise in my argument that the two frameworks are empirically
equivalent is that indexicalists and truth-conditional pragmaticists can ac-
commodate the distinction between saturation and modulation, in struc-
turally similar and parallel ways (cf. Section 1.2.1 and Chapter 2). This is
a philosophical consequence of the syntactic and semantic formalizations
that are provided in the following chapter.26
24In fact, it is argued that Recanati’s framework makes empirically inadequate predictions.
See Chapter 2.4.3.
25The worry raised by Carston & Hall (2017), that optional covert variables lead to an un-
necessarily complex syntax, because of a proliferation of structural ambiguity, is thereby
avoided.
26In a related discussion about predicates of personal taste, Stojanovic (2007) argues that
contextualism and relativism are notational variants from a semantic perspective.
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1.7.3 Formalization: purpose and method
The claim about equivalence is one of the main points of this dissertation.
But the purpose is also to present a formal (compositional) semantics, with
detailed syntactic and semantic accounts of various phenomena discussed
in the debate about context dependence. In the literature, one is often left
with a translation of a natural language expression without specifications of
what syntactic categories are assumed or, perhaps more importantly, how
the composition of themeaning of the parts yields themeaning of the whole
expression. I will sharpen the discussion about contextual effects on truth
conditions by setting up formal semantic accounts of the relevant English
sentences. This aim is as important as the equivalence claim.
The method of formalization puts constraints on philosophical frame-
works and, for that reason, the list of possible, and tenable, answers is re-
duced. Hopefully, this results in philosophical progress.
1.7.4 Plan
The plan for the elaboration of these claims is as follows. In Chapter 2, in-
dexicalist and truth-conditional pragmaticist formal semantic accounts of
the main kinds of examples discussed in the debate are presented. In Chap-
ter 3, context-dependent dimensions of the present perfect are examined.
In contrast to the linguistic phenomena considered in Chapter 2, the dis-
cussion in 3 concerns examples and problems not previously discussed in
relation to indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics. Chapter 4 con-
tains a discussion of the philosophical consequences of the results, and an
outlook on future research.
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2 Indexicalism and Truth-Conditional
Pragmatics
In this chapter, I will make plausible the claim that truth-conditional prag-
matics and indexicalism are empirically equivalent. More specifically, I will
show that both frameworks allow for the formulation of formal semantic ac-
counts that model the relevant linguistic phenomena. The discussion below
will be centered around quantifier domain restrictions, semantic transfer,
binding, colour adjectives, meaning litigation and enrichments of thematic
roles. I have chosen to focus on these phenomena, since they have been
used (or could be used) to argue against truth-conditional pragmatics and
for indexicalism or the other way around.
The notions of indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics could be
made precise in different ways. In the literature, event semantic notions are
often used to formulate the differences. This route is taken in Borg (2012);
Recanati (2010b); Stanley (2007) and Zeman (2011a). I will continue in
that direction here. The indexicalist and the truth-conditional pragmaticist
formal semantic accounts will both be of the event semantic kind.
The disposition of this chapter is as follows. First, I set up basic and
shared aspects of the indexicalist and the truth-conditional pragmaticist
formal accounts (2.1). Second, I develop indexicalist and truth-conditional
pragmaticist analyses of quantifier domain restrictions (2.2), semantic trans-
fer (2.3), binding (Section 2.4), colour adjectives (Section 2.5), meaning
litigation (2.6), and enrichments of thematic roles (2.7) within extensions
of the basic formal account.
2.1 Syntax and semantics
2.1.1 Basic formal account
The basic formal account contains a lexicon, a syntax that specifies the well-
formed expressions of a fragment of the language L, and translations from
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the well-formed expressions of L into expressions in a simply typed formal
language, which in turn are given model-theoretic interpretations. This
format is well-known. It is found in e.g. Montague (1974a), Lewis (1970)
and Partee (1975).1
Lexicon and syntax are defined as follows. The set 𝐶𝑎𝑡 contains sets
of phrases and sets of basic (lexical) expressions. Accordingly, 𝐶𝑎𝑡 has as
elements a set of determiners (𝐵𝐷 ), a set of nouns (𝐵𝑁 ) etc. There is also a
set of noun phrases (𝑃𝑁𝑃 ), a set of intransitive verb phrases (𝑃𝐼 𝑉 ) etc. The
following expressions are elements in sets of basic expressions:
Lexicon
1. every, the ∈ 𝐵𝐷
2. dog, leaf, ham sandwich, planet, door ∈ 𝐵𝑁
3. runs, laughs, cries ∈ 𝐵𝐼 𝑉
The syntactic structures proposed in this chapter are intended to be logi-
cal forms, i.e. syntactic representations interpreted by the semantics. A
further elaboration of the syntax could develop the ideas in the direction
of Chomsky (2000), where ‘LF’ (for ‘Logical Form’) is contrasted to ‘PF’
(for ‘Phonetic Form’) (cf. Graf 2013).2 Other syntactic formats could be
used as well. The account of Montague (1974a), where derivation history
rather than phrase structure is displayed3, could, in principle, be used in
a formal implementation of indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmat-
ics. The difference between indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics
would, however, not be clearer with a more complex syntax. Therefore, a
simple phrase structure syntax, along the lines sketched below, is sufficient
for our purposes.4
1Comprehensive introductions to model-theoretic formal semantics are found in the text-
books of Dowty et al. (1981), Gamut (1991) andChierchia&McConnell-Ginet (2000).
More recent, and somewhat shorter, introductions are found in Sternefeld & Zimmer-
man (2013) and Winter (2016).
2It would also be possible to develop it in accordance with Chomsky (1976), where there
is a distinction between the logical form of a sentence, LF, and its surface structure, SS
(cf. May 1985 and Neale 1994).
3Cf. (Jacobson, 2012).
4I will only postulate syntactic structure that is semantically motivated. The strategy could
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The syntactic and lexical labels I use are closely related to the terminology
ofTheCambridge Grammar of the English Language (Huddleston& Pullum,
2002), even though I will have to deviate from their terminology occasion-
ally. But Huddleston & Pullum’s format is not a generative grammar: I use
their terminology but not their theory.
The syntax below specifies the members of various sets of phrases. The
labels are, hopefully, transparent to the reader. But note that ‘M.Clause’
is an abbreviation for ‘Main Clause’ (I will use ‘S.Clause’ for subordinated
clauses later on).
Syntax
Let 𝛼 be a (meta-language) variable over basic/lexical expres-
sions and 𝛽 and 𝛾 be (meta-language) variables over phrasal
expressions.
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐷 , [D 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐷 .
2. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑁 , [N 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑁 .
3. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐼 𝑉 , [IV 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐼 𝑉 .
4. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐷 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑁 , then [NP 𝛽𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑃 .
5. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐼 𝑉 , then [VP 𝛽] ∈ 𝑃𝑉 𝑃 .
6. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑃 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑉 𝑃 , then [M.Clause 𝛽  𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 .
Let me now introduce 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 , the language used later on for translations.
Every expression in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 has a type. All types are in a set 𝑌 . The types in
𝑌 are either 𝑒 (entity) or 𝑡 (truth-value), or, for any types 𝑎 and 𝑏 , ⟨𝑎, 𝑏 ⟩
(the type of functions from a type 𝑎 to a type 𝑏 ). For every type, there are
infinitely many variables and infinitely many constants at our disposal.
𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 has denotations with respect to a modelℳ. ℳ is a tuple ⟨𝑀, 𝐹 ⟩,
where 𝑀 is a set of entities and 𝐹 is an interpretation function (from ex-
be perceived as at odds with the syntactic X-bar theory proposed by Chomsky (1970)
and Jackendoff (1977), since I will not use their (allegedly universal) schema for syntactic
structure. Such an effort would give us a more complicated syntactic representation,
where several syntactic operations would be semantically vacuous. That would, again,
be unnecessarily complicated for the claims I argue for in the dissertation.
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pressions to denotations in𝑀 ). The set𝑀𝑎 of possible denotations for an
expression 𝑎 in a domain𝑀 is determined by the type of 𝑎:
Possible denotations:
1. 𝑀𝑒 = 𝑀
2. 𝑀𝑡 = {0, 1}
3. 𝑀⟨𝑎,𝑏 ⟩ = 𝑀
𝑀𝑎
𝑏
We can now specify the set of meaningful expressions of our 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 . Every
expression has a given type, which determines its possible denotations. In
the definitions below, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are arbitrary types, and 𝜒 , 𝜒0 , … are arbitrary
𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 -expressions:
Meaningful expressions of 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
1. Every constant of type 𝑎 is in𝑀𝐸𝑎.
2. Every variable of type 𝑎 is in𝑀𝐸𝑎.
3. If 𝜒 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑏 and 𝑥 is a variable of type 𝑎, 𝜆𝑥.𝜒 ∈
𝑀𝐸⟨𝑎,𝑏 ⟩.
4. If 𝜒 ∈ 𝑀𝐸⟨𝑎,𝑏 ⟩ and 𝜒0 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑎, then 𝜒 (𝜒0) ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑏 .
5. If 𝜒 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑡 and 𝑥 is a variable of any type, then ∀𝑥𝜒
and ∃𝑥𝜒 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑡 .
6. If 𝜒 , 𝜒0 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑡 , then [𝜒 → 𝜒0], ¬𝜒 , [𝜒 ∧ 𝜒0], [𝜒 ∨ 𝜒0]
and [𝜒 ↔ 𝜒0] ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑡 .
Given a model ℳ, a variable assignment assigns to each variable 𝑥𝑎 (of
type 𝑎) an element of𝑀𝑎 (𝑔, 𝑔0 , 𝑔1 are used for variable assignments).
The definition of truth and denotation below assigns inductively, for ev-
ery modelℳ and every assignment 𝑔 in𝑀 , a denotation J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 in𝑀𝑎
to each expression 𝜒 of type 𝑎. In particular, formulas, i.e. expressions of
type 𝑡 , are assigned 1 or 0 (True or False):
Truth and denotation in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
1. If 𝜒 is a constant, then J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 is 𝐹 (𝜒).
2. If 𝜒 is a variable, then J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 is 𝑔(𝜒).
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3. If 𝜒 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑏 and 𝑥 is a variable of type 𝑎, thenJ𝜆𝑥.𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 is that function ℎ with domain𝐷𝑎 such that
whenever 𝑑 is in that domain, ℎ(𝑑) is J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 ′ , where
𝑔 ′ is like the assignment 𝑔 except that 𝑔 ′(𝜒) = 𝑑.
4. If 𝜒 ∈ 𝑀𝐸⟨𝑎,𝑏 ⟩ and 𝜒0 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑎, then J𝜒(𝜒0)Kℳ,𝑔 isJ𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 (J𝜒0Kℳ,𝑔 ).
5. If 𝜒 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑡 and 𝑥 is a variable of any type, thenJ∀𝑥𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 is 1 if and only if for every 𝑔 ′ like 𝑔 except
possibly for the value assigned to 𝑥 by 𝑔 ′, J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 ′ is 1,
and J∃𝑥𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 is 1 iff for some 𝑔 ′ like 𝑔 except possibly
for the value assigned to 𝑥 by 𝑔 ′, J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 ′ is 1.
6. If 𝜒 and 𝜒0 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑡 , then J𝜒 → 𝜒0Kℳ,𝑔 is 1 if and only
if J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 is 0 or J𝜒0Kℳ,𝑔 is 1, J¬𝜒Kℳ,𝑔 is 1 iff J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔
is 0, and similarly for the other connectives.
Let us now turn to the translations and map expressions of the fragment to
𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 in a systematic fashion. We start with the basic (lexical) expressions
and continue with the phrasal ones. From now on, the symbols 𝑥, 𝑥0 , 𝑥1
etc. will be used as variables over entities, and 𝑋, 𝑋0 , 𝑋1 etc. as variables
over sets of entities.
Translations of basic expressions
1. every𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋0 .∀𝑥[𝑋(𝑥) → 𝑋0(𝑥)]
(type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩)5
2. dog𝑡 𝑟 = dog (type 𝑒𝑡 ), ham sandwich =
ham sandwich (𝑒𝑡 ), etc.
3. runs𝑡 𝑟 = run (type 𝑒𝑡 ), laughs𝑡 𝑟 = laugh (𝑒𝑡 ), etc.
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [D 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩)6
2. [N 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type 𝑒𝑡 )
5If a function is of type ⟨𝑒, 𝑡 ⟩, the notation is simplified to 𝑒𝑡 .
6In what follows, types are only presented in connection to phrasal expressions.
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3. [IV 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type 𝑒𝑡 )
4. [NP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩)
5. [VP 𝛽]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (type 𝑒𝑡 )
6. [M. Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑡 )
For example, the following expression is an element of 𝑃𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 and thus
an expression of𝐿, if we identify trees with corresponding strings of labelled
brackets:
M.Clause
NP
D
every
N
dog
VP
IV
runs
In the next tree, translations and type information are added. It iillustrates
how the translation of [D every] is applied to the translation of [N dog],
which yields the translation of [NP[D every][N dog]] etc. As the translation
proceeds up the tree, the formulas are simplified by beta-reduction.7
M.Clause
∀𝑥[dog(𝑥) → run(𝑥)]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋0 .∀𝑥[dog(𝑥) → 𝑋0(𝑥)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
D
every
𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋0 .∀𝑥[𝑋(𝑥) → 𝑋0(𝑥)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩
N
dog
dog
𝑒𝑡
VP
run
𝑒𝑡
IV
runs
run
𝑒𝑡
7Beta-reduction, which is essentially a principle of equivalence, simplifies function-
argument expressions by eliminating lambda operators and replacing variables bound
by lambdas with arguments. See the original formulation of Church (1941), or the
textbooks of Dowty et al. (1981) or Gamut (1991).
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The final translation of our example is, accordingly, ∀𝑥[dog(𝑥) → run(𝑥)].
The truth conditions for universally quantified sentences are found above
in Truth and denotation in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 .
I have now set up a general format for the two formal semantic accounts.
In the next section, events will be introduced, which allows for a revision
of verbal meanings.
2.1.2 Compositional event semantics
The tradition of event semantics began with Davidson’s analysis of action
sentences (Davidson, 1967). Davidson’s key assumption was that logical
forms of action sentences contain event variables bound by existential quan-
tifiers. Various developments of Davidson’s analyses have been proposed.
Neo-Davidsonian frameworks, which relate events to thematic roles like
agent and theme, have been successfully applied to a broad range of lin-
guistic problems, e.g. the semantics of verbal modification (Parsons, 1990;
Landman, 2000). Champollion (2015) combines ideas from the event se-
mantics tradition with ideas in the tradition of compositional semantics
and suggests some innovative ideas about the translation of verbs, the type
system and the phrase structure rules.
The set of types are revised as follows (cf. page 33): we have a set of types
𝑌 such that 𝑒 (entity), 𝑣 (event) and 𝑡 (truth-value) ∈ 𝑌 . And, as before,
for every type 𝑎 and 𝑏 ∈ 𝑌 , there is a function ⟨𝑎, 𝑏 ⟩ ∈ 𝑌 .8 The possible
denotations are also changed, in line with the change of type expressions.
A model ℳ is now a tuple ⟨𝑀,𝐸, 𝐹 ⟩ such that 𝐹 is an interpretation
function and 𝑀 is a set of entities (as before), and 𝐸 is a set of events
(disjoint from𝑀 ) (cf. Champollion 2015, p. 35-44).
The following clause is added to the definition of meaningful expressions
of 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 , in order to allow for translations containing the predicates 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡
and 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒 :
Meaningful expressions in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
• The expressions 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒 and 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 are of type ⟨𝑣 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩.
The symbols 𝑒, 𝑒0 , 𝑒1 etc. will be used as variables over individual events and
𝑓 , 𝑓0 , 𝑓1, 𝑓2 will be event predicate variables.
8As before, if 𝑎 and 𝑏 are atomic, I will write 𝑎𝑏 and not ⟨𝑎𝑏⟩.
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The translation of intransitive verbs is modified as follows..
Translations of basic expressions
1. runs𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[run(𝑒)∧𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)], and similarly for
other intransitive verbs9
The following tree describes, accordingly, an expression of 𝐿, where an
𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 -translation of the whole tree is stated at the top and translations of
each subtree are stated at each node:
M.Clause
∀𝑥[dog(𝑥) → ∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋1.∀𝑥[dog(𝑥) → 𝑋1(𝑥)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
D
every
𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋1.∀𝑥[𝑋(𝑥) → 𝑋1(𝑥)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩ ⟩
N
dog
dog
𝑒𝑡
VP
𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑒𝑡
IV
runs
𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑒𝑡
Comparison with Champollion
My compositional event semantics is inspired by the framework in Cham-
pollion (2015). The complexity of his framework is to a large extent moti-
vated by his analysis of verbs, but I have chosen to translate verbs differently.
A central tenet of Champollion (2015) is that verbs are always translated
into formulas containing existential quantifiers over events. Moreover, the
translations of verbs are of type ⟨𝑣𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩. In other words, verbal meanings are
properties of sets of events (or event quantifiers). One of Champollion’s rea-
sons for this view is that he is committed to a principle called the Scope Do-
9Function terms in the simply typed lambda calculus take one argument. Therefore,
the correct notation of thematic roles is 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒)(𝑥), 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒)(𝑥), etc., and not
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥), 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥), etc. However, informally or for ease of exposition, I oc-
casionally write 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥), 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥), etc.
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main Principle, according to which universal quantifiers always have scope
over event quantifiers (Champollion, 2015, p. 35-45). By letting verbs be
translated to expressions of type ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, containing an existential quantifier
over events, and by postulating that the translations of noun phrases (DPs
in Champollion’s syntactic framework) are of type ⟨⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩, a com-
positional translation/interpretation is achieved where (possible) quantifiers
in the noun phrase translation always take scope over the event quantifier
in the verbal translation.
If one accepted Champollion’s reasoning here, my proposed translation
above could be problematic. The problem is really pressing for transitive
verbs, but a natural extension of my account to transitive verbs would be to
treat the translation of transitive verbs as type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩. The idea would
be that, if𝑄 is a variable of type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, then greet𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[greet(𝑒)∧
[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥) ∧ 𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥0))]].
But is it never plausible to let the existential quantifier over events have
scope over universal quantification? Consider the following sentence:
(21) Kim greeted every party member.
Imagine a situation where Kim is about to deliver a speech on the first of
May in front of a large audience of party members. (21) could truly be used
of that situation, with the intuitive meaning that Kim has the thematic role
of agent and every party member has collectively the role of theme in one
event of greeting. A translation of (a syntactically parsed version of ) (21)
expressing this meaning could be as follows:
(22) ∃𝑒[greet(𝑒) ∧ [𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, k) ∧ ∀𝑥[party-member(𝑥) →
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥)]]]
If this analysis were accepted, we could distinguish between a situation
where Kim greets every party member with one greeting from the stage (as
above) and an alternative situation where Kim greets every party member
individually in a chain of greeting events.
There may be other ways that a proponent of the Scope Domain Princi-
ple, or Champollion’s specific implementation of the principle, would like
to account for the difference between these situations. My point here is not
to show that Champollion’s proposal is untenable. It may well be rewarding
to explore the theoretical and empirical consequences of the Scope Domain
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principle. But one does not have to accept the Scope Domain Principle or
Champollion’s specific proposal. It is not obviously correct for all readings,
and it leads to a complexity of the framework that is unnecessary for our
purposes.
The basic aspects of the indexicalist and the truth-conditional pragmati-
cist formal accounts have now been illustrated. In what follows, I will ex-
tend the approaches to cover quantifier domain restrictions, transfer, bind-
ing, colour adjectives, meaning litigation, and enrichments of thematic
roles. The aim is to extend the basic account just introduced to the men-
tioned linguistic phenomena and to provide one indexicalist and one truth-
conditional pragmaticist extension for each phenomenon, thereby illustrat-
ing important ways in which indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics
are empirically equivalent.
2.1.3 Digression: Static or dynamic semantics?
The intuitive meanings of sentences in contexts can be theoretically mod-
elled statically. This is the approach in the thesis: each sentence is assigned
truth conditions with respect to model and variable assignment (and con-
text; cf. page 135). It is also possible to adopt a dynamic perspective on
sentence meaning, and let the notion of sentence meaning be explicated in
terms of conventional, typical change of information available in discourse.
There are two reasons for the choice of a static semantics. The first reason
is that dynamic semantic notions are rarely used in the literature on indexi-
calism and truth-conditional pragmatics. In the contributions of e.g. Borg,
Martí, Pagin, Recanati, Stanley and Szabó, the proposals are not formulated
dynamically. A choice of Discourse Representation Theory, or some other
dynamic framework, would make the connection to the discussion in the
literature less straightforward.10 The second reason is that frameworks of
the dynamic variety have been developed in order to account for linguistic
10Kamp & Reyle (1993) and Kamp et al. (2011) develop and elaborate the dynamic ac-
count ‘Discourse Representation Theory’ (DRT). In that framework, logical forms of
sentences are translated into Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs), which are, in
turn, given model-theoretic interpretations. DRSs are used to illustrate how the mean-
ing of a sentence may depend on the information provided earlier in discourse. More-
over, DRSs can be changed dynamically as further information is added in discourse,
and thereby illustrate how sentences add to and change the available information.
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phenomena that are difficult to account for statically (e.g. interrogatives,
anaphora and presupposition), or so it has been argued. But since I will
not discuss these linguistic phenomena, but others that are not, as far as I
know, better accounted for dynamically than statically, it would be unnec-
essarily complicated to use a dynamic formalism. This does not entail that
one could not, for programmatic reasons, generality and parsimony, try to
account for the phenomena discussed in the thesis dynamically. However,
that would be motivated by an interest in extending the empirical coverage
of dynamic frameworks, e.g. Discourse Representation Theory, which is
not the ambition here.
2.2 Quantifier domain restrictions
Consider the following example, mentioned as example (1) above but re-
peated below as (23):
(23) Let’s go to Ireland. We’ll stop in every bar and have a drink.
We have not (yet) specified the mechanisms in our semantics that allows
‘every bar’ to range over different domains in different discourses. Moreover,
there are no mechanisms that account for the fact that the interpretation
of ‘every bar’ may change within the boundaries of a discourse: the most
natural reading of (23) is not that the suggestion is to stop at every bar in
Ireland but rather to stop at every encountered bar in Ireland (or on the way
to Ireland).
Other linguistic examples illustrate the same phenomena. Westerståhl
(1985, p. 49) discusses the following one:
(24) The English love to write letters. Most children have several pen
pals in many countries.
Themost natural reading of the second sentence above is that ‘most children’
ranges over English children, but the domain contains other children as well.
And in Stanley & Williamson (1995, p. 294), the phenomena is illustrated
by the example below:
(25) As the ship pulled away from the dock, every man waved to every
woman, every woman waved to every man, and every child waved
to every child.
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One reading of (the last clause of ) (25) could be paraphrased as every child
on the dock waved to every child on the ship.11 These examples warrant a
theoretical distinction between the entities, events (etc.) in the domain, on
the one hand, and the restricted part of the domain that ‘every bar’, ‘most
children’, etc. range over, on the other.
Westerståhl (1985) introduces the notion of context sets, and extends the
fragment, the translations and the semantics of Barwise & Cooper (1981)
accordingly, in order to make the right predictions about quantifier do-
main restrictions. The translational language 𝐿(𝐺𝑄) of Barwise & Cooper
(1981), which we will not be concerned with in any detail here, is extended
by the following operation that forms new determiners:
(RES) 𝐷𝑋𝑀𝐴 𝐵 ↔ 𝐷𝑀𝑋 ∩ 𝐴 𝐵
On the right hand side, we see the determiner symbol 𝐷𝑀 , which denotes
a relation between subsets on the domain𝑀 , and 𝐴 and 𝐵 , which denote
two sets related by (the denotation of ) the determiner. 𝑋 is a set variable
(in context denoting a ‘context set’), whose extension is determined by the
variable assignment. By intersecting 𝑋 and 𝐴, the first argument of the de-
terminer, a contextually determined set is yielded. On the left hand side, we
see that whenever the mentioned facts hold, we could indicate the presence
of a context set by an index on the determiner.
In the literature on indexicalism, Stanley & Szabó have defended the the-
sis that each common noun “co-habits a node with a contextual variable”
(Stanley & Szabó, 2000, p. 251), and this is the view we will develop and
discuss below. In their proposal, a sentence such as every dog runs, is repre-
sented as below:
11In Stanley & Szabó (2000), a variant of this example is discussed:
(25b) Every sailor waved to every sailor.
It is possible to interpret this sentence as every sailor on the ship waved to every
sailor on the shore.
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S
NP
Det
every
N
⟨dog, f(i)⟩
VP
V
runs
The idea is that “f” is a variable over functions from entities to sets of enti-
ties; the value is specified by context. The variable “i” ranges over entities,
so, in a context, “f(i)” will denote a set of entities. The reason why Stanley
and Szabó choose this formulation of quantifier domain restriction is that
there are examples where the interpretation of one quantifier expression is
dependent on the interpretation of another. Consider (26) below (Stanley
& Szabó, 2000, p. 250-251):
(26) In most of John’s classes, he fails exactly three Frenchmen.
The most natural reading of (26) is, informally put, that in most 𝑥 such
that 𝑥 is a class of John’s, John fails exactly three Frenchmen in 𝑥. For
Stanley and Szabó, this means that 𝑥 ranges over classes (in the educational
sense!). But since classes in this sense are not appropriate as domains of
quantification, according to Stanley and Szabó, they postulate functions
from such classes to sets, which are appropriate for that purpose.
It is, however, unclear what it means to “co-habit” a node, and the crucial
role of intersection, stressed in the account of Westerståhl (1985), is not
mentioned at all in Stanley & Szabó (2000). These problems can, however,
be overcome by the indexicalist, and I will demonstrate how below (Section
2.2.1). I will also provide some remarks on (26) later on, in Section 2.2.4.12
12In Peters & Westerståhl (2006, p. 46), the view that determiners in noun phrases are
indexed with context set parameters is attributed to Westerståhl (1985). Peters & West-
erståhl contrast this view with the view of Stanley & Szabó (2000), where the noun of
every noun phrase has a parameter of that sort, as will be discussed below. But this is
misleading, since Westerståhl (1985) defines determiners with context-set parameters in
the translational language 𝐿(𝐺𝑄). In the phrase structure tree of (24), and similar ex-
amples, there is no set variable, according to the account. Westerståhl (1985) is explicit
about this:
[We] must also account for the introduction of set variables which do
not appear in the phrase structure trees[…]. Only the translation of
NPs is affected. Here we may stipulate that, optionally, an NP
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The truth-conditional pragmaticist literature on quantifier domain re-
strictions is rather sparse. Recanati (2004, p. 124-127) discusses the is-
sue in relation to situation-semantic frameworks. He claims that a truth-
conditional pragmaticist approach to quantifier domain restrictions is pos-
sible, even though he does not attempt to show that the indexicalist variant
of quantifier domain restriction is mistaken. Recanati’s 2004 discussion is,
however, quite far from a formal semantic implementation. Furthermore,
the orientation towards situation semantics in that discussion is at odds
with the event semantic accounts I develop here. This does not mean that
situations are uninteresting for the present purposes, on the contrary, but
I have chosen to leave them out of the picture for simplicity. In Section
2.2.2, I will extend our event semantic framework in a truth-conditional
pragmaticist direction, by developing and applying some ideas about com-
positional semantics and truth-conditional pragmatics outlined in Pagin &
Pelletier (2007) and Recanati (2010b) to the phenomenon of quantifier do-
main restriction.
2.2.1 Extension of the formal semantic account (indexicalist variant)
For concreteness, consider the example ‘every dog runs’, which was given a
detailed syntactic and semantic analysis in the basic formal account above
(page 38). In order to provide an analysis of that example, which takes
quantifier domain restriction into account, we will add some lexical items
and syntactic rules:
Lexicon
1. 𝑅,𝑅0 , 𝑅1, … ∈ 𝐵𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟
2. 𝑛, 𝑛0 , 𝑛1, … ∈ 𝐵𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟
[[𝛼]DET[𝛽]N]NP,
where 𝛽 is not a set variable, is translated as
𝛼’𝑋 (𝛽 ′),
where X is a new set variable.” (Westerståhl, 1985, p. 52).
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The variables in the lexical category 𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟 will be used for modifying the
meaning of nouns.13 The indexicalist analysis adds two syntactic rules to
the standard version:
Syntax
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟 , [N𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟 .
2. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑁 , then [N 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑁 .
Any noun could, accordingly, be combined with a variable in𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟 . Fur-
thermore, additional translations are added:
Translations of basic expressions
1. 𝑅0 𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑥.[𝑋0(𝑥)∧𝑋(𝑥)], and similarly for all 𝑅𝑖
2. 𝑛0 𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.𝑁0(𝑋), and similarly for all 𝑁𝑖
The letters𝑁,𝑁0 , 𝑁1, … will be used later on for variables in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 of type
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩. But in this section, the new syntactic variables 𝑅,𝑅0 , 𝑅1, …, and
their translation, are relevant (𝑛, 𝑛0 , 𝑛1, …, and their translations, which in-
volve 𝑁,𝑁0 , 𝑁1, …, are used in Section 2.3 and 2.6).
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [N𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
2. [N 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽(𝛾 ) (type 𝑒𝑡 )
The treatment of domain restriction below will let the fact that the deno-
tations of 𝑋, 𝑋0 , 𝑋1 etc. vary as a result of the chosen variable assignment
play a key role (cf. Westerståhl, 1985, p. 51).
The following tree structure with translations and type information is
available to the indexicalist:
13The lexical and phrasal categories labelled 𝐶𝑣𝑎𝑟 are used for variables modifying the mean-
ing of expressions of category 𝐶 , which, hopefully, explains the choice of label name.
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M.Clause
∀𝑥[[𝑋(𝑥) ∧ dog(𝑥)] → ∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋1 .∀𝑥[[𝑋(𝑥) ∧ dog(𝑥)] → 𝑋1(𝑥)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
D
every
𝜆𝑋0 .𝜆𝑋1 .∀𝑥[𝑋0 (𝑥) → 𝑋1(𝑥)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩ ⟩
N
𝜆𝑥0 .[𝑋(𝑥0 ) ∧ dog(𝑥0 )]
𝑒𝑡
N𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑅
𝜆𝑋2 .𝜆𝑥0 .[𝑋(𝑥0 ) ∧ 𝑋2(𝑥0 )]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
N
dog
dog
𝑒𝑡
VP
𝜆𝑥1 .∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥1)]
𝑒𝑡
IV
runs
𝜆𝑥1 .∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥1)]
𝑒𝑡
Intuitively, 𝑋 denotes a contextually salient set; when it is intersected with
the literal denotation of the constant, a possibly restricted denotation is
given.
In cases where one sentence contains two syntactically identical noun
phrases that differ in meaning because of a difference in contextual restric-
tion of the noun phrasemeaning, as in (25) and (25b) above, the indexicalist
strategy is to place different variables, say𝑅1 and𝑅2, as sisters to the lowest
N-node.
This strategy may raise the question of why certain readings are more
likely than others, or what makes it the case that some readings are unavail-
able. But the question of how to account for the fact that some readings
are more likely than others is beyond the scope of the formal semantics
presented here. Such questions could be addressed in a separate pragmatic
theory about pragmatic constraints (cf. Section 4.4).
2.2.2 Extension of the formal semantic account (truth-conditional
pragmaticist variant)
In the previous section, the standard framework was extended, in an in-
dexicalist manner, in order to handle quantifier domain restriction. In this
section, I put forward a similar extension, on the truth-conditional prag-
maticist’s part.
Instead of postulating a more complex syntax, and variables in the frag-
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ment’s syntax, the truth-conditional pragmaticist suggests a more complex
semantics in order to account for quantifier domain restriction. The strat-
egy I will pursue here is to adapt the formats in Pagin & Pelletier (2007,
p. 47-50) and Recanati (2010b, p. 44-46) to the present framework. I will
show how the truth-conditional pragmaticist could account for quantifier
domain restriction, by providing an explication of the truth-conditional
pragmaticist notion of modulation.14
Truth-conditional pragmatics, as I construe the position here, makes use
of other translation functions than the indexicalist. For instance, 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 will
be used. On the lexical level, this function works just like the ordinary
translation 𝑡 𝑟 . But on the phrasal level, this function takes phrases and
yields the same translation as 𝑡 𝑟 plus a modulation variable that fronts the
translation.
Meaningful expressions in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
• For every phrasal category 𝐶 , if the type of translations
of expressions of category 𝐶 is 𝑎, then 𝑂𝐶 , 𝑂 ′𝐶 , 𝑂 ″𝐶 are
modulation variables of type ⟨𝑎, 𝑎⟩.15
Translations of basic expressions
1. For every basic expression 𝛼, 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐 16
14My account differs from the one in (Pagin & Pelletier, 2007, p. 47-50) in several respects,
as was mentioned on page 13. One difference, which I mentioned but did not elabo-
rate, is that they do not translate logical forms into a formal, intermediate language.
But expressions are not directly interpreted in models either. Instead, expressions are
first mapped onto structured meanings, construed as finite sequences of compositional
operations and meanings, and then evaluated semantically. The evaluation can be either
modulated or literal. In the former case, but not in the latter, modulation functions are
inserted into the structural meaning. On my account, variables for modulation func-
tions are always inserted in the translation, but can be assigned the identity function by
the context (furthermore, it is not clear to me if they intend the symbols for modulation
functions to be variables or constants).
15The type-theoretic language has variables of every type. For ease of reading, special letters
are often used for variables of certain types. In particular, for every category 𝐶 with type
𝑎, I use the symbols 𝑂𝐶 , 𝑂 ′𝐶 , …for variables of type ⟨𝑎, 𝑎⟩, in the truth-conditional
pragmaticist setting.
16Modulation of a lexical item 𝛽 will occur at the immediate parent node of 𝛽.
47
disarming context dependence
In each of the translation rules on page 36 and 38, replace the right hand
side (𝑟 ℎ ) by 𝑂𝐶 (𝑟 ℎ), where 𝐶 is the appropriate category, and replace 𝑡 𝑟
with 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 . I illustrate these translations by a few examples below:
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [D 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = 𝑂𝐷 (𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐 )
(type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩)
2. [N 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = 𝑂𝑁 (𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐 )
(type 𝑒𝑡 )
Now consider once again the example ‘every dog runs’. In the truth-
conditional pragmaticist variant, the translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 yields the fol-
lowing translation:
𝑡 𝑟𝑐([M.Clause [NP [D every][N dog]][VP [IV runs]]])
=
𝑂𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 (𝑂𝑁𝑃 (𝑂𝐷 (𝜆𝑋 .𝜆𝑋1.∀𝑥[𝑋(𝑥) → 𝑋1(𝑥)])
(𝑂𝑁 (dog)))
(𝑂𝑉 𝑃 (𝑂𝐼 𝑉 (𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]))))
The translation is generated straightforwardly by the application of modu-
lation variables to the lowest nodes of the trees and then one modulation
variable for each syntactic operation. This allows for massive modulation,
in the sense that every constituent in the phrase structure tree could poten-
tially have a modulated meaning. However, the phenomenon of interest
for us in this section is quantifier domain restriction. Modulation of every
constituent is hardly needed for that phenomenon; indeed, such an analysis
seems wrong. The truth-conditional pragmaticist is not bound to the (ab-
surd) view that every constituent (in every sentence) always has a meaning
that differs from its standard meaning (i.e. the meaning assigned by the
model and the variable assignment). The trick is to allow every modula-
tion variable to be assigned the identity function, as suggested by Recanati
(2010b, p. 43-46). In other words, the compositional semantics leaves room
for modulation at every constituent in every phrase structure tree, but this
doesn’t mean that every constituent always has a different meaning from the
standard one. This assumption warrants elimination of modulation func-
tions that do not have effects on interpretation as a last step in the analysis.
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In a case where Robin and Kim talks about their dogs, and Robin uses ‘dog’
exclusively for his dogs (and not Kim’s), the truth-conditional pragmaticist
could provide the following simplified translation of ‘every dog runs’:
𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋1.∀𝑥[𝑋(𝑥) → 𝑋1(𝑥)](𝑂𝑁 (dog))
(𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)])
Applying beta-reduction, the following equivalent and simplified formula
results:
∀𝑥[𝑂𝑁 (dog)(𝑥) → ∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]]
But how does truth-conditional pragmatics account for (25) and (25b)? As
I argued on page 46, the indexicalist could use different variables in different
occurrences of the same noun phrase. The same kind of strategy is open for
the contextualist: different occurrences of noun phrases could be translated
differently: just use a different modulation variable for the same category.
2.2.3 Truth conditions and empirical equivalence
The indexicalist and truth-conditional pragmaticist frameworks ended up
with two different formal semantic accounts of quantifier domain restric-
tion above. We noted that the sentence ‘every dog runs’ is translated into
two different 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 -formulas, repeated below:
• (ind): ∀𝑥[[𝑋(𝑥) ∧ dog(𝑥)] → ∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]]
• (tcp): ∀𝑥[𝑂𝑁 (dog)(𝑥) → ∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]]
In this section, I present a detailed account of the truth conditions of (ind)
and (tcp), using the given semantics for 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 . This will allow us to see
in which sense the two translations are empirically equivalent (even though
they are not logically equivalent). In the sections below, where other lin-
guistic phenomena are discussed, this step of the argument is left implicit,
since the idea should be clear from this first example.
Let ℳ = ⟨𝑀,𝐸, 𝐹 ⟩ be any model and 𝑔 any variable assignment over
ℳ. For ease of exposition, I will write the interpretation in ℳ of the
constant dog as a set (the subset of𝑀 of which it is the characteristic func-
tion): dogℳ. Similarly, the interpretation of run is written as the subset
runℳ of 𝐸 , and 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡ℳ will be a relation (a subset of 𝐸 ×𝑀 ).
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Then, following the definition of truth and denotation in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 on page
34, we obtain:17
1. JindKℳ,𝑔 = 1
2. iff for all entities 𝑎 ∈ 𝑀 , J[[𝑋(𝑥) ∧ dog(𝑥)] → ∃𝑒[run(𝑒) ∧
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]]Kℳ,𝑔(𝑎/𝑥) = 1
3. iff for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝑔(𝑋) ∩ dogℳ, there is an event 𝑖 ∈ 𝐸 such thatJ[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]Kℳ,𝑔(𝑎/𝑥, 𝑖/𝑒) = 1
4. iff for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝑔(𝑋) ∩ dogℳ there is 𝑖 ∈ runℳ s.t. 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡ℳ(𝑎, 𝑖)
Similarly, for truth-conditional pragmatics:
1. JtcpKℳ,𝑔 = 1
2. iff for all entities 𝑎 ∈ 𝑀 , J[[𝑂𝑁 (dog)(𝑥)] → ∃𝑒[run(𝑒)
∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]]Kℳ,𝑔(𝑎/𝑥) = 1
3. iff for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝑔(𝑂𝑁 )(dogℳ), there is an event 𝑖 ∈ 𝐸 such thatJ[run(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)]Kℳ,𝑔(𝑎/𝑥, 𝑖/𝑒) = 1
4. iff for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝑔(𝑂𝑁 )(dogℳ), there is 𝑖 ∈ runℳ s.t. 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡ℳ(𝑎, 𝑖)
It can be concluded that, for allℳ and all 𝑔 , the following holds:
1. If 𝑔(𝑋) ∩ dogℳ = 𝑔(𝑂𝑁 )(dogℳ), then (ind) and (tcp) are equiva-
lent.
To give an example, consider a model where𝑀 consists of the household-
members of my house, dogℳ the dogs in𝑀 , and runℳ is a set of running
events, each of which has a unique dog as agent. Suppose that ‘every dog
runs’ is uttered in a situation where 𝑔(𝑋) is the subset of things in𝑀 that
are in the backyard. Then (int) could be true, under this assignment, but
false if, for instance, 𝑔(𝑋) = 𝑀 (the sentence would, in that case, be false
if there is a dog not in the backyard and with no associated running event).
17Note that 𝑔(𝑎/𝑥) is the assignment that is just like 𝑔 except that the entity 𝑎 is assigned
to the variable 𝑥. Similarly, 𝑔(𝑎/𝑥, 𝑖/𝑒) assigns the event 𝑖 to the variable 𝑒 , etc. Thus,
𝑔(𝑎/𝑥)(𝑋) = 𝑔(𝑋), and 𝑔(𝑎/𝑥)(𝑂𝑁 ) = 𝑔(𝑂𝑁 ).
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Nowwe would get the same result from (tcp), provided that 𝑔(𝑂𝑁 )(dogℳ)
is precisely the set of dogs in the backyard.
I assume that every utterance situation comes with a model ℳ and an
assignment 𝑔 over ℳ. If 𝑔 satisfies the antecedent of (1) above, we have
equivalence, since the resulting truth conditions are the same. Similar re-
quirements of 𝑔 are easy to formulate for the other examples discussed in
what follows. In general, the claim about equivalence of the two semantic
accounts of the English sentences 𝑆 discussed in this dissertation may be
expressed as follows:
Empirical Equivalence Claim
If the indexicalist translation of 𝑆 is 𝜙 and the truth-
conditional pragmaticist translation is 𝜓 — i.e. if 𝜙 and 𝜓 are
𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 -formulas obtained by our translation functions applied
to the logical form of 𝑆 in the respective fragments— then for
all models ℳ, there is an assignment 𝑔 such that J𝜙Kℳ,𝑔 =J𝜓 Kℳ,𝑔 .
A fragment consists of the set of analyzed expressions, that is, of logical
forms, generated by the relevant syntax rules. But 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 is the full type-
theoretic language, with all the basic types needed (entity and event are
introduced above, but a basic degree type is added later), and all the con-
stants such as 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒 , and, as will be added later on, 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑜𝑛,
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 and ≻−.18 Thus, although the fragment will differ somewhat
in the indexicalist and the truth-conditional pragmaticist cases, the formal
language into which the analyzed sentences of the fragments (the logical
forms) are translated is the same.
The Empirical Equivalence Claim above refers to the particular English
sentences whose semantic analysis has been debated in the literature (and
a few more added in this thesis). It is natural to extend it to a claim about
all English sentences analyzable in the fragments introduced here, and, ten-
tatively, even to other indexicalist and contextualist fragments as well (see
Chapter 4.5).
18Strictly speaking, nothing is “added” to 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 . The types and constants mentioned above
are already there, as it were, but for pedagogical reasons, the language is presented suc-
cessively, as we go along.
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Finally, it should be pointed out that the truth-conditional pragmatics
translation, (tcp), is, in this case, more flexible than (ind): it is not con-
strained by the condition of intersection, imposed by the conjunction in
the indexicalist translation. This may seem like a problem for the claim
about empirical equivalence, but, in fact, a similar flexibility is available for
the indexicalist, as will become clear in Section 2.3 and 2.6.
2.2.4 Quantified contexts: domain restriction and variable-binding
Before we leave the problem of quantifier domain restriction, I will briefly
comment on Stanley & Szabó’s discussion of ‘quantified contexts’:
Quantified contexts are cases involving sentences containing
multiple quantified expressions whose intuitive readings are
only possible to capture by assuming that an index represent-
ing the quantifier domain of the second quantifier expression
is bound by the first quantifier expression. Since the prag-
matic approach does not postulate syntactically represented,
or semantically reflected quantifier domains, it cannot capture
these readings. (Stanley & Szabó, 2000, p. 242)
By “pragmatic approach” Stanley & Szabó refer to the view in e.g. (Sperber
& Wilson, 1995) and (Bach, 1994). Such approaches cannot explain, they
claim, the natural reading of (26) above. I will not attempt to defend these
pragmatic approaches here. It is more relevant for us to ask whether Stanley
& Szabó’s criticism applies to my variant of truth-conditional pragmatics.
The answer is: no.
The example is repeated in (27) below (the most natural and intuitive
reading is that exactly three Frenchmen in John’s classes are failed by John):
(27) In most of John’s classes, he fails exactly three Frenchmen.
I will not provide a full compositional analysis of (27) – it would require
a detour via the semantics of ‘most’ and possessives. Instead, I will discuss
the sentence in (28), which is similar enough for our purposes:
(28) In every class, John fails a Frenchman.
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This example could in principle be accounted for by my variant of truth-
conditional pragmatics, which translates expressions in the fragment into
𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 , a language that contains variable-binding operators of the kind
needed for the case at hand. The difference between how indexicalism
and truth-conditional pragmatics, on my construal, account for the read-
ing in question concerns how they implement quantifier domain restriction:
given my general framework, the variable-binding in the most straightfor-
ward analysis of (27) is orthogonal to the question about indexicalism versus
truth-conditional pragmatics. Consider the following indexicalist transla-
tion in (29) and the truth-conditional pragmaticist translation in (30) (I
have not introduced syntax and compositional translations that yield the
translations above – that would be unnecessary for the point I try to make
here):
(29) ∀𝑥[[class(𝑥) ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥)] → ∃𝑒[fail(𝑒) ∧ [𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, j) ∧
∃𝑥0[[french(𝑥0) ∧ 𝑋1(𝑥)] ∧ [𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥0) ∧
𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖 𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 -𝑖𝑛(𝑥0 , 𝑥)]]]]]
(30) ∀𝑥[𝑂𝑁 (class)(𝑥) → ∃𝑒[fail(𝑒) ∧ [𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, j) ∧
∃𝑥0[french(𝑥0) ∧ [𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥0) ∧
𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖 𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 -𝑖𝑛(𝑥0 , 𝑥)]]]]]
The translations could be paraphrased as follows: for all entities 𝑥, if 𝑥 is a
contextually salient class, there is an event of failing such that John is the
agent of the event and there is an entity 𝑥0 such that 𝑥0 is French and 𝑥0 is
a participant in the class 𝑥.
In (29) there are two free variables: 𝑋0 and𝑋1. We actually only need the
first variable, for the restriction of the set of (educational) classes to the set
of John’s classes. The second variable does not change the interpretation in
this case: intuitively, (28) is not about some contextually salient Frenchman,
who attends all of John’s classes. But indexicalism always lets the translation
of noun phrases like ‘a Frenchman’ and ‘every class’ contain a free variable,
allowing for the possibility of restriction. In the truth-conditional pragmati-
cist variant in (30), I have eliminated all modulation variables that do not
have semantic effect.
The difference between the two translations lies in how the property of
being a class is restricted to the contextually salient property of being a
class of John’s. Indexicalism does this by the addition of a free variable 𝑋0
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(which, in a full syntactic and compositional analysis, would be reflected
in the syntactic structure by a variable) whereas the truth-conditional prag-
maticist lets a modulation variable O𝑁 front the predicate class (with no
corresponding variable in the syntactic structure). But in both cases, the
predicate 𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖 𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 -𝑖𝑛 has as argument the variable 𝑥, which is bound
by the first quantifier expression: the variable binding operator ∀𝑥. The
fact that 𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖 𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 -𝑖𝑛 has the bound variables 𝑥 and 𝑥0 as arguments
is crucial to the explanation of the reading in question. The choice between
indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics is orthogonal to this expla-
nation.
I conclude that the problem raised by Stanley & Szabó about quanti-
fied contexts is not a problem for the truth-conditional pragmaticist vari-
ant of my framework, at least for the kind of examples Stanley & Szabó
discuss. Stanley & Szabó explain the readings of (27) and, supposedly,
(28) in terms of indexicalist quantifier domain restriction. I explain the
readings in terms of a combination of quantifier domain restriction, which
proponents of truth-conditional pragmatics and indexicalism implement
differently, and variable-binding, which is available to both indexicalists
and truth-conditional pragmaticists.
Stanley & Szabó claim that “the pragmatic approach does not postu-
late syntactically represented, or semantically reflected quantifier domains”.
But it is not made clear exactly what ‘the pragmatic approach’ is. My ex-
plication of the notions of truth-conditional pragmatics and indexicalism
above handle the example, but perhaps it could be argued that modula-
tion variables, crucial to the truth-conditional pragmaticist account, reflect
quantifier domains. The heart of the matter is, I think, that questions like
this only have clear answers in relation to formal semantic accounts.
2.3 Transfer
In ordinary talk-exchanges, expressions seem to occasionally have non-
ordinary meanings. Recall the following examples, presented as (6) and
(7) above, repeated here as (31) and (32):
(31) (Pia has called the IT-support because of problems with the new
computer system called ‘Dafgu’. An IT-technician opens the door
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to her office.)
Pia: Hi, are you Dafgu?
IT-technician: I am Dafgu.
(32) (Elevator repairman on phone:) I don’t know what to do with that
order. I’ll send André street over to you.
In (31), the technician uses ‘am Dafgu’ of himself but does not mean, obvi-
ously, that he is a computer system. He rather means that he is the person
who is responsible for the computer system (or knows a lot about it) and
is there to help Pia with it. In (32), the repairman’s use of the street name
‘André street’ denotes an order concerning an elevator on that street (and
not the street itself ).
Nunberg (1995) illustrates the same phenomenon by similar examples.
Consider the transfer in (33):
(33) I am parked out back.
On a natural reading of (33), ‘I’ is used ordinarily but ‘am parked out back’
is used to denote the property of having one’s car parked out back, or sim-
ilarly. And in the following examples, Nunberg’s (34) and Recanati’s vari-
ant, presented as example (8) above but repeated here as (35), ‘the ham
sandwich’ is naturally read to denote the orderer of the ham sandwich (Re-
canati, 2004, p. 26):
(34) The ham sandwich is at table 7.
(35) The ham sandwich left without paying.
These examples illustrate the linguistic phenomenon of semantic transfer,
where expressions temporarily take on meanings that differ from their ordi-
nary, literal or conventional meanings.
Some different implementations of transfer have been suggested in the
literature. Sag (1981) outlines a possible worlds semantics, where the oper-
ator 𝑆 , which denotes a function from intensions to intensions, forms new
predicates from every predicate 𝑃 .19 And, more recently, Pagin & Pelletier
19Abstracting from details that are not relevant for our purposes, Sag’s proposal is that
𝑆 denotes a function 𝑐𝑠𝑡 from intensions to intensions, such that for every predicate 𝑃 ,J𝑆𝑃 Kℳ,𝑤 = 𝑐𝑠𝑡 (𝐼𝑃 )(𝑤), where 𝐼𝑃 is the interpretation function applied to the predicate
𝑃 .
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(2007) and Recanati (2010b) have suggested compositional implementa-
tions of modulation that allow for modulated meanings everywhere in a
phrase structure tree built up step-wise by syntactic operations, as I have
described above. Transferred meanings could be seen as instances of such
modulated meanings.
In contrast to the mentioned attempts to model transfer within some
format of compositional semantics, Stanley (2005, p. 226-230) argues that
formal semantics is not apt to model transfer. The argument goes as fol-
lows. The subject matter of formal semantics is semantic content. Semantic
content is constrained by conventional meaning. But transfer is not con-
strained by conventional meaning. So whatever role transfer plays, it has no
effects on semantic content, and hence not for formal semantics. Stanley
relates this point to Sag’s implementation of transfer:
Something like Sag’s semantic proposal is required to account
for deferred reference. But notice what the resulting “seman-
tic” theory has the power to do […] The available sense-
transfer functions are constrained only by pragmatics. So, the
resulting semantic theory is one according to which semantic
content is unconstrained by conventional meaning. (Stanley,
2005, p. 230)
I admit that the argument points to a potential problem with modeling
transfer within a formal semantic framework. It is not the job of a formal
semantics to theorize about the nature and the scope of linguistic conven-
tions, but I disagree with Stanley about the claim that formal semantics
only concerns conventional meaning. One could reasonably require that
a formal semantic theory accommodates a distinction that corresponds to
the intuitive distinction between ‘conventional meaning’, ‘ordinary mean-
ing’, ‘literal meaning’ on the one hand and ‘occasional meaning’ or ‘non-
conventional’ meaning on the other hand. This is a reasonable requirement,
since the phenomenon of transfer is illustrated by this intuitive distinction
in the first place.
I will argue that this is not a problem for truth-conditional pragmatics,
as we think of that position here. Truth-conditional pragmatics does in
fact accommodate such a distinction. The frameworks in Sag (1981), Re-
canati (2010b) and Pagin & Pelletier (2007), where modulation functions
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(or something like modulation functions) operate on the outputs of the
‘normal’ interpretation function, are naturally understood as follows: there
is an interpretation mapping expressions to meanings, and this function
corresponds to our notion of ‘ordinary’ or ‘literal’ meaning. Modulation
functions change the meaning of expressions, and this corresponds to our
intuitive notion of ‘occasional’ or ‘non-conventional’ meaning.
Where does the discussion above leave us, dialectically speaking? Should
we draw the conclusion that the phenomenon of transfer is better modelled
by truth-conditional pragmatics than indexicalism? No, that conclusion
would be far too quick. As I will show below, the indexicalist does have the
theoretical resources to model transfer (even if this hasn’t previously been
realized by the indexicalists themselves). The solution is in fact quite sim-
ple: the indexicalist could postulate hidden variables of suitable types in the
phrase structure tree to capture the relevant readings. Before showing an
implementation of this proposal, I will, however, present a possible objec-
tion on behalf of the indexicalist, and I will show why this objection in fact
needn’t worry indexicalists.
The indexicalist could claim, following the reasoning in Stanley (2005,
p. 225), that the strategy is unsound because it would over-generate read-
ings. Stanley makes this point in relation to the following example:
(36) Every Frenchman is seated.
Stanley claims that this sentence could not get the reading every Frenchman
and Dutchman is seated, and uses this point to criticise truth-conditional
pragmatics: truth-conditional pragmaticists do not explain why modula-
tion does not allow for the mentioned reading. Recanati (2010b, p. 11)
admits that truth-conditional pragmaticists should develop explanations of
why some modulations occur while others don’t, but tries to show that this
is rather a research question to be addressed by truth-conditional pragmati-
cists than a serious objection to their research program.20 Now the indexi-
20Recanati objects, however, to Stanley’s specific example. In this particular case, a similar
reading is in fact available:
When Hercule Poirot says ‘Strictly speaking, I am not French’, he con-
cedes that loosely speaking, he is French; and in the latter use ‘French’
means something like ‘French or Belgian’. (Recanati, 2010b, p. 11)
Hall (2009, p. 356-361) discusses this problem from a relevance-theoretic perspective.
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calist could try to argue that my proposed strategy of implementing transfer
by postulating hidden variables of suitable types in the logical form would
suffer from the same problem: if we are allowed to postulate hidden vari-
ables in order to account for transfer, we allow for sentences with readings
that are in fact not available for competent speakers.
But I think the over-generation argument is misplaced. In fact, I would
like to point out, on the indexicalist’s behalf, that this objection to my sug-
gestion would be incoherent with other assumptions already accepted by
indexicalists. As was shown in Section 2.2.1, indexicalists implement quan-
tifier domain restriction by variables at sister-nodes to the noun-nodes.21 In
the interpretation of the variable, the variable assignment plays a key role
(c.f. Section 2.2.3). But indexicalism puts no constraints on the choice of
variable assignment.
It is assumed by all parties that, in any given utterance situation, a vari-
able assignment and a model are available, but a given model can allow
for a large number of different assignments (possibly an infinite number).
Therefore, it seems natural to deal with questions of over-generation within
a separate pragmatic theory. As far as I know, indexicalists have offered no
alternative account of this fact. Accordingly, the indexicalist does not seem
to have the over-generation objection available.
Below, I will show how indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics
can model transfer formally.
2.3.1 Indexicalism and transfer
Consider the following noun phrase:
(37) The ham sandwich
The reading in question is the orderer of the ham sandwich. There is a discus-
sion in the literature about the proper syntactic treatment of ‘the’. In Bar-
wise & Cooper (1981), it is treated as a determiner, but Westerståhl (1985)
argues against that treatment, primarily on the basis that the singular-plural
distinction is essential to ‘the’ but inessential to other expressions classi-
fied as determiners, and suggests an alternative analysis. The framework in
21This holds in my implementation of indexicalism, but the point I am making is not
dependent on my specific formulation of the view.
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Heim (2011/1982) also does not treat ‘the’ as a determiner. I will not take
a stand on the issue of the best classification of ‘the’ here. For simplicity,
I will, however, assume a somewhat more conservative approach than the
ones in Westerståhl (1985) or Heim (2011/1982) and adopt a Montague-
style, Russellian analysis of the definite article.
Translations of basic expressions
1. the𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑋(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥0 = 𝑥] ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥)]
Given this minor addition to the framework, we have the following tree in
𝑃𝑁𝑃 (with translations and type information provided):
NP
𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑁0(ham sandwich)(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥0 = 𝑥] ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡  ⟩
D
the
𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋0 .
∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑋(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥0 = 𝑥]
∧𝑋0(𝑥)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩
N
𝑁0(ham sandwich)
𝑒𝑡
N𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑛0
𝜆𝑋1.𝑁0(𝑋1)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
N
ham sandwich
ham sandwich
𝑒𝑡
Now if we let 𝑔(𝑁0) be a function taking meals available at a restaurant
to the orderers of such meals, J𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑁0(ham sandwich)(𝑥0) ↔
𝑥0 = 𝑥] ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥)]Kℳ,𝑔 is precisely the transferred meaning of (37).
2.3.2 Truth-conditional pragmatics and transfer
Truth-conditional pragmatics is apt for modelling transfer, as
Recanati (2010b) and Pagin & Pelletier (2007) show. Their formats are,
however, different frommy format of compositional event semantics. I will
therefore show how transfer could be modelled within the formal semantic
account presented here.
For the truth-conditional pragmaticist, the variables 𝑛, 𝑛0 , 𝑛1 etc. are
not lexical items in the lexicon. And the truth-conditional pragmaticist
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will have no use of the syntactic rules combining N and N𝑣𝑎𝑟 , in the index-
icalist extension. The syntactic rules used below were already introduced
in earlier sections. The relevant information about the translations of basic
expressions is provided below:
Translations of basic expressions
1. the𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = the𝑡 𝑟
2. ham sandwich𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = ham sandwich𝑡 𝑟
Given this extension, as well as the definitions in Section 2.2.2, it is evident
that the truth-conditional pragmaticist extension contains the following ex-
pression and translation:
𝑡 𝑟𝑐([NP [D the][N ham sandwich]])
= 𝑂𝑁𝑃 (𝑂𝐷 (𝜆𝑋 .𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑋(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥0 = 𝑥] ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥)])
(𝑂𝑁 (ham sandwich)))
In this translation, there are as many modulation variables as possible: one
for each syntactic operation. But the reading in question is a reading where
only the noun meaning is modulated. On page 49 above, I mentioned that
modulation variables can have the identity function as value. We could
accordingly let the identity function be the value of all modulation function
variables in the translation, apart from 𝑂𝑁 , which is assigned a function
from meals available at a restaurant to their orderers. The translation could
accordingly be simplified as follows:
𝑡 𝑟𝑐([NP [D the][N ham sandwich]])
= 𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑋(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥0 = 𝑥] ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥)]
(𝑂𝑁 (ham sandwich))
By beta-reduction, we get:
𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑂𝑁 (ham sandwich)(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥0 = 𝑥] ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥)]
I have now shown how both indexicalist and truth-conditional pragmaticist
extensions of the basic formal account model the linguistic phenomenon of
transfer. Clearly, the Empirical Equivalence Claim holds, again (see page
51). In the next section, we will discuss the phenomenon of binding.
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2.4 Binding
In Stanley (2000, p. 409-418), it is argued that all contextual effects on
truth conditions are traceable to logical form. Stanley distinguishes be-
tween two cases: phonologically overt expressions with context dependent
meanings, e.g. indexicals, and phonologically covert variables. Contextual
effects on truth conditions depend on these two kinds of expressions (Stan-
ley, 2000, p. 400). Amotivation for postulating covert variables is that there
are sentences, where the contextual effects seem to be dependent on variable-
binding operators, i.e. natural language expressions that correspond to the
quantifiers of predicate logic, binding variables.
To make this reasoning vivid, consider (38) below:
(38) It rains.
The intuitive reading of (38) (but perhaps not the only reading) is that it is
raining at some contextually salient place. Onemight wish to argue that this
contextual effect is not due to a syntactic constituent but rather depends on
modulation or some similar pragmatic process. But consider the following
example:
(39) Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains.
In this example, the most natural reading (but not the only one) is that
every time John lights a cigarette at a particular location, it rains at that
location at the time when John lights a cigarette. This is a case where the
variable-binding operator ‘every time’ seems to bind variables for location
or time in the logical forms of ‘John lights a cigarette’ and ‘it rains’.
Stanley outlines two proposals of logical forms of (39). According to the
first proposal, there are function variables and variables over times in the
logical form, which, schematically, would be as follows:
(40) Every time 𝑡 John lights a cigarette 𝑡 , it rains 𝑓 (𝑡) 𝑔(𝑡).
The semantics, which is only preliminarily sketched by Stanley, assigns an
identity function from times to times to 𝑓 , and a function from times to
locations to 𝑔 . The variable 𝑡 ranges over times. The idea is, as I understand
it, that for every value of 𝑡 , if it is true that John lights a cigarette at 𝑡 , it
is true that it rains at time 𝑓 (𝑡), at location 𝑔(𝑡). According to the second
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proposal, outlined in (Stanley, 2007, p. 257-258), the logical form of (39)
is couched in event semantic terms:
(41) ∀𝑒[𝐽 𝑜ℎ𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑡 𝑡 𝑒 𝑎𝑡(𝑒) → 𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠(𝑒)]
In contrast to the first proposal, there is only an event variable present, and
the material implication is made explicit by the arrow.
Unfortunately, Stanley presents no syntactic tree structures that explicitly
show us the syntax of the analysed sentences. This is problematic for many
reasons. For instance, it is not clear whether the variables are parts of the
lexical items or if they occur in separate nodes. Moreover, in Stanley’s event
semantic proposal, it is said that the event of John lighting a cigarette and
the raining event is the same event. But this can’t be right, since the agent of
the lighting event is not agent of the raining event (which does not have an
agent). The indexicalist could, however, overcome these technical problems,
which I will demonstrate below in Section 3.4.
Recanati has, in numerous publications, challenged Stanley’s binding ar-
gument, with the aim to avoid Stanley’s conclusion that all truth-
conditional contextual effects are traceable to logical form, in the sense out-
lined above (see Recanati 2002, p. 224-230 and Recanati 2004, p. 98-111,
discussed in Zeman 2011b and Bourmayan & Recanati 2013). Recanati
(2004) uses variadic functions for this purpose. Such functions can increase
the number of thematic roles associated with a verb and thus narrow the in-
terpretation.22 Applied to the examples at hand, the idea of Recanati (2004)
is that (38) does not contain a variable or thematic role for location on any
level of representation: ‘rain’ denotes a zero-place relation or, in event se-
mantic terms, the verb’s translation does not contain any thematic roles.
But the expression ‘every time John lights a cigarette’ somehow introduces
a variadic function and thus changes the verbal meaning of ‘rain’ by adding
22Recanati mentions Quine’s derelativization-operator (DER), defined in Quine (1960,
p. 344), as a predecessor to variadic functions. The DER-operator plays an important
role in Quine’s proposal of a logical language without variables. In a related paper, focus-
ing on natural language semantics, Jacobson (1999) eliminates free variables from the
translations of expressions, in the fragment she considers. A contrast between Jacobson’s
proposal, on the one hand, and indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics, on the
other, is that both indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics accept free variables
in the (type-theoretic) translations: the main conflict between the latter two concerns
whether there are, in addition, variables in logical form.
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a thematic role of location, which takes a variable as argument (in addi-
tion to the event variable). This variable is bound by the variable-binding
operator translating ‘every time John lights a cigarette’.23
In the development of a formal semantic account below, it will be sug-
gested that the case of binding should not be regarded as an area of conflict
between the frameworks of indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics.
The compositional semantics below, which, to my knowledge, is the first
of its kind, with an explicit syntax, translations into 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 and truth condi-
tions, is available to both frameworks.24
The discussion will, however, not focus on (39), since it contains a 0-
place predicate and a semantically vacuous pronoun. A discussion of the
semantics of these expressions would distract from the questions under con-
sideration. Instead, I will discuss the following example, which, further-
more, makes it clear that two events are involved:
(42) Every time Kim laughs, Robin cries.
The contextual effects to be accounted for are the implicit locational and
temporal relations between the two events. The most salient reading is that
Kim and Robin are at the same place, when the two events occur. But
one could also interpret the relation between the events as solely temporal.
These two readings will be accounted for below.
2.4.1 Binding: extending the accounts
The lexicon contains the following additional expressions:
23Other theoretical accounts of these examples have been provided in the literature. Pagin
(2005) provides a contextualist semantics for (39) and similar examples without using
variadic functions. Pagin’s compositional semantics employs quantifiers that bind vari-
ables over contexts in the meta-language, and leaves the object-language without hidden
variables. But it is not formulated in event semantic terms. I will therefore not discuss
it further below. See Stanley (2005, p. 239-241) and Zeman (2011a, p. 71-75) for
discussions of Pagin’s account.
24See, however, (Pagin, 2005) for a semantic formalization of examples like (39). One (of
many) differences between Pagin’s and my proposal is that explicit syntactic rules, and
compositional operations related to them, are provided below.
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Lexicon
1. every time ∈ 𝐵𝐴𝑑𝑣 25
2. Robin, Kim, Pluto, Allsvenskan, IFK Norrköping,
𝑃 , 𝑃0 , 𝑃1, etc. ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝑛
We have the following syntactic rules:
Syntax
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐴𝑑𝑣 , [Adv 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑣 .
2. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐼 𝑉 , [IV𝑒 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐼 𝑉𝑒 .
3. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝑛 , [Pn 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑛 .
4. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑛 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝐼 𝑉𝑒 , then [V𝑒 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑉𝑒 .
5. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑣 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑉𝑒 , then [AdvP 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑃 .
6. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑃 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑉𝑒 , then [M.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 .
I use the phrase labels 𝐼 𝑉𝑒 , 𝑉𝑒 , and not the more standard 𝐼 𝑉 , 𝑉 , because
the types I will associate with expressions of this kind will be non-standard
for verbs. This modification of the semantics has the consequence that some
of the trees presented above, the ones that contain intransitive verbs, would
have to be rewritten, if we followed the development of the framework.
However, there are problems pertaining to syntactic structure that would
arise, if the trees were rewritten according to the suggestions here (cf. Land-
man, 2000; Champollion, 2015). These problems are irrelevant for the
main claims of the thesis. Therefore, I will continue to use the simpler
translations of intransitive verbs below, when the relevant claims under dis-
cussion are not related to the precise structure and translation of intransitive
verbs (in contrast to the section here, where the precise syntax and semantics
of intransitive verbs matter for the problem at hand).
As before, I use𝑄,𝑄0 , 𝑄1 etc. as variables over quantifiers of type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩.
The adverb phrase [Adv every time] will have as denotation a quantifier tak-
ing two arguments, just like the determiner phrase [D every]. The two
25I will treat ‘every time’ as a primitive expression (compare with ‘whenever’). One could,
of course, explore the prospects of a compositional analysis of this expression, but this
would not affect any of the points made below.
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phrases differ, however, in the respect that their translations have types con-
structed from different basic types. Whereas the translation of the former
is of type ⟨𝑣𝑡 , ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩, the translation of the latter is of type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩.
Intuitively, the former expression denotes a relation between sets of events,
whereas the latter denotes a relation between sets of entities.
Translations of basic expressions
1. Robin𝑡 𝑟 = r , Kim𝑡 𝑟 = k, etc.
2. 𝑃𝑡 𝑟 = 𝑥, 𝑃0𝑡 𝑟 = 𝑥0 etc.
3. every time𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑓0 .∀𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒)  → ∃𝑒0[𝑓0(𝑒0)
∧ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 (𝑒, 𝑒0)]]
The expression ‘every time’ will have as its translation an expression con-
taining 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 , a constant of type ⟨𝑣 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩ (‘𝐶𝑂𝐻 ’ abbreviates ‘coherence’).
This expression is an indexical, in the sense that its denotation is always de-
termined by context. We have not introduced the formal notion of context
yet, since it is not needed for most examples in this chapter. The formal no-
tion of context, which should not be conflated with the variable assignment
used for modulation, is introduced on page 135. Informally, the role of the
indexical is to provide a contextual coherence relation between the events
related by ‘every time’. It is, consequently, assumed that every context has
a salient coherence relation, picked out by 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 .
The translation of phrasal expressions is as follows:
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [Pn 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.𝑋(𝛼𝑡 𝑟 ) (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩)
2. [IV𝑒 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑒.[𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑄(𝜆𝑥.𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥))]
(type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩)26
3. [V𝑒 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛾𝑡 𝑟 (𝛽𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑣𝑡 )
4. [AdvP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩)
26Landman (2000) assigns a similar semantics to intransitive verbs generally: “walk is a
function that maps an individual onto the set of walking events with that individual as
agent” (Landman, 2000, p. 46). A difference between Landman’s semantics and mine is
that I translate proper noun phrases to quantifiers, which has effects on the translation
of 𝐼 𝑉𝑒 (cf. Barwise & Cooper, 1981, p. 166-168).
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5. [Adv 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑣𝑡 , ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩)
We accordingly have the following tree structure, with translations into the
typed lambda-calculus specified at each step:
M.Clause
∀𝑒[[laugh(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, k)]
→ ∃𝑒0 [[cry(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒0 , r)]
  ∧ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 (𝑒, 𝑒0)]]
𝑡
AdvP
𝜆𝑓0 .∀𝑒[[laugh(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, k)]
→ ∃𝑒0 [𝑓0(𝑒0) ∧ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 (𝑒, 𝑒0)]]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡  ⟩
Adv
every time
𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑓0 .∀𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒)
→ ∃𝑒0 [𝑓0(𝑒0)
∧𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 (𝑒, 𝑒0)]]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩
V𝑒
𝜆𝑒3 .[laugh(𝑒3)
∧𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒3 , k)]
𝑣 𝑡
Pn
Kim
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
IV𝑒
laughs
𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑒3[laugh(𝑒3)
∧𝑄(𝜆𝑥.𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒3 , 𝑥))]
⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩
V𝑒
𝜆𝑒4 .[cry(𝑒4)
∧𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒4 , r)]
𝑣 𝑡
Pn
Robin
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(r)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
IV𝑒
cries
𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑒4 .[cry(𝑒4)∧
𝑄(𝜆𝑥.𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒4 , 𝑥))]
⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩
This proposal, which appears to be the first of its kind for sentences like (42),
lets the indexical 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 play a crucial role. The indexical denotes the con-
textually salient coherence relation, for instance, a relation of co-location or
co-temporality. In order to work through the truth conditions, as we did
for cases of quantifier domain restriction in Section 2.2.3, a semantics for
indexicals is needed. That will be provided in Chapter 3.4.
2.4.2 Binding for indexicalists and truth-conditional pragmaticists?
I have only provided a definition of the indexicalist’s translation function
𝑡 𝑟 above (I have not used the truth-conditional pragmaticist’s 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ). But,
in this case, there is really no need for indexicalists and truth-conditional
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pragmaticists to give relevantly different semantic accounts. The difference
between the truth-conditional pragmaticist and indexicalist account, in this
case, would be that the truth-conditional pragmaticist would have modula-
tion variables at each step in the translation. However, these variables would
not do any work for the contextual effect under discussion; they could mod-
ify what ‘Robin’, ‘cries’, ‘Kim’, ‘laughs’, and plausibly ‘every time’ mean but
they would not, in my truth-conditional pragmaticist variant, do any job
for the temporal and locational effects under consideration.
The context dependence involved in (42) is not optional. Therefore, the
mechanism in play is saturation and not modulation (cf. Chapter 1.3.1).
Some coherence relation between the events has to be specified contextu-
ally. It is difficult to get a reading with no temporal connection between the
events, but the semantics only requires some coherence relation. This stands
in contrast to cases of quantifier domain restriction and transfer, where the
role of context (formally implemented in terms of variable assignments) is
optional. The crucial theoretical difference between indexicalism and truth-
conditional pragmatics lies in their views and implementations of modula-
tion and not saturation; on the face of it, the two frameworks can agree on
a common semantic account of binding.
Even so, the indexicalist may be unhappy with the proposal. Stanley
(2000, p. 411) advances the hypothesis that sentences like (39) and (42)
do not contain (phonologically overt) indexical expressions in logical form.
The proposal here may be taken to contradict that idea: the meaning of
‘every time’ is partly dependent on the indexical ‘𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 ’. An alternative
to the proposal above, would, in that case, be to develop the indexicalist
approach to binding by introducing ‘𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 ’ via a (phonologically covert)
variable in logical form.
In spelling out this idea, we can let𝑍,𝑍0 , 𝑍1 … be variables of type ⟨𝑣 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩
and 𝐵𝑡 𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 . Furthermore, the translation of ‘every time’ is modified:
every time𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑍.𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑓0 .∀𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒)  → ∃𝑒0[𝑓0(𝑒0)∧𝑍(𝑒, 𝑒0)]]. The trans-
lation is thereby of a different type from the one suggested above. If suitable
definitions of further syntactic and translational rules were specified (left
implicit in the tree structure below), the following would be an indexicalist
proposal:
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Adv
𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑓0∀𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒) → ∃𝑒0[𝑓0(𝑒0) ∧ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 (𝑒, 𝑒0)]]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩
Adv𝑒
every time
𝜆𝑍.𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑓0∀𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒) → ∃𝑒0[𝑓0(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑍(𝑒, 𝑒0)]]
⟨⟨𝑣 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩, ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩⟩
TV𝑒
𝐵
𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻
⟨𝑣 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩
The tree could then be developed along the lines suggested earlier in the
section.
2.4.3 Further notes on binding and domain restriction
Several readings of constructions containing intransitive uses of transitive
verbs, which have been discussed in relation to binding constructions in the
literature, could be accounted for by the mechanism of quantifier domain
restriction, rather than by the mechanism of binding, in contrast to what is
often suggested, as I will illustrate with some final remarks. Consider the
following example:
(43) John is anorexic. But whenever his father cooks mushrooms, he
eats.
The transitive verb ‘eat’ is here used intransitively, in the sense that the
theme of the eating event is not denoted by a linguistic expression. Two
readings of (43) have been discussed in the literature. Recanati (2004,
p. 106-107) and Bourmayan & Recanati (2013, p. 124) claim that the sen-
tence has a definite reading and could mean that whenever John’s father
cooks mushrooms, John eats the mushrooms cooked by his father. Martí
(2006, p. 154-159) and Stanley (2005, p. 249) claim that (43) has an indef-
inite existential reading: when Johns father cooks mushrooms, John eats
something.
There is an empirical question concerning which readings the sentence
has. The following example has been used by Martí against the claim that
the sentence could be read definitely:
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(44) #Whenever Sally cooks mushrooms, John never eats. Instead, he
eats pasta with tomato sauce.
Bourmayan & Recanati try to account for the negation data by locating
the source of infelicity in the semantics of ‘instead’, and they outline a situ-
ation semantic analysis in order to account for the alleged definite reading
(Bourmayan & Recanati, 2013, 134-138). I will, however, not discuss the
empirical issue here. My point is that the formal accounts I have developed
so far could be straightforwardly extended to account for both readings, if
that would be empirically motivated. But the difference between indexical-
ist and truth-conditional pragmaticist explanations of these readings boils
down to a difference in how quantifier domain restriction is implemented,
rather than a difference in the explanation of binding.
The indefinite reading is captured by the following translation (in a suit-
able extension of the fragment):
(45) ∀𝑒[[[cook(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, father-of-John)] ∧
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒,mushrooms)] → ∃𝑒 ′∃𝑦[[eat(𝑒 ′) ∧
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒 ′, John)] ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒 ′, 𝑦)]]
Thedefinite reading could be accounted for by themechanisms of quantifier
domain restriction. The indexicalist version would then have the following
translation:
(46) ∀𝑒[[[cook(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, father-of-John)] ∧
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒,mushrooms)] → ∃𝑒 ′∃𝑦[[[eat(𝑒 ′) ∧
𝑓 (𝑒 ′)] ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒 ′, John)] ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒 ′, 𝑦)]]
The conjunct, “𝑓 (𝑒 ′)” leaves it to context to determine the value of 𝑓 ; a
possible value is a predicate of events of mushroom eating, which accounts
for the definite reading. The truth-conditional pragmaticist version would
let the modulation function 𝑂𝐼 𝑉𝑒 take the semantic value of eat and yield
some other, possibly narrower, meaning:
(47) ∀𝑒[[[cook(𝑒) ∧ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, father-of-John)] ∧
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒,mushrooms)] → ∃𝑒 ′∃𝑦[[𝑂𝐼 𝑉𝑒 (eat)(𝑒
′) ∧
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒 ′, John)] ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒 ′, 𝑦)]]
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This only serves as a quick illustration of how the present framework could
be used for these much discussed examples.27
2.5 Colour adjectives
In this section, I will first present the linguistic phenomena to account for,
and then review two theories of the semantics of colour adjectives: Kennedy
& McNally (2010) and Hansen (2011). Neither of these is clearly truth-
conditional pragmaticist nor clearly indexicalist. But they have quite re-
cently been put forward in the literature as alternatives to indexicalism.
Therefore, they deserve our attention. After presenting these two alterna-
tives, I will illustrate and discuss the truth-conditional pragmaticist pro-
posal concerning colour adjectives in Recanati (2010a) and the indexicalist
proposal in Szabó (2001). Finally, I will show how both indexicalism and
truth-conditional pragmatics could be developed in order to explain the
relevant phenomena.
2.5.1 Scenarios and semantic explanations
The discussion about colour adjectives has to a large extent been centered
around scenarios28 containing contrasting uses of colour terms. In the fol-
lowing scenario, we find two stories where ‘black’ is used. The expression is
predicated of the same kettle in the two stories, and there is no change in the
the common sense properties of the object in question. Despite that, truth-
values differ in ways that do not follow if there is no context dependence of
‘black’.
27Binding constructions could also be analyzed within a situation-semantic framework (see
Barwise & Perry 1983). The analysis of in examples similar to (42) in Bourmayan &
Recanati (2013) is couched in situation-semantic terminology. The key notion for them
is that of a ‘minimal situation’ and extensions thereof. Applied to the example at hand,
the analysis would be that every situation containing precisely Kim and the property of
laughing could be extended to a situation that also contains Robin and the property of
crying. A formal situation-semantic implementation would, however, lead us away from
the main issues. See Kratzer (2017) and Stojanovic (2012) for overviews and discussions
of situation-semantic programs, frameworks and implementations.
28A ‘scenario’ is a contrasting pair of ‘stories’ in the terminology of Hansen & Chemla
(2013) that I use here.
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(48) A. Max fills his shiny new aluminum kettle with the makings of a
stew, and sets it over the campfire. An hour later, he informs Sam
that he has done this. ‘That was pretty stupid’, Sam replies, and
rushes out to the fire. He returns holding a soot-blackened pot and
says (speaking truly), ‘Look. The kettle is black.’
B. Everard and Clothilde are acquiring their first common batterie
de cuisine. For many reasons, including tradition and presumed
heat-retaining properties, they want only black pots. (Though what
sort of black pot happens not to matter much.) Coincidentally,
Max’s soot-blackened pot has come to rest precisely in the shopwin-
dow into which they are now staring. Everard says, ‘Look. There’s a
nice black pot.’ But Clothilde is more observant. ‘No it isn’t black’,
she replies, ‘it’s only covered with soot. How careless of them to let
that get in their window.’ And off they go elsewhere, with, to all ap-
pearances, Clothilde having spoken the truth. (Travis, 2008/1985a,
p. 26)
Travis’s famous ‘maple leaves’-example illustrates the same linguistic phe-
nomenon. In the following scenario, there is a contrast in truth-value be-
tween two predications of ‘green’ to the same painted leaf:
(49) A story. Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that
green is the colour of leaves, she paints them. Returning, she re-
ports, ‘That’s better. The leaves are green now.’ She speaks truth.
A botanist friend then phones, seeking green leaves for a study
of green-leaf chemistry. ‘The leaves (on my tree) are green,’ Pia
says. ‘You can have those.’ But now Pia speaks falsehood. (Travis,
2008/1985b, p. 111)
As a final example, consider the following scenario, which appears in its
original formulation in Bezuidenhout (2002), and in a modified version in
Hansen & Chemla (2013), where the last sentence in each ‘apple-story’ is
true (which would be contradictory if ‘red’ had the same meaning in the
two final sentences).
(50) Anne and her son are sorting through a barrel of assorted apples
to find those that have been afflicted with a horrible fungal disease.
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This fungus grows out from the core and stains the flesh of the ap-
ple red. Anne’s son slices each apple open and puts the good ones
in a cooking pot. The bad ones he hands to Anne. He cuts open
a Granny Smith apple (with green skin) that has the disease. Anne
asks, ‘Is that one red?’ and he says ‘Yes, this one is red’.
Anne and her son are investigating a horrible fungal disease that
afflicts apples. This fungus grows out from the core and stains the
flesh of the apple red. So far, all of the apples that have been discov-
ered with the disease have been Granny Smiths (with green skin),
and they’re interested in whether any apples with red skin have the
disease. Anne’s son cuts open another Granny Smith apple that has
the fungal disease. Anne asks, ‘Is that one red?’ and he says ‘No,
this one isn’t red’. (cf. Hansen & Chemla, 2013, p. 318)
There are several suggestions in the literature of how to develop truth-
conditional frameworks in order to insure that two seemingly contradictory
sentences containing colour adjectives in fact may have the same truth-value
(as in 48 or 50), or that the same sentence containing a colour adjective may
differ in truth-value although there is no change of the denotation of the
subject noun phrase (as in 49).
In Kennedy & McNally (2010) an ambiguity thesis is put forward. Ac-
cording to the thesis, colour adjectives are ambiguous between non-gradable
meanings and gradable meanings. Non-gradable meanings have a classify-
ing function. The colour of an object, in this sense, is associated with some
stable property of the object such as its species or its normal function. Ac-
cordingly, a leaf may be said to have the colour ‘green’, if it is the leaf of
an oak tree, and a pen may be said to be ‘green’, if it produces green ink,
regardless of how the leaf or the pen appear to the speaker on some specific
occasion. In contrast, gradable meanings concern the appearance of some
object. An oak tree painted black could be said to be ‘black’, in this sense of
the expression. The latter kind, but not the former, allows for quantity and
quality variation, on Kennedy and McNally’s account. A smaller or larger
part of an object may be ‘green’, and factors like the values of the dimen-
sions of hue, brightness and saturation may result in more or less typical
instances of colours of which the expression ‘green’ may be correctly used.
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In addition to this ambiguity, ‘green’ could also occur as a noun, as in the
following example:
(51) Green was a surprising choice for the colour of the dining room
(Kennedy & McNally, 2010, p. 94).
In the semantic framework of Kennedy and McNally, the noun ‘green’ is of
a basic type (type 𝑒) and the adjectival variants are defined in terms of the
noun’s meaning:
(52) green𝑁𝑡 𝑟 = green (type 𝑒)
The classificatory adjective meaning is as follows (‘nongr’ means non-
gradable):
(53) green𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑥.𝑃𝑖 (𝑥) ∧ cor(𝑃𝑖 , green) (type 𝑒𝑡 ).
It states that the translation of ‘green’ is a function from entities to true,
for all entities that have a property denoted by 𝑃𝑖 , a property correlated
with the green entity (the value of the free variable 𝑃𝑖 is determined by
context). Moving on, the gradable adjectives are not of type 𝑒𝑡 but 𝑒𝑑, i.e.
functions from entities to degrees. There is one quantity variant and one
quality variant:
(54) green𝐴𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑥.𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡(𝑔𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑛)(𝑥)
(55) green𝐴𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑥.𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑔𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑛)(𝑥)
In a full compositional analysis of a sentence containing the quantity or
quality variant of ‘green’, implementing Kennedy & McNally’s proposal,
the function in (54) or (55) will be taken as argument by a function associ-
ated with a phonologically covert morpheme pos (this holds for the positive
form) or adjuncts such as ‘very’, ‘completely’ etc. In the case of a positive
form, which is the only case we will consider, the function associated with
the morpheme or adjunct introduces a minimal value (a cut-off point) and
a linear order relation, which relates the degree given by the colour adjec-
tive applied to some entity and the minimal value by the relation of ‘greater
than or equal to’.
The truth-values of the relevant sentences in the scenarios above, (48),
(49) and (50), could be explained by Kennedy and McNally’s distinction
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between the non-gradable meaning and the gradable one. They do not ap-
ply it to (48), but it is unproblematic to do so. In the first story of the
scenario in (48), the expression ‘black’ is not used for classifying aluminum
kettles but the kettle looks black; in the second story the expression is used
with a non-gradable meaning. Similarly, in (49), which they explicitly ad-
dress, the leaf in the scenario in (49) looks perfectly ‘green’, but the leaf
does not have the property of belonging to a certain species conventionally
associated with being ‘green’. The same explanation fits (50), as I believe is
obvious to the reader.
I will discuss the proposals of Kennedy and McNally below. But first, I
will introduce two earlier accounts: the indexicalist analysis in Szabó (2001)
and the truth-conditional pragmaticist analysis in Recanati (2010a). Szabó
(2001) discusses the principle of compositionality and potential problems
of context dependence for the principle.29 Adjectives are chosen as lin-
guistic phenomena illustrating context dependence, since they are context-
dependent along different dimensions. The meaning of evaluative adjec-
tives like ‘good’ differ with respect to “ways of being good”: to be a ‘good
dancer’ is different from being a ‘good pianist’. Adjectives like ‘lucky’ re-
quire a perspective from which an event is lucky, and e.g. ‘tall’ requires a
contextual standard of comparison. Szabó (2001) suggests that such dimen-
sions of context dependence for adjectives could be semantically accounted
for by postulating variables in logical form. When it comes to colour adjec-
tives, Szabó argues that those expressions are context-dependent along two
dimensions: a part dimension (cf. Hansen’s and Kennedy & McNally’s
quantity dimension above) and a dimension of comparison. The proposal
of logical form of ‘green’ is accordingly:
(56) (Green(𝐶 , 𝑃 ))(𝑥)
The variable 𝐶 ranges over comparison classes and 𝑃 ranges over parts. Sz-
abó intends in this way to account for the variation in scenarios like the ones
above, explicitly for the scenario in (49). But the specific proposal in (56)
above is not fully empirically adequate. As Kennedy and McNally argue,
the full variation of the meaning of colour adjectives is not accounted for, if
29Cf. Westerståhl & Pagin (2010a,b) for an introduction to definitions of ‘compositional-
ity’, and discussions of arguments for the thesis that natural languages are compositional.
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we only pay attention to the dimensions of parthood or context-dependent
standards of comparison:
[This] is shown by the fact that the judgments about [(49)]
remain the same if, instead of merely painting her leaves, Pia
immerses them in a dye that has the effect of rendering them
green throughout, or at least green in all the parts of that are
green in naturally green leaves. (Kennedy & McNally, 2010,
p. 83).
As Kennedy and McNally correctly claim, the botanist would still deny
that the leaves are ‘green’ in the sense relevant to botanists. Accordingly,
parthood is not the relevant dimension of contextual variation. However,
as I will argue below, this only shows that Szabó’s specific implementation
of indexicalism is insufficient – not that any indexicalist account of colour
adjectives is refuted. But first, consider Recanati’s truth-conditional prag-
maticist variant.
Recanati (2010a) suggests that ‘green’ denotes a property of greenness,
but the core denotation can be modulated freely when the adjective is at-
tributed to or predicated of nouns in various conversational contexts.30 Re-
canati does not provide a detailed formal analysis of the context dependence
of colour adjectives, but the reader is by now familiar with my explication
of truth-conditional pragmatics above and I will provide a detailed devel-
opment of my version of the truth-conditional pragmaticist account below.
For now it suffices to say that Recanati accounts for (48), (49) and (50) by
modulations operating on a core meaning of the colour adjective.
2.5.2 Indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics: live options
In this section, I will discuss Kennedy & McNally’s criticism of Szabó’s
theoretical proposal. I will first argue that, despite the fact that the criti-
cism does target Szabó’s specific proposal about colour adjectives, the more
general thesis in Szabó (2001), that context dependence could be handled
compositionally by indexicalism, does not necessitate Szabó’s specific imple-
mentation but is perfectly compatible with a modified indexicalist analysis,
30Cf. Recanati (2004, p. 23-27).
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which is compatible with Kennedy & McNally’s data and their criticism of
Szabó’s specific proposal.
A successful defense of (Szabó, 2001) would therefore provide an index-
icalist theory of colour adjectives that is not falsified by Kennedy & Mc-
Nally’s criticism. Such an analysis is indeed possible. Simplifying a bit, the
logical form I will suggest, on behalf of the indexicalist, is as follows:
(57) M.Clause
NP
the leaf
VP
is 𝐼0 green 𝑝𝑜𝑠
I will provide the details of the analysis in Section 2.5.4. But in short, ‘green’
denotes a function from entities to degrees and the phonologically covert
variable 𝐼0 denotes a function that takes that function and yields another
one of the same type. The morpheme 𝑝𝑜𝑠 , which is also phonologically
covert, introduces a cut-off point and the relation of being higher or equal
to (which is crucial for positive forms of adjectives). The proposal is not
vulnerable to the criticism of Kennedy & McNally (2010), since it does
not, in contrast to Szabó’s proposal, build the notion of parthood into the
logical form of colour adjectives.
Moving back to Kennedy & McNally, a key aspect of their attempt to
explain (49) is the claim that there is a non-gradable sense of ‘green’ (and all
other colour adjectives): the biologist uses ‘green’ in a non-gradable sense
whereas Pia (in Travis’s story) uses ‘green’ in a gradable sense. In contrast,
I will not postulate that ‘green’ is ambiguous. The reason for this choice
is that it is unclear to me why the sense of the biologist’s use of the expres-
sion is non-gradable. Kennedy & McNally (2010) supports this claim by a
modification of Travis’s story in (49), where Pia has a pile of painted leaves
and a pile of naturally green leaves. Pia’s artist friend walks in and asks for
green leaves. In sorting through the piles, the artist could then utter any of
the following sentences:
(58) These leaves are green
(59) These leaves are greener than those.
(60) These leaves are not green enough.
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(61) These leaves are not so green.
(62) These leaves are perfectly green.
The botanist could not, according to Kennedy & McNally (2010), use lan-
guage in the same way:
The situation is different for the botanist. She is perfectly jus-
tified in continuing to reject (the words in) [(58)] as a false
description of the painted leaves, while accepting it as true of
the natural leaves. However, if these are her judgments about
[(58)], then none of the examples in [(59)-(62)] are acceptable
as descriptions of any of the leaves. (p. 87)
But it seems false that ‘green’ couldn’t be used in the botanist’s sense with a
gradable meaning. Consider a case where two botanists compare the leaves
of two trees, with the intention to collect leaves for an experiment involving
chlorophyll:
(63) Botanist 1 (pointing at a tree): Let’s pick the leaves of this tree.
Botanist 2 (pointing at another tree): No, let’s take these instead.
They are greener, so they must have more chlorophyll.
And consider other cases of ‘classificatory’ uses of colour adjectives. In the
case of ‘blue pens’, it is acceptable to use (64) below, even if one is interested
in the pen’s function to produce blue ink:
(64) This pen is not blue enough.
Of course, one is not always interested in comparing the blueness of one
object with the blueness of another object. I might, for instance, intend to
buy a blue T-shirt and not a red one. But this is consistent with assuming
that ‘blue’ is gradable; what matters in the just mentioned situation is that
the T-shirt to be bought is blue to some degree, i.e. that the blueness passes
some cut-off point for counting as blue.
It is, however, not my ambition here to show that any variant of an am-
biguity approach would be impossible: it is sufficient for my purposes to
show that Kennedy and McNally do not show that one has to assume that
‘green’ has a non-gradable meaning in addition to the gradable one.
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2.5.3 Recanati on Szabó’s proposal
The discussion above concerned Kennedy & McNally’s proposal and criti-
cism of indexicalism. I responded to their criticism of Szabó’s indexicalist
analysis and explained why it is not a disadvantage on the indexicalist’s part
not to assume that ‘green’ is ambiguous. In this section, I will discuss Re-
canati’s criticism of Szabó’s proposal (Recanati, 2010a, p. 54-59).
Recanati’s criticism partly parallels the criticism just discussed and could
therefore be met by the same reply: it targets Szabó’s specific proposal but
not the modified indexicalist analysis I sketched above. However, Recanati
also provides other reasons for preferring his truth-conditional pragmatics
over Szabó’s analysis. A reason, which according to Recanati gives “prima
facie support” to truth-conditional pragmatics over indexicalism, is the fol-
lowing. We could imagine a language where colour adjectives do not have
context-dependent meanings. If a colour adjective in that language were
used in ordinary conversations about common-sense objects, questions of
contextual adjustments of the meanings of colour ascriptions would arise:
And the context will often answer the question implicitly, in
such a way that a simple ascription, ‘𝑎 is red’, will be under-
stood as ascribing redness to 𝑎 with respect to some contextu-
ally salient part 𝑃 . So whether or not there is a covert variable,
there will be tacit reference to the relevant parts of the object;
it follows that positing a covert variable to account for the tacit
reference in question is a superfluous move which complicates
the semantics without buying us anything. (Recanati, 2010b,
p. 57)
I partly agree and partly disagree with Recanati’s remark. If the notions of
truth-conditional pragmatics and indexicalism are understood as they are
in this chapter, I grant that we don’t have to adopt indexicalism in order
to explain that meanings of colour adjectives are adjusted to concern parts
of objects. But it doesn’t follow that we couldn’t adopt an indexicalist ap-
proach. Recanati claims that such a move would complicate the semantics.
I grant that too, if the comparison point is a semantics without context
dependence. However, Recanati’s truth-conditional pragmatics, which is
the variant of truth-conditional pragmatics I have modified and developed
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in this chapter, complicates the semantics as well (compared to the same
point of comparison). Therefore, I do not agree with Recanati’s claim that
the thought experiment gives prima facie support to truth-conditional prag-
matics over indexicalism. But note that I have not argued against Recanati’s
truth-conditional pragmaticist proposal and I will not do so; in fact, I find
his account plausible.
Digression: Observer relativity or indexicality?
Before we move on to the development of my variants of indexicalism and
truth-conditional pragmatics, I will briefly motivate why I have made some
theoretical choices that differ from the accounts in Hansen (2011), where
observer relativity is built into the analysis of colour adjectives, and Roth-
schild & Segal (2009), which assumes that colour adjectives are indexicals,
in the sense of Kaplan (1989a).
Hansen (2011) discusses the scientific fact that different light stimuli may
appear as identical colours to an observer (in a certain condition of light and
perspective). It is also a scientific fact that there is individual variation in
the perception of light stimuli: two different light stimuli may appear as
the same colour to one observer but not to another. Different light stimuli
that appear identical to an observer are called “metamers” for that observer.
In his proposal for a semantic analysis, Hansen motivates a modification
of the proposal of Kennedy and McNally on the basis of such facts. A
main difference between the accounts is that in Hansen’s analysis, the basic
noun translation of ‘green’ is subscripted with a variable for observer (𝑜) (cf.
Hansen, 2011, p. 215).
I grant that individual variation in the perception of light stimuli explains
some disagreements. For instance, consider the recent survey I found on
the social media site Buzzfeed, where visitors were asked to report their
judgment about the colours of a dress (a picture of the dress appeared on
the site). On the 1st of December 2016, ‘White and Gold’ had 2.4 million
votes (67%) and ‘Blue and Black’ had 1.2 million votes (33%).31
This seems to be a case where there is individual variation in how light
stimuli appear to observers, and the scientific concept of metamers could
31See https://www.buzzfeed.com/catesish/help-am-i-going-insane-its-definitely-blue? or
ask me for a downloaded version of the webpage.
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straightforwardly be used in an explanation of the mentioned disagreement.
Interestingly, the phenomenon of metamers suggests that different indi-
viduals have different common sense conceptions of what properties there
are in the world. However, this kind of disagreement is not a disagreement
about what property some colour expression denotes. It rather concerns
the question about what the facts are in the world, than questions about
the meaning of expressions. But the variants of indexicalism and truth-
conditional pragmatics under development in this chapter are explanations
of contextual adjustments of meaning and not explanations of differences
in conceptions of common sense facts. The phenomena of metamers, and
Hansen’s implementation, therefore fall outside of the empirical and theo-
retical scope of the present investigation.
Turning to indexicality, Rothschild & Segal (2009) argues that ‘red’ and
other colour adjectives are indexical expressions like ‘I’ and ‘here’. I will not
provide a full treatment of pronouns in this dissertation, but an initial prob-
lem with subsuming colour adjectives under the same semantic category as
such expressions, is that the content of ‘I’ and ‘here’ cannot be shifted by
operators, but ‘green’ and other colour adjectives do not exhibit the same
behavior. Consider (65) and (66) below (cf. Kaplan 1989a, p. 510-512):
(65) In some contexts, it is true that I am not tired now.
(66) In some contexts, these leaves are green.
It is impossible for (65) to have the reading that someone other than the
speaker would be tired at some other time than the time of utterance. In
contrast, it is not impossible to hear ‘green’ as denoting some other property
than the one operative in the context of utterance. Suppose that only nat-
urally green leaves are of interest in a given context. (66) could then mean
that the leaves would be counted as green in some context, since they are
painted green. This is my reason for avoiding the analogy between colour
adjectives and indexicals.32
32Kennedy & McNally (2010, p. 83-86) and Clapp (2012, p. 86-92) provide other critical
remarks on Rothschild and Segal’s account.
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2.5.4 Colour adjectives and indexicalism
I will discuss the example the leaf is green below. In order to provide an
analysis of that example, some novel lexical items and syntactic rules are
provided below:
Lexicon
1. leaf ∈ 𝐵𝑁
2. is ∈ 𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑝
3. green, red ∈ 𝐵𝐴
4. 𝐼 , 𝐼0 , 𝐼1, 𝐼2 … ∈ 𝐵𝐴𝑑𝑣
5. 𝑝𝑜𝑠 ∈ 𝐵𝐷𝑒𝑔
The indexicalist analysis adds the following syntactic rules to the framework
already developed:
Syntax
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐴 , [A 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐴 .
2. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐴𝑑𝑣 , [Adv 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑣 .
3. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐷𝑒𝑔 , [Deg 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐷𝑒𝑔 .
4. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑝 , [Cop 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑝 .
5. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑣 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝐴 , then [A 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝐴.
6. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐷𝑒𝑔 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝐴 , then [Predicative 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 .
7. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑝 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 , then [VP 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑉 𝑃 .
The set of types is revised as follows (cf. page 33 and 37): we have a set
of types 𝑌 such that 𝑒 (entity), 𝑣 (event), 𝑑 (degree) and 𝑡 (truth-value)
belong to 𝑌 . As before, for every type 𝑎 and 𝑏 ∈ 𝑌 , there is a function of
type ⟨𝑎, 𝑏 ⟩ ∈ 𝑌 . The modelℳ is now a tuple ⟨𝑀,𝐸,𝐷 , 𝐹 ⟩ such that 𝐹 is
an interpretation function,𝑀 is a set of entities, 𝐸 is a set of events disjoint
from 𝑀 (as before), and 𝐷 is the set of real numbers, which will have its
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standard order ≥. A ‘scale’ will from now on be any function of type 𝑒𝑑,
i.e. any function that maps entities to real numbers. 33
Functions in𝑀𝐸𝑒𝑑 from entities to degrees are called ‘degree functions’.
The variables𝐺,𝐺0 , 𝐺1, 𝐺2 … are of this type. I use𝐻,𝐻0 , 𝐻1, 𝐻2 … as vari-
ables of type ⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑒𝑑 ⟩, i.e. for functions from degree functions to degree
functions. And 𝑆 , 𝑆0 , 𝑆1, 𝑆2 … are variables for functions from degree func-
tions to degrees (type ⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑑⟩). To the definition of meaningful expressions
of 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 a symbol for an ordering relation is added:
Meaningful expressions in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
• ≻− ∈ 𝑀𝐸⟨𝑑,𝑑𝑡  ⟩
The new symbol above is defined in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 as follows:
Truth and denotation in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
• If 𝛼 and 𝛽 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑑 , J𝛼 ≻− 𝛽Kℳ,𝑔 = 1 iff J𝛼Kℳ,𝑔 ≥J𝛽Kℳ,𝑔 .34
Furthermore, I will add these translations:
Translations of basic expressions
• 𝐼0 𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝐺.𝐻0(𝐺)
• green𝑡 𝑟 = green, red𝑡 𝑟 = red
• 𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝐺.𝜆𝑥.𝐺(𝑥) ≻− 𝑆(𝐺)
33Kennedy (2007, p. 32) defines a ‘scale’ as a triple ⟨𝐷 , ≺, 𝛿 ⟩, where𝐷 is a set of points, ≺ is
a total ordering on𝐷 and 𝛿 is a dimension that “indicates the kind of measurement that
the scale represents”. In my analysis, there is no such dimension in the model, and𝐷 is
the set of real numbers not points. This difference spares us the problem of explicating
what it means to say that there is a dimension of measurement in the model (in contrast
to letting the dimension of measurement be an intuitive description of what a given
function from entities to degrees, a ‘scale’ in my terminology, represents). Moreover,
given my framework, there is no need to make precise the idea that 𝐷 is a set of points,
providing the denotations of expressions of type 𝑑 . However, Kennedy (2007, p. 32-36)
uses these aspects of his framework in a discussion of “scale structure” and antonymic
relationships between absolute adjectives. I will leave it open if and how the formal
semantic accounts developed here potentially could explain such phenomena.
34For ease of exposition, I write ‘𝛼 ≻− 𝛽 ’ instead of ‘≻− (𝛼)(𝛽)’.
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• is𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.𝑋
Next, some additional specifications of translations are in order:
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [Adv 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑒𝑑⟩)
2. [A 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type 𝑒𝑑)
3. [Deg 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
4. [Cop 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
5. [A 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑒𝑑)
6. [Predicative 𝛽  𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑒𝑡 )
7. [VP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑒𝑡 )
The following tree structure with translations and type information is an
indexicalist analysis of ‘the leaf is green’:
M.Clause
∃𝑥0 [∀𝑥1[[𝑋1(𝑥1) ∧ leaf(𝑥1)] ↔ 𝑥1 = 𝑥0 ] ∧ 𝐻0 (green)(𝑥0 ) ≻− 𝑆(𝐻0 (green))]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥0 [∀𝑥1[[𝑋1(𝑥1) ∧ leaf(𝑥1)]
↔ 𝑥1 = 𝑥0 ] ∧ 𝑋0 (𝑥0 )]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
D
the
𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋0 ∃𝑥0 [∀𝑥1[𝑋(𝑥1)
↔ 𝑥1 = 𝑥0 ] ∧ 𝑋0 (𝑥0 )]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩
N
𝜆𝑥2 .[𝑋1(𝑥2)
∧leaf(𝑥2)]
𝑒𝑡
N𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑅1
𝜆𝑋2 .𝜆𝑥2 .[𝑋1(𝑥2) ∧ 𝑋2(𝑥2)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
N
leaf
leaf
𝑒𝑡
VP
𝜆𝑥.𝐻0 (green)(𝑥)
≻− 𝑆(𝐻0 (green))
𝑒𝑡
Cop
is
𝜆𝑋.𝑋
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
Predicative
𝜆𝑥.𝐻0 (green)(𝑥)
≻− 𝑆(𝐻0 (green))
𝑒𝑡
Deg
𝑝𝑜𝑠
𝜆𝐺.𝜆𝑥.𝐺(𝑥)
≻− 𝑆(𝐺)
⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
A
𝐻0 (green)
𝑒𝑑
Adv
𝐼0
𝜆𝐺.𝐻0 (𝐺)
⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑒𝑑⟩
A
green
green
𝑒𝑑
This compositional analysis is a development of the account of gradable ad-
jectives in Kennedy (2007) and Kennedy & McNally (2010). It has both
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similarities and differences with those accounts. I will discuss three similar-
ities/differences below.
First, the notion of covert morphological suffix for the positive form,
𝑝𝑜𝑠 , is adopted without significant revision. On my construal, this is not a
difference between indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics, but an
aspect of the analysis that both formal semantic accounts have in common.
The translation of 𝑝𝑜𝑠 introduces a cut-off point by the function denoted
by 𝑆 : a function of type ⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑑⟩mapping scales to real numbers. The trans-
lation of 𝑝𝑜𝑠 also introduces how degrees are to be compared in the final
translation. If an entity falls under the concept expressed by the positive
form of the adjective, the degree to which the entity has the property is
higher or equal to the cut-off point. Comparative and superlative construc-
tions require other relations between degrees, but we will not discuss such
constructions here.
Second, I have eliminated two functions and added one function. The
two functions quality and quantity in Kennedy and McNally’s framework
are not present in my analysis (see 54 and 55 above); context dependence
with regards to these dimensions will instead be handled by the adverbial
variable 𝐼0 and its translation, which applied to the translation of ‘green’
yields a new scale.
Third, my syntax is somewhat different from Kennedy’s, who postulates
a so-called ‘Degree phrase’ of which adjectives and adjective morphemes
constitute parts (Kennedy, 2007, p. 5). Kennedy’s choice is motivated by
reasons of coherence with syntactic theory, more specifically X-bar theory
broadly understood. But the syntax I postulate is not intended to be for-
mulated within X-bar theory; it is intended to be as simple as possible for
showing the semantic facts under discussion.
Let us now turn to the translation of 𝐼0 : 𝜆𝐺.𝐻0(𝐺). By functional ap-
plication, we obtain 𝐻0(green) one step up in the tree. 𝐻0 is a variable of
the same type as adverbs like ‘slowly’ presumably will be in developments
of the semantic accounts (cf. Montague, 1974a). Intuitively, the function
associated with the adverbial variable 𝐼0 , by the variable assignment, takes
a scale (the one associated with ‘green’) and yields a new scale. The differ-
ences between having a green surface, being naturally green, being green
under normal circumstances, looking green in a certain light, etc., etc., are
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here explicated in terms of differences between scales. The choice of scale
depends on context, formally modelled as the variable assignment. Tomake
the idea more vivid, compare with accounts of adjectives in terms of func-
tions from entities to truth values. On such accounts, different meanings
between adjectives are modelled as different functions of type 𝑒𝑡 . If we let
adjectives denote such functions, modulation could result in a change of
the denotation of a given adjective, in a given context (informally, it could
denote another function of type 𝑒𝑡 , after modulation). On the approach
here, (gradable) adjectives are associated with different scales or functions
of type 𝑒𝑑. The denotation of an adjective can be modulated: accordingly,
the precise function of type 𝑒𝑑 denoted in context may vary.35
The indexicalist proposal laid out above is intended as a modification
and development of the indexicalist analysis in (Szabó, 2001), presented as
example (56) above but repeated as (67) below for convenience:
(67) (Green(𝐶 , 𝑃 ))(𝑥)
As I have described above, Szabó argues that (67) is the logical form of the
expression ‘green’. 𝐶 is a variable for comparison class and 𝑃 is a variable
for part. We saw on page 75 that this specific proposal is not empirically
adequate, but as I made plausible in Section 2.5.2, and as I have shown in
this section, there are empirically adequate modified indexicalist accounts
of colour adjectives. In the specific proposal I have put forward, there is
no variable for part and no variable for comparison class (the latter is not
needed for the examples discussed in this section). Nevertheless, the analy-
sis straightforwardly explains the linguistic phenomena presented in Section
2.5.1.
Colour adjectives in attributive position
In the fragment above, adjectives only appear in the verb phrase as predica-
tives. But adjectives could also appear in attributive position in the noun
phrase, intuitively modifying the meaning of the noun. Given the context
dependence of colour adjectives established above, we should also expect
that some sentences that might seem to be contradictory at first sight, in
35See Kennedy (2007) for a discussion and elaboration of the idea that (gradable) adjectives
denote functions of type 𝑒𝑑 .
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fact do not necessarily have contradictory truth conditions, and that some
sentences that might seem tautological at first sight, in fact do not necessar-
ily have tautological truth conditions. Consider the following sentences:
(68) The green leaf is red.
(69) The green leaf is green.
An utterance of (68) might seem contradictory, but the meaning could be
that precisely one contextually salient leaf that looks green has some red
parts.36 And (69) could mean that some unique contextually salient leaf
that is naturally green also looks green, which could be false (if it is, say,
painted red).
In order to account for cases where colour adjectives are in attributive
positions, and to account for the truth conditions of (68) and (69), some
minor additions to the indexicalist framework above are needed. A syntac-
tic rule allowing combinations of attributive adjectives and nouns is postu-
lated:
Syntax
1. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐷𝑒𝑔 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝐴 , then [Attributive 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑟 𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 .
2. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑟 𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑁 , then [N𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟 .
3. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐷 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟 , then [NP 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑃 .
The translations are extended as follows:
36This is the intuitive meaning of the following sentence found on a webpage about cake
toppers:
(68b) Made of heavy glitter card stock, attached to a wooden stick, it is the
same on both side [sic], except the green leaf is red on the back.
(www.etsystudio.com/listing/478690507/cake-topper-big-apple-nyc-party)
In the observed example, the locative ‘on the back’ specifies the intuitive mean-
ing, but it is quite easy to imagine a context where the location is not explicit.
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Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [Attributive 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑒𝑡 )
2. [N𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑥.[𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝑥) ∧ 𝛾𝑡 𝑟 (𝑥)] (type 𝑒𝑡 )
The following tree illustrates the noun phrase ‘the green leaf ’:
NP
𝜆𝑋0 ∃𝑥0 [∀𝑥1[[𝐻0 (green)(𝑥1) ≻− 𝑆(𝐻0 (green)) ∧ [𝑋1(𝑥1)
∧leaf(𝑥1)]] ↔ 𝑥1 = 𝑥0 ] ∧ 𝑋0 (𝑥0 )]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
D
the
𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥0 [∀𝑥1[𝑋(𝑥1) ↔
𝑥1 = 𝑥0 ] ∧ 𝑋0 (𝑥0 )]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩
N𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟
𝜆𝑥3 .[𝐻0 (green)(𝑥3 ) ≻− 𝑆(𝐻0 (green))
∧[𝑋1(𝑥3 ) ∧ leaf(𝑥3 )]]
𝑒𝑡
Attributive
𝜆𝑥.𝐻0 (green)(𝑥) ≻− 𝑆(𝐻0 (green))
𝑒𝑡
Deg
𝑝𝑜𝑠
𝜆𝐺.𝜆𝑥.𝐺(𝑥) ≻− 𝑆(𝐺)
⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
A
𝐻0 (green)
𝑒𝑑
Adv
𝐼0
𝜆𝐺.𝐻0 (𝐺)
⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑒𝑑⟩
A
green
green
𝑒𝑑
N
𝜆𝑥2 .[𝑋1(𝑥2)
∧leaf(𝑥2)]
𝑒𝑡
N𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑅1
𝜆𝑋2 .𝜆𝑥2 .[𝑋1(𝑥2) ∧ 𝑋2(𝑥2)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
N
leaf
leaf
𝑒𝑡
The translations of the attributive and the noun yield a translation one step
up in the tree, at N𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟 , according to the translation rules consisting of two
subphrases stated above. If the noun phrase above were combined with the
verb phrase ‘is green’, the full translation could be:
(70) ∃𝑥0[∀𝑥1[[𝐻0(green)(𝑥1) ≻− 𝑆(𝐻0(green))∧[𝑋1(𝑥1)∧leaf(𝑥1)]] ↔
𝑥1 = 𝑥0] ∧ 𝐻1(green)(𝑥0) ≻− 𝑆(𝐻1(green))]
This could be, but does not have to be, the translation of ‘The green leaf
is green’, on the indexicalist account. I say ‘could’, because the the choice
of variables 𝐻0 and 𝐻1 depends on which covert variables (𝐼 , 𝐼0 , 𝐼1, …) are
chosen in the logical form (i.e. in the phrase structure tree). If the trans-
lation is as above, however, the truth conditions are not necessarily tauto-
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logical: 𝐻0(green) and 𝐻1(green) could denote different properties (the
property of being green on the inside, say, or being naturally green). And
‘the green leaf is red’ is not necessarily contradictory, even if it is stipulated
in the semantics that no object could be both (totally) green and (totally)
red: 𝐻0(green) could denote the property of being naturally green whereas
𝐻0(red) could denote the property of being painted red.
Kennedy & McNally do not discuss attributive adjectives, but disregard-
ing the indexicalist aspect ofmy analysis, what I have said here about attribu-
tive adjectives is closely related to a natural development of the proposal of
Kennedy & McNally (2010). They let adjectives be of type 𝑒𝑑, but com-
bined with the silent morpheme 𝑝𝑜𝑠 , an expression of type 𝑒𝑡 results (ibid.,
p. 95). This sketch of a compositional analysis could naturally be made
more precise by adding the syntactic rules combining a Deg-phrase with an
Adjective-phrase to an Attributive-phrase above, and the rule combining
an N-phrase and an Attributive-phrase to an N𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑟 -phrase, and the associ-
ated translations, which I employ above. Kennedy (2007, p. 5), however,
sketches a syntactic/semantic account in terms of X-bar theory, and uses
the syntactic label “DegP” and not “Attributive”, as in my proposal.
2.5.5 Colour adjectives and truth-conditional
pragmatics
Recanati elaborates on his truth-conditional pragmaticist proposal (referred
to as “contextualist position” in the quote below) about ‘green’ as follows:
[T]he standard contextualist position regarding colour predi-
cates is that an adjective like ‘green’ or ‘red’ denotes a deter-
minate property or contributes a determinate predicate: the
predicate GREEN or HAVING THE COLOUR GREEN.
This is a complete predicate, not something that stands in need
of contextual completion; but in context the property that is
ascribed is made more specific through specification of (inter
alia) the parts or dimension under which the property applies
to the object talked about. (Recanati, 2010b, p. 56)
Recanati’s discussion above is intended to point to a difference between
Szabó’s specific variant of indexicalism and Recanati’s proposal. Whereas
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Recanati’s truth-conditional pragmatics lets ‘green’ denote a property, Sz-
abó’s ‘green’ has a more incomplete meaning and denotes a property only
after saturation of the variables 𝑃 and 𝐶 , or so Recanati understands the
proposal. Let’s grant that this is a reasonable reading of (Szabó, 2001). But
this is not a difference between my modified indexicalism and the truth-
conditional pragmaticist analysis to be stated below. Both the indexicalist
and the truth-conditional pragmaticist formal approach contain the expres-
sion green, which denotes a function from entities to degrees (real num-
bers). Intuitively, one might think of the scale denoted by green as letting
every object that is green in some sense or other be associated with a degree
above the cut-off point introduced by the phonologically silent morpheme
𝑝𝑜𝑠 . By adverbial variables in the logical form or by modulation variables
in the translation (as below) the indexicalist or truth-conditional pragmati-
cist analysis allows for other scales to be denoted when ‘green’ occurs in the
context of a sentence.
The truth-conditional pragmaticist extension is identical to the indexical-
ist, except for the implementation of context dependence. I will therefore
describe the truth-conditional pragmaticist variant briefly, but bear in mind
that it contains all complexities above that do not pertain to context depen-
dence.
In the truth-conditional pragmaticist extension of the framework, the
lexicon and syntax are similar to its indexicalist counterparts but somewhat
sparser. The truth-conditional pragmaticist has no need for the adverbial
variables 𝐼 , 𝐼0 etc. and doesn’t need the syntactic rules 5 and 2 on page 81
(at least not for the phenomena at hand).
The truth-conditional pragmaticist’s translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 is identical
to 𝑡 𝑟 in its translation of basic expressions:
Translations of basic expressions
• leaf𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = leaf𝑡 𝑟
• is𝑡 𝑟𝑐 =is𝑡 𝑟
• green𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = green𝑡 𝑟
• 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑟
As in earlier truth-conditional pragmaticist extensions of the semantics, ev-
ery syntactic operation adds a new modulation variable in the translation:
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Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [A 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = 𝑂𝐴(𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ) (type 𝑒𝑑)
2. [Deg 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝑂𝐷𝑒𝑔(𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ) (type ⟨𝑒𝑑, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
3. [Cop 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑝(𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ) (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
4. [Predicative 𝛽  𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝑂𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝛾𝑡 𝑟𝑐 (𝛽𝑡 𝑟𝑐 )) (type 𝑒𝑡 )
5. [VP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝑂𝑉 𝑃 (𝛽𝑡 𝑟𝑐 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟𝑐 )) (type 𝑒𝑡 )
The expression under consideration accordingly receives the following
translation:
𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ([.M.Clause [.NP [.DThe ] [.N leaf ]] [.VP [.Cop is] [.Pred-
icative [.Deg 𝑝𝑜𝑠] [.A green ] ]]])=
𝑂𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒(𝑂𝑁𝑃 (𝑂𝐷 (𝜆𝑋 .𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥0[∀𝑥1[𝑋(𝑥1) ↔
𝑥1 = (𝑥0)] ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥0)])
(𝑂𝑁 (leaf))) (𝑂𝑉 𝑃 (𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑝(𝜆𝑋 .𝑋)
(𝑂𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑂𝐷𝑒𝑔(𝜆𝐺.𝜆𝑥.𝐺(𝑥) ≻− 𝑆(𝐺))
(𝑂𝐴(green)))))))
If the only modified meaning is that of ‘green’, the translation simplifies to
the following:
𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ([.M.Clause [.NP [.D The ] [.N leaf ]] [.VP [.Cop is] [.AP
[.A green ] [.Deg 𝑝𝑜𝑠]]]])=
𝜆𝑋.𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥0[∀𝑥1[𝑋(𝑥1) ↔ 𝑥1 = (𝑥0)] ∧ 𝑋0(𝑥0)]
(leaf) (𝜆𝐺.𝜆𝑥.𝐺(𝑥) ≻− 𝑆(𝐺)(𝑂𝐴(green)))
In the case of attributive constructions, truth-conditional pragmatics can
adopt the syntax rules and translations operative in the tree on page 87,
except for the ones introducing the indexicalist’s covert variable.
Summing up Section 2.5, I began by illustrating ways in which colour
adjectives have context-dependent meanings. I continued to present three
suggestions of how to implement this fact in compositional semantic anal-
yses: Kennedy & McNally (2010), Szabó (2001) and Recanati (2010b). I
argued that, even if Kennedy and McNally, who aim to refute the indexi-
calist account in Szabó (2001), succeed in their criticism of Szabó’s specific
proposal, there are other indexicalist analyses available that avoid their crit-
icism. I then extended indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics to
accommodate colour adjectives.
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2.6 Meaning Litigation
Some disagreements concern what a given expression should mean. Follow-
ing Ludlow (2014), I will call such discussions ‘meaning litigations’. The
discussion of the expression ‘planet’, which took place in scientific commu-
nities and in public debates in the beginning of this century, is a case in
point. Ludlow (2014) also reports on a number of naturally occurring ex-
amples of meaning litigations – I will focus on one about ‘athlete’ below.37
The plan for the section is as follows. I begin by describing the data to
account for: the ‘planet’-case and the ‘athlete’-case. After this, I present
Ludlow’s suggestion that these examples are straightforwardly explained by
(his variant of ) radical contextualism. I will argue that meaning litigation
could also be explained by truth-conditional pragmatics and indexicalism.
As before, the section ends by an extension of indexicalism that explains the
mentioned cases, and a truth-conditional pragmaticist extension explaining
the same examples.
2.6.1 The ‘planet’-case and the ‘athlete’-case
It has been recognized for a long time that Pluto differs in several respects
from other celestial bodies traditionally classified as ‘planets of our solar
system’: its orbit and its material properties differ significantly. Modern
astronomy nevertheless classified Pluto as ‘planet’ until August 24 2006,
when the general assembly of the International Astronomical Union (IAU)
made the decision to adopt a definition of ‘planet’ that leaves Pluto outside
of the term’s extension. The decision was a rejection of the association’s
Planetary Definition Committee’s proposal, which would have left Pluto
in the extension of ‘planet’ (Ludlow, 2014, p. 42-45). It is accordingly
natural to suppose that disagreements of the following sort occurred:
37In early analytic philosophy, Waismann pursued a related discussion in (MacKinnon
et al., 1945) about concept development in scientific language. Waismann did not use
the term ‘meaning litigation’ but referred to more or less the same phenomenon as the
‘open texture’ of empirical concepts. Earlier on, the German term ‘Porosität der Begriffe’
was used byWaismann (according to a footnote inMacKinnon et al. 1945). Kaså (2017,
p. 1-52) discusses these notions in relation to the notion of convergent concepts, which
he explicates in terms of ‘trial-and-error classifiers’.
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(71) Astronomer 1: Pluto is a planet.
Astronomer 2: Pluto is not a planet.
Bearing in mind that the disagreement in (71) is not factual but rather lin-
guistic or conceptual, it would be odd to suggest that one of the astronomers
says something true and one says something false. But before I present a
formal modelling, I will describe another case of meaning litigation.
Ludlow (2014) reports an observation of meaning litigation:
Consider the dispute I heard onWFAN (a sports talk radio sta-
tion in New York) when Sports Illustrated announced its “50
greatest athletes of the 20th Century.” Some listeners called in
complaining that a horse–Secretariat–had made the list, while
Chris Russo defended the choice. Clearly this is a dispute
about what should be in the extension of ‘athlete’, and the
callers wanted to argue that a horse had no place here. (Lud-
low, 2014, p. 78)
Regimenting the observation to some extent, the case could be formulated
as follows:
(72) Chris Russo: Secretariat is an athlete.
Listener: Secretariat is not an athlete.
A semantic explanation should account for the intuition that Chris Russo
and Listener are not contradicting each other, in a semantic sense, even
though it might seem so at first sight.38
2.6.2 Ludlow’s explanation
According to Ludlow’s radical contextualist explanation, the utterances in
(71) and (72) are meta-linguistic utterances used with the purpose of de-
creasing the semantic underdetermination of ‘planet’ or ‘athlete’ by point-
ing out an object that falls outside or inside the extension of the term on the
proposed sharpening (see Chapter 1.5.2). Astronomer 1 and Astronomer 2
38The examples discussed here resemble cases of so-called ‘faultless disagreement’, discussed
in the debate about semantic relativism (e.g. Lasersohn 2005). But the discussion here
is not intended to be related to the theoretical issues raised in that debate.
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are debating how their micro-language should be constructed (and similarly
for Chris Russo and Listener). They are not contradicting each other, since
the standards for the micro-language are under discussion: truth/falsity ap-
plies to communicated utterances in a micro-language only when the in-
terlocutors agree on the meaning of the used expressions (Ludlow, 2014,
p. 1-7, 72-89, 112-113).
2.6.3 Indexicalism and meaning litigation
The indexicalist strategy will be to adopt an explanation similar to the one
provided for domain restriction and transfer (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
Briefly and informally put, the idea is that the noun ‘planet’, which will
have a translation of type 𝑒𝑡 , is combined with a phonologically covert vari-
able, which denotes a contextually determined function of type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩.
But precisely which function that is denoted is determined by context. In
(71), the meaning of Astronomer 1’s utterance of ‘Pluto is a planet’ is true,
because ‘planet’, in that context, denotes a function taking Pluto to 1. The
context of Astronomer 2’s utterance is different: here the function takes
Pluto to 0. How modulation operates in determining the intuitively cor-
rect semantic value for the variable is a question left to pragmatic theory
(see Chapter 4.4).
Almost all lexical items needed for the phenomenon under discussion
are already in place (see e.g. Section 2.2). For good measure, we make the
following minor additions:
Lexicon
1. a ∈ 𝐵𝐼𝐷 39
Syntax
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐼𝐷 , [ID 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐼𝐷 .
39The use of ‘a’ in the relevant example does not seem to have any significant semantic
effect and will denote the identity function mapping functions of type 𝑒𝑡 to functions
of type 𝑒𝑡 (the expression 𝑎, as it occurs in the examples relevant to this section, is not
a determiner). Lacking a better label for ‘a’ as it occurs in predicatives, I will call the
set of basic expressions of which it is a member ‘ID’ (relating the label to the notion of
identity).
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2. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐼𝐷 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑁 , then [Predicative 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 .
3. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑛 , then [NP 𝛽] ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑃 .
Translations of basic expressions
• a𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.𝑋
The translations of phrasal expressions are extended as follows:
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [ID 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
2. [NP 𝛽]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩)
Accordingly, the following phrase structure tree, with translations at each
step, is a part of the indexicalist variant of 𝐿:
M.Clause
𝑁0(planet)(p)
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑃 .𝑃 (p)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Pn
Pluto
𝜆𝑃 .𝑃 (p)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
VP
𝑁0(planet)
𝑒𝑡
Cop
is
𝜆𝑋.𝑋
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
Predicative
𝑁0(planet)
𝑒𝑡
ID
a
𝜆𝑋.𝑋
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
N
𝑁0(planet)
𝑒𝑡
N𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑛0
𝜆𝑋.𝑁0(𝑋)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
N
planet
planet
𝑒𝑡
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In (71) the two interlocutors assign different values to 𝑁0 . Thereby, dif-
ferent functions are denoted. The function denoted by [N 𝑁0(planet)] in
the sentence used by Astronomer 1, who claims that Pluto is a planet, takes
Pluto to 1, whereas the function denoted by [N 𝑁0(planet)] in the context
of Astronomer 2’s utterance, denotes a function that takes Pluto to 0.40
As before, the semantics shows that the readings in question are possible,
but pragmatic theory will have to restrict the likely choices of variable as-
signments. The later task is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation.
I will discuss differences between my proposals and Ludlow’s below, but
the truth-conditional pragmaticist extension will be considered first.
2.6.4 Truth-conditional pragmatics and meaning litigation
The truth-conditional pragmaticist has no need for the lexical category𝑁𝑣𝑎𝑟
and its syntactic counterpart. But the other lexical items and syntactic
rules stated above, in the indexicalist extension concerning meaning litiga-
tion, will be used by the truth-conditional pragmaticist as well. The truth-
conditional pragmaticist’s translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 is, as usual, identical to
𝑡 𝑟 in its translation of basic expressions.
This is, accordingly, the full truth-conditional pragmaticist translation of
‘Pluto is a planet’:
𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ([.M.Clause [.NP [.Pn Pluto]] [.VP [.Cop is] [.Predicative
[.ID a] [.N planet]]]])=
𝑂𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒(𝑂𝑁𝑃 (𝑂𝑃 𝑛(𝜆𝑃 .𝑃 (p)))(𝑂𝑉 𝑃 (𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑝(𝜆𝑋 .𝑋)
(𝑂𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑂𝐼𝐷 (𝜆𝑋 .𝑋)
(𝑂𝑁 (planet)))))))
If every vacuous modulation variable is eliminated, we obtain the following
translation:
𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ([.M.Clause [.NP [.Pn Pluto]] [.VP [.Cop is] [.Predicative
[.ID a] [.N planet]]]])= 𝑂𝑁 (planet)(p)
40Alternatively, indexicalism can account for Astronomer 1 and 2’s utterances by supposing
that Astronomer 1 and 2 are using different sentences, where different variables, for
instance 𝑛0 and 𝑛1, appear under N𝑣𝑎𝑟 . The difference is not audible, since the variables
are phonologically covert.
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For the truth-conditional pragmaticist, the account of meaning litigation
is, accordingly, essentially the same as the explanation of quantifier domain
restrictions and transfer put forward in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
2.6.5 Meaning litigation: comparisons and conclusions
There is a crucial difference between Ludlow’s radical contextualist proposal,
on the one hand, and my indexicalist and truth-conditional pragmaticist
proposals, on the other. The difference is that the former proposal lets se-
mantic underdetermination, and the process of sharpening, which decreases
underdetermination, play a significant role, whereas the latter proposals let
the distinction between the denotation of ‘planet’ in the model available in
the utterance situation and the modulated meaning, which depends on the
variable assignment, play a key role.
As should be clear by now, the phenomenon of meaning litigation could
neither be used for refuting indexicalism or truth-conditional pragmatics
nor for showing that indexicalism or truth-conditional pragmatics are lead
to help hypotheses of the ad hoc variety in attempts to model the phe-
nomenon. It is rather the case that the theorist’s choice of explanation
of this phenomena will be dependent on theoretical commitments already
adopted.
In conclusion: my purpose in this section has been to show that it is pos-
sible to explain the phenomenon of meaning litigation within the frame-
work of indexicalism, and to show how truth-conditional pragmatics could
account for it. The indexicalist proposal posits a variable in the syntactic
structure, whose value is pragmatically determined, the truth-conditional
pragmaticist operates, as usual, with modulation variables in the type the-
oretic language used for translations. I have not claimed that these expla-
nations are better than the radical contextualist proposal. A theory com-
parison between radical contextualism and indexicalism/truth-conditional
pragmatics would in principle be interesting and probably worthwhile, but
it would require that radical contextualism is made more precise. In this
dissertation, I focus on indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics.41
41A further topic for research could be to formulate a framework for the pragmatics of
meaning litigation. A possible result of a meaning litigation is that one proposal wins,
and that a new convention is formed. This was clearly the case in the astronomers’
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2.7 Enrichments of thematic roles
The intuitive truth conditions of the following two sentences seem to in-
volve thematic roles that do not correspond to any part of the sentences’
surface structure:
(73) Mary took out the key and opened the door.
(74) It’s raining.
Intuitively, (73) means that Mary took out a contextually salient key and
opened a contextually salient door with the key that she took out. And when
(74) is used, the speaker and hearer normally have a contextually salient
location in mind.
However, it is possible to use (73) without conveying that Mary used the
key as instrument for opening the door. And, as Recanati has argued, (74)
could be used indefinitely, i.e. without reference to a particular location:
I can imagine a situation in which rain has become extremely
rare and important, and rain detectors have been disposed all
over the territory (whatever the territory – possibly the whole
Earth). In the imagined scenario, each detector triggers an
alarm bell in theMonitoring Roomwhen it detects rain. There
is a single bell; the location of the triggering detector is indi-
cated by a light on a board in the Monitoring Room. After
weeks of total drought, the bell eventually rings in the Mon-
itoring Room. Hearing it, the weatherman on duty in the
adjacent room shouts: ’It’s raining!’ His utterance is true, iff
it is raining (at the time of utterance) in some place or other.
(Recanati, 2010b, p. 81)
Below, I will review Recanati’s truth-conditional pragmaticist explanation
of these intuitive readings (focusing on the case of weather reports). I will
also consider two indexicalist alternative explanations of weather reports
and their semantics: one that construes location in a broad sense, sketched
by Martí (2006), and one that distinguishes between free and existentially
bound readings of weather reports, discussed and criticized by Recanati
debate about ‘Pluto’.
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(2010b). I will consider Recanati’s criticism of the latter proposal and end
up rejecting his criticism. One indexicalist and one truth-conditional prag-
maticist extension of the formal semantic accounts are then put forward.
But before we start, a few words about ‘unarticulated constituents’ are
in order. Perry (1986) introduced this notion in a theoretical account of
weather reports and other expressions where there seems to be a compo-
nent in the proposition that is not the denotation of any expression of the
sentence. Recanati (2010b, p. 23-24) points out that modulation and free
enrichment are not the same theoretical notions as that of unarticulated con-
stituents. Free enrichment operates on the meaning of parts of sentences
by changing it, Recanati explains, and could therefore not really be said to
add anything to them. He continues, however, by saying that free enrich-
ment could also operate on the meaning of the top-node of a sentence, and
in that case free enrichment functions like unarticulated constituents. In
general, however, the proposal in (Perry, 1986) is, just like the proposal in
(Korta & Perry, 2011), difficult to compare with frameworks in formal se-
mantics, given the relatively high level of semantic and syntactic precision
of the contemporary debate, as proponents of unarticulated constituents
seem to acknowledge (see Korta & Perry, 2011, p. 111).
2.7.1 Recanati’s truth-conditional pragmaticist proposal and two
variants of indexicalism
In Recanati’s theoretical proposal, there is a distinction between the “bare
logical form” of (74) and the “modified logical form”. The bare logical form,
which reveals the underlying logical structure of the sentence type and its
conventional meaning, does not have a thematic role for location:
(75) ∃𝑒[rain(𝑒)]
However, the modified logical forms, which are typically associated with
uses of (74), and accordingly could be appealed to in an explanation of
the intuitive truth conditions of the sentence, contain the thematic role of
location as well as references to particular locations. A use of (74) could, for
instance, mean that it is raining in Paris. The modified logical form would,
in that case, be as follows:
(76) ∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒,Paris)]
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Recanati (2010b) considers two alternative explanations of the linguistic
intuition that a particular location could be, but does not necessarily have
to be, a part of the intuitive truth conditions. First, Martí (2006) has argued
that the weatherman case above does not show that there are indefinite
readings of weather reports. In the case at hand, the earth is the location for
the raining event, she claims. The floor is therefore open for an indexicalist
analysis, where a free variable for location is present in the logical form,
according to Martí. Recanati admits that this line of response is possible,
on the indexicalist’s behalf. It presupposes, however, that the indexicalist’s
variable ranges over locations in a broad sense, and that an event could be
said to occur at a location 𝑙 , if it occurs at sub-location 𝑙 ′ of 𝑙 , as Recanati
points out (Recanati, 2010b, p. 108-109) (this point will be relevant below).
Second, as Recanati conjectures, in contrast to Martí, indexicalists could
argue that there is a free variable for location in the cases where a narrow
location is intuitively salient, and that this variable is bound by an existential
quantifier in the weatherman case (Recanati, 2010b, p. 98-102).
Recanati argues against the viability of the latter indexicalist proposal
(while accepting the former one as a theoretical alternative). The main con-
sideration against that alternative, is that it is committed to a problematic
view about negation. Consider the following variation of the weatherman
case:
Imagine a situation where the absence of rain has become ex-
tremely rare and important (it rains almost everywhere and ev-
erytime). All over the territory detectors have been disposed,
which trigger an alarm bell in the Monitoring Room when
they detect absence of rain. There is a single bell; the location
of the triggering detector is indicated by a light on a board in
the Monitoring Room. After weeks of flood, the bell eventu-
ally rings in the Monitoring Room. Hearing it, the weather-
man on duty in the adjacent room shouts: ‘It’s not raining!’.
(Recanati, 2010b, p. 103)
Recanati claims that the use of ‘It’s not raining’ in a context like the one
described is infelicitous: it is difficult and unnatural to assign the truth con-
ditions that the sentence is true iff it is not raining at some place or other.
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This is deeply problematic for the latter indexicalist proposal, according to
Recanati, who elaborates the complaint as follows:
[The latter indexicalist proposal] has trouble accounting for
the unavailability of the indefinite reading of [(74)]. Accord-
ing to that theory, ‘rain’ carries a location variable, which is
optional and can be bound by a covert existential quantifier.
That is what happens in the weatherman example. In the neg-
ative variant of the example, therefore, the existential quanti-
fier is expected to interact with negation, in such a way that
two readings ought to be generated, depending on the scope of
negation: the sentence will say either that at some location 𝑙 ,
there is no rain, or that it is not the case that, at some location
𝑙 , there is rain. But the first reading is not actually available.
(Recanati, 2010b, p. 104-105)
I disagree with Recanati’s claims about the latter indexicalist variant, which
I take to be the most promising one to develop in an indexicalist direction.
I will now provide my reasons for choosing the latter indexicalist variant
over the former variant (defended by Martí).
The reason I choose to develop the latter indexicalist variant is that it
marks a contrast between a clearly definite, specific reading of (74), where
a narrow location is intuitively salient, and a clearly indefinite, unspecific,
existential reading where no location in the domain is more salient than
any other. If the indexicalist just treats these two readings as a difference
in contextual variable assignment, the contrast is lost. A further compli-
cation for the proposal of Martí (2006) is the context-dependent sub-part
relation one thereby has to account for: in some cases, for instance in the
weatherman case, raining events are taking place at some but not all sub-
parts of the broad location, whereas in other cases, the intuitive meaning
is that the raining event is located at every sub-part of the location (if I,
for instance, look out through the kitchen window an early morning, after
weeks of drought and sunshine, and say to my 5 year old daughter ‘Look!
It’s raining’).
In the event semantics literature, the claim that one should not let the
event quantifier have scope over (truth-functional) negation has been
stressed in various places (cf. Champollion 2015, p. 37, and Parsons 1990).
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However, it is not clear that readings that could be accounted for by letting
the event quantifier have scope over negation in fact are infelicitous to com-
petent speakers. The empirical facts are not completely clear in this case. It
is not obvious, at least not to me, that the use of ‘It’s not raining’ in the story
above is infelicitous: my account therefore makes room for the possibility
that such a reading exists. In the fragment below, I will provide rules and
translations that allow the event quantifier to have scope over negation (and
the other way around). The extension will thus not follow Champollion’s
Scope domain principle, which was discussed in Section 2.1.2. However,
the rules allowing the event quantifier to have scope over negation could be
eliminated without much loss.
2.7.2 Extending the fragment: indexicalism
In this section, I will provide an indexicalist explanation of the following
sentences/readings:
1. The definite reading of (74), where one location is intuitively salient.
2. The indefinite reading of (74), where no specific location is salient
(where the reading is paraphrasable as ‘It is raining somewhere’).
3. The sentence ‘It is raining in Paris’.
4. The sentence ‘It is not raining’, understood definitely (about one
salient location).
5. The same sentence, ‘It is not raining’, understood indefinitely (para-
phrasable as ‘It is not raining anywhere’).
6. The same sentence, again, but now with the reading ‘there is an event
that is not a raining event taking place at some location’.
7. The sentence ‘Kim opens the door’ with the intuitive reading that
Kim opens the door with the key (or some other contextually salient
instrument).
8. The sentence ‘Kim opens the door with the key’.
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The analysis of the sentence ‘Kim opens the door’ explains the reading of
(73). I have chosen to provide a compositional analysis of a sentence slightly
different from the one in (73), since the original one also exhibits the phe-
nomenon of ellipsis, a phenomenon not immediately relevant to the present
discussion. The reason for providing a compositional analysis of ‘It is rain-
ing in Paris’ and ‘Kim opens the door with the key’ is that it is thereby
shown how the analysis of sentences where the location or the instrument
is explicit are related to the analysis of the implicit/definite readings.
I will also provide syntactic rules and translations that could be used by an
indexicalist theorist, if she wishes to account for readings by letting the event
quantifier have scope over negation (as in reading 6 above). This is to allow
for the possibility that the sentence ‘it is not raining’, as it is used in the story
on page 99, is felicitous to some speakers. If one finds Recanati’s empirical
claim correct, however, it is easy to eliminate these rules and translations.
The fragment is extended as follows. In the lexicon, there are some new
categories. The main verb in the construction under consideration, ‘rain-
ing’, differs from verbs treated previously in the dissertation, in that it is not
associated with the thematic role of agent. I will follow the literature and
treat it as a predicate of events; lexically it is a verb variant of category 𝑉𝑒 .
The variables𝑊 ,𝑊0 , 𝑊1, … and 𝑌 , 𝑌0 , 𝑌1, …will be combined with the verb
in the syntactic analysis: lexically they are labelled ‘locatives’. 𝑈 ,𝑈0 , 𝑈1, …
will be of the lexical category called ‘instrumental’. These are the added
items to the lexicon:
Lexicon
1. raining ∈ 𝐵𝑉𝑒
2. opens ∈ 𝐵𝑇 𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟
3. it is ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝐻
4. in_Paris ∈ 𝐵𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
5. with_the_key etc. ∈ 𝐵𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙
6. not ∈ 𝐵𝑁𝑒𝑔
7. 𝑌 , 𝑌0 , 𝑌1, …,𝑊 ,𝑊0 , 𝑊1, … ∈ 𝐵𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
8. 𝑈 ,𝑈0 , 𝑈1, 𝑈2 etc. ∈ 𝐵𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙
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The verb ‘opens’, intuitively speaking, requires three thematic roles: an
agent (the entity opening something), a theme (the entity that is opened)
and an instrument (the entity used for opening). Syntactically, I will let
‘open’ be a transitive verb associated with a noun phrase, intuitively denot-
ing the theme of the event, an instrumental phrase, intuitively denoting the
instrument used in the event of opening, and a (subject) noun phrase intu-
itively denoting the agent of the event. I will use the syntactic label TV𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟
for verbs like ‘opens’.
I have chosen to let ‘it is’ belong to a class of ‘placeholders’ and denote an
identity function. In a more fine-grained syntactic theory, or in a discussion
focusing on other questions, these expressions would perhaps have been
given a different syntactic treatment. For instance, it may be appropriate
to distinguish between different temporal expressions, marking different
tenses. This is, however, not in our focus now, and by preliminarily treating
‘it is’ in this manner, several complex questions that are not relevant for our
purpose in this chapter are avoided.
We have the following syntactic rules. ‘S.Clause’ is an abbreviation for
‘Subordinated Clause’.
Syntax
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑁𝑒𝑔 , [Neg 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔 .
2. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑁𝑒𝑔 , [Neg𝑒 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑒 .
3. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑇 𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 , [TV𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑇 𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 .
4. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝐻 , [PH 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝐻 .
5. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑒 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑉𝑒 , then [NegP𝑒 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑒 .
6. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 , [Locative 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 .
7. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 , [Instrumental 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 .
8. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑉𝑒 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 , then [S.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑆 .𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 .
9. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑒 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 , then [S.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑆 .𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 .
10. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝐻 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑆 .𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 , then [M.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 .
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11. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝐻 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃 , then [M.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 .
12. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑆 .𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 , then [NegP 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑃 .
13. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑇 𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑃 , then [TV 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑇 𝑉 .
14. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑇 𝑉 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 , then [VP 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑉 𝑃 .
In 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 , I will use 𝐿, 𝐿0 , … as variables of type ⟨𝑣 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩, and 𝑇 , 𝑇0 , … as
variables over expressions of type 𝑡 . Some new symbols are added to 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 :
Meaningful expressions in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
• 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∈ 𝑀𝐸⟨𝑣 ,𝑒𝑡 ⟩
• open ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑣𝑡
• Paris ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑒
• key, door ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑒𝑡
Translations of basic expressions are as follows:
Translations of basic expressions
1. raining𝑡 𝑟 = rain, opens𝑡 𝑟 = open
2. in_Paris𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒,Paris)]
3. not𝑡 𝑟 = ¬42
4. with_the_key𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[key(𝑥0)∧𝑋0(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥 =
𝑥0] ∧ 𝑋(𝑥)]
5. 𝑌𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒∃𝐿∃𝑥[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]43
6. 𝑊𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)], 𝑊 0 𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧
𝐿0(𝑒, 𝑥)], etc.
7. 𝑈𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑋.∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑋0(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥0 = 𝑥] ∧ 𝑋(𝑥)], 𝑈 0 𝑡 𝑟 =
𝜆𝑋.∃𝑥[∀𝑥0[𝑋1(𝑥0) ↔ 𝑥0 = 𝑥] ∧ 𝑋(𝑥)], etc.
42Negated propositions, 𝑝 , will, informally, be written ¬𝑝 and not ¬(𝑝).
43As before, 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥), and similar formulations, are informal variants of the correct notation:
𝐿(𝑒)(𝑥), etc.
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8. it is𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
The translation of ‘with_the_key’ above is of the same type as noun phrases.
In this case, the contextual domain restriction is built into the translation
of ‘with_the_key’ (the variable 𝑋0 will do that job) and is not the result
of a separate restriction phrase (cf. page 44). In the variable case, where
𝑈 is translated into an expression that will, intuitively speaking, fill in the
role of instrument in the compositional analysis, there is only a free variable
𝑋0 providing the contextually salient property (the property of being a key
of mine, for example). A more developed syntactic and semantic theory
about instrumentals could provide more details, but these translations are
sufficient for our purposes.
The translation of phrasal expressions will be as follows:
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [Neg 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type 𝑡 𝑡 )
2. [Neg𝑒 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑒.𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (𝑓 (𝑒)) (type ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩)
3. [TV𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑄0 .𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)
∧ 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥0)) ∧
𝑄0(𝜆𝑥1.𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥1))]
(type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩)
4. [Locative 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩)
5. [Instrumental 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩)
6. [S.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛾𝑡 𝑟 (𝛽𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑡 )
7. [NegP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑡 )
8. [NegP𝑒 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑣𝑡)
9. [TV 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
10. [PH 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type 𝑡 𝑡 )
11. [M.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟 ) (type 𝑡 )
The definite reading (reading 1 on page 102) is accounted for by the fol-
lowing tree structure, where translations are written under each node. The
semantics lets the variables 𝐿 and 𝑥 be free, and thus leaves it open what
105
disarming context dependence
relation between an entity and an event that 𝐿 denotes, and what entity 𝑥
denotes. The semantics makes it possible for this relation to be the relation
of being located at some place, and the entity could be a place (like a city,
a street etc.),
M.Clause
∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
PH
it is
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
S.Clause
∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
V𝑒
raining
rain
𝑣𝑡
Locative
𝑊
𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
The indefinite reading is accounted for in the following analysis, where
quantifiers bind the variables 𝐿 and 𝑥:
M.Clause
∃𝑒∃𝐿∃𝑥[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
PH
it is
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
S.Clause
∃𝑒∃𝐿∃𝑥[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
V𝑒
raining
rain
𝑣𝑡
Locative
𝑌
𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒∃𝐿∃𝑥[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
In the following compositional analysis, it is seen how ‘it is raining in Paris’
parallels ‘it is raining’ on its definite reading:
106
indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics
M.Clause
∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒,Paris)]
𝑡
PH
it is
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
S.Clause
∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒,Paris)]
𝑡
V𝑒
raining
rain
𝑣𝑡
Locative
in_Paris
𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒,Paris)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Turning to negations of the sentence in question, the following analysis
shows a negation of the definite reading:
M.Clause
¬∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
PH
it is
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
NegP
¬∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
Neg
not
¬
𝑡𝑡
S.Clause
∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
V𝑒
raining
rain
𝑣𝑡
Locative
𝑊
𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
And the negation of the indefinite reading:
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M.Clause
¬∃𝑒∃𝐿∃𝑥[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
PH
it is
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
NegP
¬∃𝑒∃𝐿∃𝑥[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
Neg
not
¬
𝑡𝑡
S.Clause
∃𝑒∃𝐿∃𝑥[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
𝑡
V𝑒
raining
rain
𝑣𝑡
Locative
𝑌
𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒∃𝐿∃𝑥[𝑓 (𝑒) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒, 𝑥)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Finally, consider the following tree structure and translations that could
be used to account for the reading of ‘it is not raining’ in Recanati’s story
on page 99, if one denied Recanati’s claim that the use is infelicitous. The
readings would then be paraphrasable as ‘there is somewhere an event that
is not a raining event’:
108
indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics
M.Clause
∃𝑒0∃𝐿∃𝑥[¬rain(𝑒0) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒0 , 𝑥)]
𝑡
PH
it is
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
S.Clause
∃𝑒0∃𝐿∃𝑥[¬rain(𝑒0) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒0 , 𝑥)]
𝑡
NegP𝑒
𝜆𝑒.¬rain(𝑒)
𝑣 𝑡
Neg𝑒
not
𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑒.¬𝑓 (𝑒)
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩
V𝑒
raining
rain
𝑣𝑡
Locative
𝑌
𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒0∃𝐿∃𝑥[𝑓 (𝑒0) ∧ 𝐿(𝑒0 , 𝑥)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Consider next the sentence ‘Kim opens the door’. In the following anal-
ysis, there is a free variable 𝑋4 whose meaning specifies the instrument for
the event in question. It is thus left to pragmatic mechanisms to deter-
mine what instrument is relevant, coherent etc. for a given use of the sen-
tence. Furthermore, there is another free variable, 𝑋2, in the translation of
the noun phrase, whose meaning restricts ‘the door’ to contextually salient
doors (as in Section 2.2.1).
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M.Clause
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, k)
∧open(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑥2 [∀𝑥3 [[𝑋2(𝑥3 ) ∧ door(𝑥3 )]
↔ 𝑥3 = 𝑥2 ] ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥2)]∧∃𝑥6 [∀𝑥7 [𝑋4(𝑥7 )
↔ 𝑥7 = 𝑥6 ] ∧ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥6 )]]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Pn
Kim
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
VP
𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)
∧open(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑥2 [∀𝑥3 [[𝑋2(𝑥3 ) ∧ door(𝑥3 )]
↔ 𝑥3 = 𝑥2 ] ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥2)]∧∃𝑥6 [∀𝑥7 [𝑋4(𝑥7 )
↔ 𝑥7 = 𝑥6 ] ∧ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥6 )]]
𝑒𝑡
TV
𝜆𝑄0 .𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)
∧open(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑥2 [∀𝑥3 [[𝑋2(𝑥3 ) ∧ door(𝑥3 )]
↔ 𝑥3 = 𝑥2 ] ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥2)]
∧𝑄0 (𝜆𝑥1 .𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥1))]
⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
TV𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟
opens
𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑄0 .𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)
∧open(𝑒) ∧ 𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥0 ))
∧𝑄0 (𝜆𝑥1 .𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥1))]
⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩
NP
𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥2 [∀𝑥3 [[𝑋2(𝑥3 ) ∧ door(𝑥3 )]
↔ 𝑥3 = 𝑥2 ] ∧ 𝑋0 (𝑥2)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
D
the
𝜆𝑋1 .𝜆𝑋0 .∃𝑥2 [∀𝑥3 [𝑋1(𝑥3 )
↔ 𝑥3 = 𝑥2 ] ∧ 𝑋0 (𝑥2)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , ⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩⟩
N
𝜆𝑥4 .[𝑋2(𝑥4)
∧door(𝑥4)]
𝑒𝑡
N𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑅
𝜆𝑋5 .𝜆𝑥4 .
[𝑋2(𝑥4) ∧ 𝑋5 (𝑥4)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
N
door
door
𝑒𝑡
Instrumental
𝑈
𝜆𝑋3 .∃𝑥6
[∀𝑥7 [𝑋4(𝑥7 )
↔ 𝑥7 = 𝑥6 ]
∧𝑋3 (𝑥6 )]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
The instrument could be explicit, as in the following sentence:
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M.Clause
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, k) ∧ open(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑥2[∀𝑥3[[𝑋2(𝑥3) ∧ door(𝑥3)] ↔ 𝑥3 = 𝑥2] ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥2)]
∧∃𝑥6[∀𝑥7 [key(𝑥7 ) ∧ 𝑋4(𝑥7 ) ↔ 𝑥7 = 𝑥6] ∧ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥6)]]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Pn
Kim
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
VP
𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)
∧open(𝑒)
∧∃𝑥2[∀𝑥3[[𝑋2(𝑥3) ∧ door(𝑥3)
↔ 𝑥3 = 𝑥2]
∧𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥2)]
∧∃𝑥6[∀𝑥7 [key(𝑥7 ) ∧ 𝑋4(𝑥7 )
↔ 𝑥7 = 𝑥6] ∧ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥6)]]
𝑒𝑡
TV
opens the door
𝜆𝑄0 .𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥)
∧open(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑥2[∀𝑥3[[𝑋2(𝑥3) ∧ door(𝑥3)]
↔ 𝑥3 = 𝑥2] ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥2)]
∧𝑄0(𝜆𝑥1.𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥1))]
⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
Instrumental
with_the_ key
𝜆𝑋3 .∃𝑥6[∀𝑥7 [key(𝑥7 )∧
𝑋4(𝑥7 ) ↔
𝑥7 = 𝑥6]
∧𝑋3(𝑥6)]
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
I have now shown how the indexicalist could explain enrichments of the-
matic roles. In what follows, I will turn to the truth-conditional pragmati-
cist extension.
2.7.3 Extending the fragment: truth-conditional pragmatics
In Recanati’s truth-conditional pragmaticist proposal there is a distinction
between ‘the bare logical form’ and ‘the modified logical form’. In my ex-
plication of the concepts under consideration here, I will not talk about
logical forms, however, but about equivalences between formulas. This will
be a clarification and an adjustment to the formal semantic account under
construction. A ‘logical form’, as I use the expression in this dissertation,
is a phrase structure tree, which represents a syntactic structure associated
with a sentence. And the truth-conditional pragmaticist strategy is precisely
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to not account for contextual effects on truth conditions by modifications
of syntactic structure. It could therefore be misleading to talk about logical
forms, when the aim is to provide an alternative to indexicalism.
In the formal proposal below, I will develop and modify Recanati’s ex-
planation in terms of so-called variadic functions, which are the denotations
of variadic operators. In short, Recanati’s idea is that variadic operators are
applied to predicates, yielding predicates with increased or decreased num-
bers of thematic roles. The verb ‘sing’ could illustrate the idea. The verb is
intuitively associated with an agent performing the activity of singing and a
theme: the song that the singer is singing. By applying a variadic function,
the adicity of the verb could be increased or decreased. The thematic role of
theme could be cancelled (‘sing’ could in that case only be associated with
an agent performing an activity). The adicity could also be increased by
the addition of, for example, location (‘sing’ would then intuitively denote
some event of singing where a singer performs a song at some particular
location).
Turning to Recanati’s examples, he claims that ‘raining’ has no thematic
role of location in the translation of that expression, but if a locational vari-
adic operator is applied to the expression, the thematic role of location re-
sults as a part of the translation. But, Recanati argues, to have merely the
location role is not enough. A specific location has to be specified in order
to capture the intuitive location-specific meaning of ‘It’s raining’. Consider
the following equation, which Recanati has used to illustrate the idea:
(77) 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑖 𝑠(𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁) = 𝜆𝑒.[𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁(𝑒) ∧ 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑇 𝐼𝑂𝑁(𝑒, 𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑖 𝑠)]
(Recanati, 2010b, p. 121)
On one understanding of Recanati’s proposal, 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑖 𝑠 denotes a spe-
cific function restricting the location of events to events in Paris. Then, the
equation above should be read as follows. The variadic operator 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑖 𝑠
is applied to the predicate constant 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁 , yielding an expression whose
denotation is a function taking an event 𝑒 to True iff 𝑒 is a raining event
and the location of 𝑒 is Paris. It follows that 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑖 𝑠 denotes one function,
𝐿𝑜𝑐𝐺𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑟 𝑔 denotes another one, etc. In other words, we would have to
postulate one variadic function for every location, if we accepted the pro-
posal (on this understanding). Alternatively, one could understand Reca-
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nati’s proposal as follows. There is one function denoted by 𝐿𝑜𝑐 , which ap-
plied to the expression ‘Paris’ yields a new function that restricts the events
in question to Paris. In my account below, I will develop and modify this
latter alternative, which avoids the proliferation of variadic functions that
otherwise seems inevitable.
Drawing on previous work byMcConnell-Ginet (1982), Recanati postu-
lates that variadic functions are the denotations of locatives like ‘in Paris’. I
will not make that assumption here. Locatives will have other denotations.
Furthermore, I do not use variadic functions in my compositional analysis
of binding constructions, in contrast to Recanati (2004, p. 98-111). As we
saw in Section 2.4, such constructions can be handled by other means in
the accounts developed here.
In the variant of truth-conditional pragmatics below, variadic functions
are closely related tomodulation variables. They are introduced by the trans-
lation function but, in contrast to modulation variables, they are not free
variables, possibly taking whatever semantic value of the right type, but
have a more restricted denotation. The choice to relate variadic functions
to modulation variables differs from Recanati’s specific proposal. But it is
compatible with his overall research program, where the notion of modula-
tion is central.
In my implementation, the variadic function denoted by 𝐿𝑜𝑐 takes an
entity of type 𝑒 , as usual denoted by 𝑥, 𝑥0 , 𝑥1, …, and has a function of type
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩ as result. This function, in turn, takes the translation of the verb
in question (e.g. rain) as argument, and has a function of type 𝑣𝑡 as result.
This function is the same as the one denoted by the translation of the verb,
except that it is now restricted to the events taking place at the entity (the
location) denoted by 𝑥. I will here assume that cities are entities, but the
entity denoted does not necessarily have to be a city: it may be a mountain
or a forest seen from an apartment window, a street, etc. The entity denoted
by 𝑥 will vary and will be specified contextually: it could be any entity but
pragmatic theory will have to specify the more likely choices and how they
are made. Accordingly, the following holds:
(78) 𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain) = 𝜆𝑒.[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒, 𝑥)]
Here is a compositional event semantic implementation of this proposal.
First, the lexicon and the syntax are somewhat different from the indexicalist
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variant:44
Lexicon
1. raining ∈ 𝐵𝑉𝑒
2. it ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝐻
3. is ∈ 𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒
4. is not ∈ 𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒
5. in Paris ∈ 𝐵𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
The main difference between this lexicon and the indexicalist one above is
that ‘is’ and ‘is not’ belong to a new lexical category 𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒 . The choice to
treat ‘is not’ as a lexical item is unorthodox. The reason will become clear in
what follows, but in short, there is no better option if we wish to avoid all
sorts of covert linguistic material in logical form. It is an open question if
a more developed syntactic theory, combined with truth-conditional prag-
matics, would construe the lexicon differently. Furthermore, ‘it’ will now
be a placeholder on its own, in contrast to the indexicalist variant, where ‘it
is’ was treated as a basic expression.
I propose the following extension of the syntax, on the truth-conditional
pragmaticist’s behalf:
Syntax
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒 , [Cop𝑒 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒 .
2. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 , [Locative 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 .
3. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝐻 , [PH 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝐻 .
4. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑉𝑒 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 , then [V𝑒 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑉𝑒 .
5. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑉𝑒 , then [S.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑆 .𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 .
6. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝐻 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑆 .𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 , then [M.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈
𝑃𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 .
44I will only focus onweather reports here. It is fairly obvious how to generalize the proposal
to the key-example.
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The relevant constants of 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 have already been introduced. For the
variadic function adding the thematic role of location, a new translation
function is needed. A further translation function would be needed for
variadic functions that add thematic roles of instruments; that is, for in-
stance, necessary in order to explain the intuitive reading of example (73)
above in the present variant of the formal account. But since I will not focus
on that example here, I will only define the variadic function for location.
In order to insert a variadic function in the compositional process, the
truth-conditional pragmaticist will have to postulate one extra translation
function for every new kind of variadic function. So there will be one trans-
lation function for locational variadic functions, called 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 , and another
one for instrumental variadic functions, etc.
Locational variadic functions are only a part of the translation when 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐
is applied to expressions of type 𝑉𝑒 (with no branching nodes). This expres-
sion is of type 𝑣𝑡 . The rest of the expressions is translated as usual, i.e. as it
is when taken as argument by the truth-conditional pragmaticist’s ordinary
translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 .
Below we find the translation of basic expressions, when 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 is applied
to them.
Translations of basic expressions
1. raining𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = rain
2. it𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
3. in_Paris𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝜆𝑓0 .𝜆𝑒0 .[𝑓0(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒0 ,Paris)]
4. is𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒𝑓 (𝑒)
5. is not𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝜆𝑓 .¬∃𝑒𝑓 (𝑒)
I will come back to the choices of these translations below. But first, I will
provide the translations of phrasal expressions, since they are more relevant
for the discussion about variadic functions that we initiated above.
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [V𝑒 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 ) (type 𝑣𝑡 )
2. [V𝑒 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝑂𝑉𝑒 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 (𝛽𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 )) (type 𝑣𝑡)
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3. [Cop𝑒 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒 (𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 ) (type ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩)
4. [Locative 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝑂𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 ) (type ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩)
5. [PH 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝑂𝑃 𝐻 (𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 ) (type 𝑡 𝑡 )
6. [S.Clause 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝑂𝑆 .𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 )) (type 𝑡 )
7. [M.Clause𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 = 𝑂𝑀.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 (𝛾𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 )) (type 𝑡 )
If the usual truth-conditional pragmaticist translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 is chosen,
the translations would be the same except for the first one, where we would
have [V𝑒 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟𝑐 = 𝑂𝑉𝑒 (𝛼𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ).
First, consider the definite reading of ‘It’s raining’. In the translation
below, where I have used 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 , I have eliminated all modulation variables
that do not have semantic impact in the case at hand, in order to simplify
the exposition.
M.Clause
∃𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain)(𝑒)
𝑡
PH
it
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
S.Clause
∃𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain)(𝑒)
𝑡
Cop𝑒
is
𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒𝑓 (𝑒)
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
V𝑒
raining
𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain)
𝑣 𝑡
By the equation in (78), the following equivalence relation holds:
• ∃𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain)(𝑒) = 1 iff ∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒, 𝑥)] = 1
This is how the truth-conditional pragmaticist could account for the read-
ing that it is raining in Paris, or at some other contextually salient location.
There is no variable for location in the logical form of the expression: in-
stead, a locational variadic function, denoted by 𝐿𝑜𝑐 in the translation of
‘raining’, takes a contextually salient location 𝑥, and the resulting function
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takes the denotation of the ordinary translation of ‘raining’, which, in turn,
results in a function that could be informally described as ‘raining at loca-
tion 𝑥’. This explains the intuition that ‘It’s raining’ could mean that it is
raining in Paris, in Gothenburg, on the street outside of a window, etc.
Second, consider the indefinite reading, with the intuitive paraphrase
‘It’s raining somewhere’. In this case, the translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 is not
used. Instead, the truth-conditional pragmaticist employs the ordinary con-
textualist translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 . Apart from that, the analysis is identical
to the tree presented right above. The reader can easily verify that this will
yield the correct reading, by going through the translation rules above.
In the case where the location of raining is explicit below, I have used
the usual 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 . I have eliminated all modulation variables, since they do not
have any semantic impact in this case.
M.Clause
∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒,Paris)]
𝑡
PH
it
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
S.Clause
∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒,Paris)]
𝑡
Cop𝑒
is
𝜆𝑓 .∃𝑒𝑓 (𝑒)
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
V𝑒
𝜆𝑒0 .[rain(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒0 ,Paris)]
𝑣 𝑡
V𝑒
raining
rain
𝑣𝑡
Locative
in_Paris
𝜆𝑓0 .𝜆𝑒0 .[𝑓0(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒0 ,Paris)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩
It is possible to use 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 as well for cases where the location is explicit.
In that case, the translation, after simplification by equation (78), would
be ∃𝑒[rain(𝑒) ∧ [𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒, 𝑥) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒,Paris)]]. This translation
leaves open whether 𝑥 is some other location than Paris. If some other lo-
cation could be denoted, perhaps some sub-location of Paris, is a question
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for pragmatic theory.
Negations of location definite readings are accounted for as follows (us-
ing 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 ):
M.Clause
¬∃𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain)(𝑒)
𝑡
PH
it
𝜆𝑇 .𝑇
𝑡 𝑡
S.Clause
¬∃𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain)(𝑒)
𝑡
Cop𝑒
is not
𝜆𝑓 .¬∃𝑒𝑓 (𝑒)
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
V𝑒
raining
𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain)
𝑣𝑡
In this case, the following equivalence holds (again by the equation in 78
above:)
• ¬∃𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑐(𝑥)(rain)(𝑒) = 1 iff ¬∃𝑒[(rain)(𝑒) ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑒, 𝑥)] = 1
This is how the truth-conditional pragmaticist could account for cases
where the intuitive meaning of ‘It’s not raining’ is that it is not raining in
Paris or some other contextually salient location.
An aspect not pertaining to variadic functions is the translation of basic
expressions above. One could discuss the choice to introduce the existen-
tial quantifier over events in the translation of ‘raining’. For instance, the
existential quantifier over events could have been present in the translation
of ‘raining’ instead of in the translation of ‘is’. That would have resulted in
a less unorthodox analysis of negation. But then the analysis of ‘in Paris’
would have had to be much less straightforward than it is now. In fact,
it is difficult to see how the truth-conditional pragmaticist would account
for ‘in Paris’ in that case. In contrast to the indexicalist analysis, the truth-
conditional pragmaticist will not posit a variable 𝐿 in the translation of
‘raining’. The most straightforward analysis of the locative is therefore to
let it take the translation of ‘rain’ as argument. But then that translation
can’t be of type 𝑡 , but will have to be of type 𝑣𝑡 . Considerations like these
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have lead to the translation of ‘is’ and ‘is not’ above.
Moving on, the analysis of ‘It’s not raining’, on its indefinite reading
(meaning that it is not raining anywhere), is accounted for straightforwardly
by truth-conditional pragmatics: the logical form above receives this trans-
lation, if we skip the locational variadic function (use 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 ).
Finally, it can be noted that the truth-conditional pragmaticist would
have to add some extra machinery to account for the inverse scope read-
ing, where the event quantifier has scope over negation (i.e. where ‘It’s not
raining’ means that there is an event that is not a raining event). Recanati
claims that ‘It’s not raining’ does not have this reading, as we noted on page
100, but there may be other views on this matter. Be that as it may, if
the truth-conditional pragmatics theorist wishes to account for that read-
ing, she could adopt some syntax rules and translations operative in the
indexicalist’s tree on page 109, in particular syntax rule 5 on 103, and and
translation 8, on 105 above. That subtree could then be combined with
[Cop𝑒 is], and form a main clause, if we add the obvious rules and trans-
lations. There is no conflict between this possible extension and the key
tenets and assumptions of truth-conditional pragmatics.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored the hypothesis that truth-conditional prag-
matics and indexicalism are two empirically equivalent frameworks, in the
sense made precise in Section 2.2.3, at least when the main examples in
the debate are considered. The result is that this hypothesis is correct. A
premise for this conclusion is the detailed formalizations of indexicalist and
truth-conditional pragmaticist accounts put forward in the chapter. But
the formalizations do not only constitute a premise for the conclusion about
equivalence: a purpose of the chapter has been to increase the level of pre-
cision in the discussion, and to provide formal, model-theoretic semantic
accounts of various context dependent phenomena.
I began the chapter by outlining a basic formal semantic account avail-
able for both indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics. I continued
by developing truth-conditional pragmaticist and indexicalist extensions of
the framework, applying them to quantifier domain restriction, transfer,
binding, colour adjectives, meaning litigation, and enrichments of thematic
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roles. In all these cases, the indexicalist variant and the truth-conditional
pragmaticist variant could account for the relevant linguistic intuitions
about readings and truth associated with the linguistic phenomena in ques-
tion.
It has not been my ambition to provide a theory of how the right vari-
able assignment is chosen. That question, I have claimed, belongs to prag-
matic theory. And I have not attempted to give a proof of empirical equiv-
alence between indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics. It has not
been my ambition to show that every possible indexicalist account could be
translated into a truth-conditional pragmaticist account, or vice versa. In
contrast, I have argued on a case-by-case basis.
A consequence is that truth-conditional pragmatics is not the only option
for theorists who wish to account for modulation within formal semantic
theory; in contrast to the negative conclusions about the prospects of in-
dexicalism in Recanati (2010b), Pagin (2005) and Pagin & Pelletier (2007),
indexicalist approaches are still an option.
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3 Tense, the Present Perfect and Saturation
3.1 Introduction
Consider the following sentence (presented as (9) in Chapter 1.1):
(79) IFK Norrköping has won Allsvenskan.
Now suppose that (79) is uttered in two different contexts:
Context 1: It’s 2016. Robin and Kim are interested in football,
especially the Swedish premier league (Allsvenskan). Today,
they have decided to make a list of all premier league winners.
Robin starts by enumerating the winners and says: “Malmö
FF has won Allsvenskan, IFK Norrköping has won Allsven-
skan…”.
Intuitively, Robin’s utterance is true. IFK Norrköping won Allsvenskan
2015 (and has won it several times in the past).
Context 2: It’s 2016. Robin wants to know who won the pre-
mier league final the day before and therefore opens the foot-
ball app. Robin shouts: “IFK Norrköping has won Allsven-
skan!”. Unfortunately, there is something wrong with Robin’s
football app. Malmö FF is the winner this year.
Robin’s utterance is, in this case, false.
The contrast between the two cases could be described as a difference
between an ‘existential’ reading, in context 1, and a ‘resultative’ reading, in
context 2 (cf. Portner 2003 and Mittwoch 2008) or, in the terminology
of Higginbotham (2009), a ‘resultant’ reading (context 1) or a ‘result state’
reading (context 2). In this chapter, I will show that developments of the
formal semantic accounts presented in Chapter 2 can capture the distinc-
tion between the intuitive meanings in the scenario. Consequently, the
empirical coverage of the accounts put forward in Chapter 2 is extended.
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However, in this case, the notion of ‘saturation’ plays a key role, in contrast
to Chapter 2, where ‘modulation’ was in focus (cf. Chapter 1.3.1).
Moreover, consider the following sentence (sentence (10) in Chapter
1.1), discussed by Recanati (2010b, p. 123-125):
(80) I have eaten.
Suppose that (80) is uttered as an answer to the question Would you like
to have dinner?, or a similar enquiry. As we noted in Chapter 1.1, there
are then, intuitively, two implicit contextual adjustments: 1) the utterance
concerns the evening when it is uttered. It is irrelevant whether the speaker
had dinner the evening before, two evenings before, etc., 2) the intuitive
truth conditions contain a theme: intuitively, the speaker asserts that she
has had a proper meal, say dinner, and not just some nuts or a fruit.
Below, I will argue that the context dependence of (80) just illustrated
can be handled by both indexicalists and truth-conditional pragmaticists. I
will thus further extend the empirical coverage of the indexicalist and truth-
conditional pragmaticist formal semantic accounts in Chapter 2. This will
also give further support to the thesis that indexicalism and truth-conditional
pragmatics are empirically equivalent. This is the main purpose of this chap-
ter. However, I also intend to show that a combination of ideas regarding
the present perfect, the Reichenbachian approach and the result state ap-
proach, is fruitful. This combination of ideas has not been developed in
detail before, as far as I know, although it is not completely unexplored;
see: Steedman ms, p. 17-24).
3.2 Background
In my proposal, which will be presented later on, I will combine two well-
known theoretical alternatives. First, I will describe the core ideas of the
two alternatives and the differences between them. I call them the ‘Re-
ichenbachian approach’ and the ‘result state approach’. The section closes
with a brief overview of accounts that do not fall under either of these two
labels.
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3.2.1 The ‘Reichenbachian approach’
The Reichenbachian approach stems from Hans Reichenbach’s highly in-
fluential proposal in Elements of symbolic logic (Reichenbach, 1947). In the
contemporary literature, it is found in e.g. Meyer-Viol & Jones (2011),
where it is adjusted to a dynamic semantic framework, Portner (2003),
where it is combined with a theory of presupposition, and in the textbook
(Gamut, 1991), where it is compared to other treatments of tense. In this
section, I will describe the core ideas of Reichenbach’s original account.
In Reichenbach (1947), there is a chapter entitled ‘The analysis of con-
versational language’, within which one can find a section about tense. Re-
ichenbach’s main thesis is that it is insufficient to distinguish only between
the past, the present and the future, if one aims to account for the complex
nature of tenses in natural languages like English, Turkish and French1. He
shows how the meanings, and the differences between the meanings, of the
present tense (81), the present perfect (82), the preterite perfect (83), the
future perfect (84), the future tense (85), and the preterite (86), can be
described by the means of three points (and relations between them): the
point of the event, the point of speech and the point of reference:2
(81) Hilary sees Kim.
(82) Hilary has seen Kim.
(83) Hilary had seen Kim.
(84) Hilary will have seen Kim.
(85) Hilary will see Kim.
(86) Hilary saw Kim.
The intuition behind positing a point of reference is clear when one con-
siders the distinction between the preterite and the preterite perfect. This
1Reichenbach discusses examples and contrasts between these three languages, which he
used in teaching in exile during World War II.
2Reichenbach himself uses the terminology of ‘point of speech’ etc. adopted here. (Gamut,
1991) uses the same terminology, and Steedman (ms) does so as well. It is, however, also
common to let the expressions ‘speech time’, ‘reference time’ and ‘event time’ replace
the original terminology. E.g. Portner (2003) describes Reichenbach’s ideas in the latter
terminology.
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is illustrated by Reichenbach (1947, p. 288), who discusses the following
passage from W. Somerset Maugham’s Of Human Bondage:
But Philip ceased to think of her a moment after he had settled
down in his carriage. He thought only of the future. He had
written to Mrs. Otter, the massière to whom Hayward had
given him an introduction, and had in his pocket an invitation
to tea on the following day.
The event where Philip writes to Mrs. Otter is clearly located before the
event where Philip is thinking of the future in the carriage. But neither
of these two events are intuitively located at the time of speech: the story
is set in the past relative to the point of reading it. Between the point of
the event of reading the story, the speech event, and the point where Philip
writes toMrs. Otter, there is the point where Philip is thinking of the future.
This is the point of reference, i.e. the time point that the story primarily
is concerned with (the time point the narrator of the story intuitively talks
about).
Reichenbach uses 𝐸 for the point of the event, 𝑆 for the point of speech,
and 𝑅 for the point of reference. The comma (,) means temporal identity
and the stroke (−) is used for temporal separation. The tenses distinguished
above in example (81-86) are illustrated as follows:
(87) The present: 𝐸,𝑅, 𝑆
(88) The present perfect: 𝐸 − 𝑅, 𝑆
(89) The preterite perfect: 𝐸 − 𝑅 − 𝑆
(90) The future perfect: 𝑆 − 𝐸 − 𝑅
(91) The future tense: 𝑆 − 𝐸,𝑅
(92) The preterite: 𝐸,𝑅 − 𝑆
A sentence in the present tense (81, 87) describes an event that co-occurs
with the point of speech, which co-occurs with the point of reference. A
sentence in the present perfect (82, 88) describes an event in the past, but
has as point of reference a temporal point identical to the point of speech.
This contrasts with the preterite (86, 92), where the point of the event is in
the past, but the point of reference is in the past as well.
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3.2.2 The ‘Result-State Approach’
The second type of account to be presented is the ‘result state-approach’.
This approach takes its starting point from the observation that there is a
result-state meaning associated with the present perfect. In the following
example, taken from (Mittwoch, 2008, p. 335), a negation or uncertainty
with regard to the contextually salient result state is infelicitous:
(93) I’ve put the book back on the shelf
(i) #but it’s not there anymore.
(ii) #and perhaps it’s still there.
(iii)?so it should still be there.
Proponents of the result state-approach argue that the assumption that the
sentence, or an utterance of it, somehow expresses the result state that the
book is on the shelf plays a key role in explaining this infelicity.
This way of thinking about the perfect shows up already in Otto Jes-
persen’s The philosophy of grammar. In contrast to Reichenbach’s idea, the
present perfect is a variant of the present tense, according to Jespersen:
[B]esides the purely temporal element it contains the element
of result. It is a present, but a permansive present: it repre-
sents the present state as the outcome of past events, and may
therefore be called a retrospective variety of the present. That
it is a variety of the present and not of the past is seen by the
fact that the adverb now can stand with it: “Now I have eaten
enough.” (Jespersen, 1924, p. 269)3
That we can use now with the present perfect contrasts with the infelicity
that arises when themoment of speech is characterized by the preterite. This
fact is not stated by Jespersen, but is implicit in his discussion:
(94) #Now I ate enough.
Jespersen does not acknowledge, however, that sentences like the one in (94)
are not fully ungrammatical: there are contexts in where they are acceptable.
If ‘now’ denotes a wider period of time, and not the moment of speech, the
preterite could occur in a contrast:
3The quite rare description ‘permansive present’ means that the form denotes a permanent
or continuing state.
125
disarming context dependence
(95) Yesterday, I didn’t eat enough, but now I ate enough.
Jespersen’s point, illustrated in the quote and in (94), still holds, however,
if ‘now’ denotes the moment of speech. (94) is odd, indeed, if ‘now’ is
assigned that meaning.
Furthermore, Jespersen mentions that He has become mad means that
the referent of the pronoun ‘he’ is mad now, and that Have you written the
letter? is a question that intuitively concerns the present. Moreover, he ac-
knowledges that the present tense and the present perfect can be combined
in the same sentence:
(96) He has given orders that all spies are to be shot at once.
We can strengthen this point by considering the following alternative sen-
tence, where the preterite is substituted for the present in the second, sub-
ordinated, clause:
(97) ?He has given orders that all spies were to be shot at once.
The sentence in (97), where the preterite expression ‘were’ is substituted
for the present ‘are’, is unacceptable, or at least a much worse alternative
than (96). This is in accordance with what seems to be Jespersen’s point:
in sequences of tense, a clause in the present perfect is naturally followed
by a clause in the present tense, where the finite verb is in its present form
(e.g. ‘are’), but not by a clause in the preterite, where the finite verb is in its
preterite form (e.g. ‘were’).
Moens & Steedman (1988) propose an account of the present perfect
along the same lines. A first step in their proposal is that propositions can
be classified into aspectual types. First, there is the aspectual type of cul-
mination, which is an intuitively instantaneous event in which there is a
transition from one state to another, as in (98) below:
(98) Kim reached the top.
The event of reaching a top contains, intuitively speaking, a state of being
very near some top and a state of being at the top. The state of being at
the top is called a consequent state, in Moens & Steedman’s terminology.
Secondly, we have the aspectual type of point, where the event is also in-
stantaneous but, in contrast to a culmination, does not contain a transition
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from one state to another (points are, in other words, not associated with
consequent states):
(99) Kim hiccupped.
Moens & Steedman also postulate two other aspectual types, processes
and culminated processes, but it is not important for our purposes to describe
their nature here.
The second step in Moens & Steedman’s account is the following idea.
The present perfect is, or denotes, a function that takes propositions of the
aspectual type of culmination, and yields the consequent state associated
with the culmination. The sentence in (100) obeys these constraints: the
proposition is of the right aspectual type and it intuitively refers to the con-
sequent state of Kim being at the top.
(100) Kim has reached the top.
Now if the present perfect takes as argument a proposition with the wrong
aspectual type, e.g. a point, the aspectual type of the proposition will be
“coerced”, i.e. changed, in order to enable an intuitive consequent state, on
the account of Moens & Steedman (1988). Alternatively, the sentence (or
an utterance of it) will be infelicitous:
(101) The clock has struck.4
(102) ?The star has twinkled.
Regarding (101), special circumstances or expectations may enable an inter-
pretation where the striking of the clock has some salient consequent state
associated with it. It is more difficult to imagine a context where (102) is as-
sociated with a consequent state, Moens and Steedman claim. I agree with
their assessment of these cases, but we can note that a difficulty in imagin-
ing a context does not rule out the possibility that there might nevertheless
be contexts where (102) is acceptable and is associated with a consequent
state of some sort. To elaborate this point, consider the following example:
(103) He has blinked.
4Moens&Steedman actually discusses the example The clock has ticked, but their point is
more clearly illustrated with this closely related example.
127
disarming context dependence
This sentence may sound a bit odd at first sight. But imagine a competition
where the person who blinks first looses. The sentence is then acceptable.
It is acceptable because, as proponents of the result state-approach would
argue, a contextually salient result state becomes evident in that story (the
person who blinked is the loser of the game).
Higginbotham (2009, p. 174) presents another variant of the ‘result state-
approach’. He suggests (105) as translation of (104), where 𝑢 denotes the
time of the speaker’s utterance and ≈ is a symbol for temporal overlap:5
(104) Mary has solved the problem.
(105) [∃𝑒 ′ ≈ 𝑢][∃𝑒][𝑅(𝑒, 𝑒 ′) & solve(Mary, the problem, 𝑒)]
The translation states that there is an event 𝑒 ′ that overlaps with the time of
utterance, and that there is an event 𝑒 such that the relation of result holds
between 𝑒 and 𝑒 ′, and that 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒 is a relation that holds between Mary, the
problem and 𝑒 .
The two-place predicate𝑅 stands for the relation of result, but according
to Higginbotham’s proposal, there is, furthermore, a distinction between
two such relations: a relation of result state and a relation of resultant (they
both correspond to the notion of consequent state in Moens & Steedman’s
account). The relation of result state holds between events and their intu-
itively natural sequels. The resultant relation holds between each event and
the state that begins as soon as an event is completed and continues to ex-
ist forever (the state that there is an event of the relevant kind in the past).
Consider the following two sentences:
(106) I have been to Japan.
(107) I have spilled my coffee.
This is how I understand Higginbotham’s distinction. Imagine a conversa-
tion where the interlocutors compare their travel experiences, and (106) is
uttered. The most salient reading is then associated with the resultant rela-
tion. When a person visits Japan, it will always be true that she has been to
Japan. The state that she has been to Japan will exist forever. The resultant
5In the semantic literature, it is common to use the symbol ∘ for overlap. However, I will
try to stay close to Higginbotham’s formalism in what follows. I will therefore use ≈ for
temporal overlap below.
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relation holds, in this case, between the event of the speaker being in Japan,
and the state/event that there is an event in the past where the speaker is in
Japan. In contrast, imagine a context where the speaker has just dropped
her cup of coffee by accident. In such a case, the most salient reading of
(107) is associated with a result state: there is spilled coffee on the table or
on the floor that needs to be wiped up.6
3.2.3 Alternative accounts
There are also other kinds of approaches. One approach found in various
places in the literature is the ‘extended now-approach’. The basic idea is put
forward inMcCoard (1978). In short, the account assumes that the present
perfect locates the event described in an interval that contains the intuitive
present, or ‘now’. In contrast, the preterite locates the event described out-
side of the ‘now’-period. A variant of this account is found in Mittwoch
(2008), where it is proposed in conjunction with an explanation in terms
of implicature, and in Portner (2003), according to whom an extended now
is presupposed, when the present perfect is used.
In my discussion below, I will put forward an account that combines the
Reichenbachian approach with the result state-approach. My account is
designed to keep the merits of both approaches: the clear-cut differences
between the tenses offered by the Reichenbachian account, and the insight
that the choice of using a present perfect sentence bears on how a situation
is conceived of aspectually, which is offered by the result state-approach.
The account is closely related to the ideas put forward by Steedman (ms,
p. 17-24). A difference between our proposals is, however, that Steedman
treats the Reichenbachian points of reference as time points, which is, I be-
lieve, close to what Reichenbach himself had in mind, whereas I will eschew
points and propose a treatment of the points of reference, speech and event
in terms of relations between events and factors pertaining to the context of
6Parsons (1990, p. 229-256) offers a theory similar to that of Higginbotham (2009). In
addition, Parsons attempts to show how his favoured event semantic translation of I
have bound him can be derived from I have him bound, given certain stipulated axioms.
The two sentences, or more precisely, their forms, are historically related, according to a
well-known thesis in historical linguistics (c.f Parsons, 1990, p. 239-241). He thereby
shows how logical relations can be used in explanations of historical stages of linguistic
developments.
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utterance. In the context of our discussion, where the formal semantic ac-
counts in Chapter 2 are developed, my alternative is the simpler one (since
events, in contrast to points, are already available for other purposes).
3.3 The plan
In Section 3.4 below, the accounts developed in Chapter 2 are extended in
order to account for the following temporal phenomena: the present perfect
(108), the preterite perfect (109), the future perfect (110), the preterite
(111), the future tense (112), and the past futurate (113).
(108) IFK Norrköping has won Allsvenskan.
(109) IFK Norrköping had won Allsvenskan.
(110) IFK Norrköping will have won Allsvenskan.
(111) IFK Norrköping won Allsvenskan.
(112) IFK Norrköping will win Allsvenskan.
(113) IFK Norrköping would win Allsvenskan.
The extension will not be specifically indexicalist or truth-conditional
pragmaticist and is, accordingly, available for both sides of the debate. I will
then turn to a discussion of contextual adjustments, or context dependence,
of result states (Section 3.5), and enrichments of thematic roles, in relation
to the present perfect (Section 3.6).
As I mentioned, this chapter has several purposes. The extension of
the formal semantic accounts developed in Chapter 2 offers a previously
underdeveloped combination of core ideas from the Reichenbachian ap-
proach and central insights from the result state approach. Furthermore,
I intend to show that both indexicalist and truth-conditional pragmaticist
extensions, including the tense part, are readily available. This will give fur-
ther support to the dissertation’s main claim that indexicalism and truth-
conditional pragmatics are empirically equivalent.
3.4 Perfect, preterite, future
The lexicon contains the following additional expressions:
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Lexicon
1. eaten, won ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒
2. has, had, will_have ∈ 𝐵𝐴𝑢𝑥
3. won𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑡 ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑡 𝑒
4. will_win ∈ 𝐵𝐹 𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟 𝑒
5. would_win ∈ 𝐵𝑃 .𝐹 𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑒
Both the past participle and the preterite of ‘win’ are spelled ‘won’. I have
subscripted the preterite variant, in order to distinguish the two. The ex-
pressions ‘will_win’ and ‘would_win’ are intuitively composed of ‘will’ and
‘win’, and of ‘would’ and ‘win’, but a discussion of the precise semantic
values of the parts is unnecessary here. The point of including these expres-
sions in the fragment is to show that the formal accounts can model the
differences between the main tenses of English. This is important for any
proposal pertaining to tense phenomena. However, our main focus is the
present perfect, or, more specifically, context-dependent properties of the
present perfect, and not the details of the compositional semantics of the
other tenses.
We have the following syntactic rules. I use the phrase label TP, for the
longer, but more informative, Temporal Phrase.
Syntax
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 , [Participle 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 .
2. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑡 𝑒 , [Preterite 𝛼] ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑡 𝑒 ,
3. and similarly if 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝐴𝑢𝑥 , 𝐵𝐹 𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟 𝑒 , or 𝐵𝑃 .𝐹 𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑒 .
4. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐴𝑢𝑥 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 , then [TP 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑇 𝑃 .
5. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑟 𝑒𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑡 𝑒 , [TP 𝛽] ∈ 𝑃𝑇 𝑃 ,
6. and similarly if 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝐹 𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟 𝑒 , or 𝑃𝑃 .𝐹 𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑒 .
7. If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑇 𝑃 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑃 , then [VP 𝛽 𝛾 ] ∈ 𝑃𝑉 𝑃 .
There are also new constants in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 , introduced below. 𝐶𝑠𝑒 and ℛ are
used to locate the event talked about temporally. I use the indexical 𝐶𝑠𝑒 for
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the speech event of the context.7 This expression’s semantic value varies with
context (the notion of context is introduced to the semantics below). ℛ is a
predicate of events (type 𝑣𝑡 ). ℛ is not an indexical expression but is related
to the contextually specified speech event in ways to be elaborated. In the
translations below, ℛ takes a free variable 𝑒0 , whose value is determined
pragmatically. 𝐶𝑠𝑒 andℛ(𝑒0) thus determine the temporal location of the
event talked about in different ways (cf. Section 3.4.1).
In the framework developed here, 𝐶𝑠𝑒 and ℛ correspond to Reichen-
bach’s notions of point of speech and point of reference (Reichenbach, 1947,
p. 287-299). But in contrast to Reichenbach, and to standard Reichen-
bachian approaches, the semantics here is not formulated in terms of time
points (or closely related notions such as time intervals). The theoretical
intuition is that events are related to one another by the relations of prece-
dence and overlap. This holds for all events, including speech events, i.e.
contextual denotations of 𝐶𝑠𝑒 , and reference events, denoted by the free
variable 𝑒0 , which appear as argument of ℛ in the translations. In what
follows, the symbol ≺ denotes the relation of anteriority and the symbol ≈
denotes temporal overlap. Accordingly, 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 means that 𝑒 is before 𝑒0 ,
and 𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 means the the two events overlap.
The translation of ‘has’ below also includes the predicate ‘result’. The re-
sult state approach discussed above, and implemented here, treats the result
as a relation between two events: one in the past described by the partici-
ple (‘won’, ‘eaten’, etc.), and one contextually salient event denoted by the
indexical expression 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 .8
The following expressions are thus included in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 :
• 𝐶𝑠𝑒 , 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 are constants of type 𝑣 .9
• ℛ is a constant of type 𝑣𝑡 .
• ≺, ≈ and 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 are constants of type ⟨𝑣 , 𝑣 𝑡 ⟩.
7I will not elaborate on the nature or characteristics of speech events here: it is sufficient
for my purposes that there is one for each context. I will thus remain neutral on the
question whether all speech events are sentential utterances or not.
8The abbreviation ‘cse’ stands for Contextually Salient Event.
9Note that indexicals are constants.
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Let us now turn to the translations. I have assumed that states are events
and not a basic type on its own. This assumption is made by Higginbotham
(2009) as well. In contrast, Parsons (1990) treats states as a basic type.
Translations of basic expressions10
1. won𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧
win(𝑒) ∧ 𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒)) ∧ 𝑓 (𝑒)],
and similarly for eaten𝑡 𝑟
2. has𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑒.[𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0∧ℛ(𝑒0)∧𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0∧𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒)∧
𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
3. had𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑒.[𝑒0 ≺ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0]
4. will_have𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑒.[𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0]
5. (won𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑡 )𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ win(𝑒) ∧
𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒)) ∧ 𝑒0 ≺ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0]
6. would_win𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ win(𝑒) ∧
𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒)) ∧ 𝑒0 ≺ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒0 ≺ 𝑒]
7. will_win𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ win(𝑒) ∧
𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒)) ∧ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0]
In the translations of basic expressions above, one can catch a glimpse of
the contrasts between the tenses (but the differences are more clearly seen
later on). The translation of ‘has’ both contains the Reichenbachian rela-
tions between the speech event and reference event, as well as the conjunct
𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒) and the specification that the result state/event (denoted
by 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) overlaps with the speech event. In the translation of ‘had’ and
‘will have’, there is no result predicate or indexical denoting a contextually
salient event. I take this to be consistent with the data, but it would be
easy to stick in extra conjuncts for the result predicate and its arguments
if that was empirically justified. In the translations of ‘won𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑡 ’, and the
other expressions, there is no result predicate, and no indexical denoting a
contextually salient event, which is as it should be.
In my proposal, there are events talked about, temporally located to
speech and reference events. But in contrast to Reichenbach’s original idea,
10In order to simplify the exposition, I omit brackets when not needed for clarity.
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there are no points of events. The event talked about (e.g. the event of
winning, eating, etc.) is, in this approach, always existentially quantified.
This is the main approach to translations of intransitive and transitive verbs
put forward in Chapter 2. I have seen no reason to revise that approach,
for the linguistic phenomena at hand. The event talked about is temporally
related to the (pragmatically determined) reference event by the relation
of precedence or overlap. The reference event, in turn, is related by prece-
dence or overlap to the speech event, which is determined contextually by
the indexical 𝐶𝑠𝑒 .
The translations of phrasal expressions are as follows:
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [Participle 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩)
2. [Aux 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type 𝑣𝑡 )
3. [Preterite 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
4. [Future 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
5. [P.Futurate 𝛼]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
6. [TP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛾𝑡 𝑟 (𝛽𝑡 𝑟 ) (type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
7. [TP 𝛽]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝛽𝑡 𝑟 (type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩)
The indexicals 𝐶𝑠𝑒 and 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 denote different events in different contexts.
However, we have not yet discussed the formal notion of context above. In
order to incorporate that notion, I will now revise the basic definitions of
truth and denotation.
In addition to what is already presented, we assume that a set of contexts
of utterance CU is given. Each context in CU is associated with a speech
event: the speech event of the context. Every context also has one contex-
tually salient event. We could add more salient events if needed, but for
present purposes it is enough to just postulate one salient event per con-
text. Speakers, addressees, and salient males and females could also be eas-
ily added to the contexts, in order to account for ‘I’, ‘he’, ‘you’ and ‘she’.11
11Each context in CU is also associated with a coherence relation, e.g. a temporal or a
locational one. This is crucial for the formal account of binding in Chapter 2.4, where
the indexical 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐻 is appealed to.
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But these expressions are not under discussion here; I will therefore leave
them aside for now. Furthermore, instead of the earlier function 𝐹 from
constants to extensions, we will now have a function 𝐹0 from constants to
functions from contexts to extensions.
The format developed here is closely related to what Westerståhl (2012)
calls a ‘Kaplan style semantics’: a set of contexts and an interpretation func-
tion assigning to expressions functions from contexts as value. There is a
major difference though between Kaplan style semantics and my proposal:
there is no set of circumstances in the semantics proposed here. Further-
more, the interpretation function assigns to each expression a function from
contexts to extensions and not, as is common in semantics of the Kaplan
style variety, a function from contexts to contents. My reason for not hav-
ing a set of circumstances is that I do not need them for the phenomena
under discussion. It seems, however, quite possible to add a set of circum-
stances to the semantics I propose, and redefine the interpretation function
in terms of it, if one wished to do so.
Combined with the set-up from page 34 and 81, a modelℳ is a tuple
⟨𝑀,𝐸,𝐷 , 𝐹 0 , 𝐶𝑈 ⟩ such that 𝐹 0 is an interpretation function as above,𝑀
is a set of entities, 𝐸 is a set of events, 𝐷 is the set of real numbers, which
has its standard order ≥, and 𝐶𝑈 is a set of contexts such that each context
is associated with a speech event (the speech event of the context) and a
contextually salient event. The sets are assumed to be pairwise disjoint.
The extensions are either primitive elements of𝑀,𝐸 or𝐷 , the True, the
False, or functions constructed from these basic types. The set 𝑌 of types is
as before (built from basic types 𝑒 , 𝑣 , 𝑑 and 𝑡 ).
Truth and denotation in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
1. If 𝜒 is a constant, then J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 is 𝐹 0(𝜒)(𝑐).
2. If 𝜒 is a variable, then J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 is 𝑔(𝜒).
3. J𝐶𝑠𝑒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 is 𝐹0(𝐶𝑠𝑒)(𝑐), i.e. the speech event of 𝑐 .
4. J𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 is 𝐹0(𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒)(𝑐), i.e. the contextually salient
event of 𝑐 .
5. J𝜆𝜒 .𝜒0Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 , J𝜒(𝜒0)Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 , J∀𝜒𝜒0Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 , J∃𝜒𝜒0Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 ,J𝜒 → 𝜒0Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 and J¬𝜒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 are defined as usual (see
page 34).
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When the new interpretation function 𝐹0 is combinedwith a constant 𝜒 and
a context argument (𝑐, 𝑐0 , 𝑐1, …), the only difference to the original set-up on
page 34 lies in the denotation of indexicals. In such cases, the denotation
of the indexical expression varies with context argument. Therefore, the
novel definitions of truth and denotations are not elaborated in detail. The
relevant difference is, however, stated above.
The introduction of contexts leads to the following updated version of
the Empirical Equivalence Claim (page 51).
Empirical Equivalence Claim (revised version)
If the indexicalist translation of 𝑆 is 𝜙 and the truth-
conditional pragmaticist translation is 𝜓 — i.e. if 𝜙 and 𝜓
are 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 -formulas obtained by our translation functions ap-
plied to the logical forms of 𝑆 in the respective fragments —
then for all modelsℳ, there is an assignment 𝑔 and a context
𝑐 such that J𝜙Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 = J𝜓 Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 .
Turning back to the examples of our interest, the following tree structure
with translations illustrates the meaning of a sentence in the present perfect
– more specifically the sentence ‘IFK Norrköping has won Allsvenskan’:
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M.Clause
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(i, 𝑒) ∧ win(𝑒) ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(a, 𝑒)∧
𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(i)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Pn
IFK Norrköping
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(i)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
VP
𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ win(𝑒) ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(a, 𝑒)
∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
𝑒𝑡
TP
𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ win(𝑒) ∧ 𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒))
∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 )
∧𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
Aux
has
𝜆𝑒.[𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0)
∧𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 )
∧𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
𝑣 𝑡
Participle
won
𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ win(𝑒)
∧𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒)) ∧ 𝑓 (𝑒)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩
NP
𝜆𝑋0 .𝑋0(a)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Pn
Allsvenskan
𝜆𝑋0 .𝑋0(a)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
The meaning of the whole expression, as formalized at the translation of
the top node, could be paraphrased as follows: there is an event 𝑒 such that
the agent of 𝑒 is i, 𝑒 is an event of winning, the theme of 𝑒 is a, the refer-
ence event 𝑒0 overlaps with the speech event of the context, 𝑒 is before the
reference event 𝑒0 , the relation of result holds between 𝑒 and the contextu-
ally salient event of the context, and the contextually salient event of the
context overlaps with the speech event of the context.
If ‘had’ or ‘will have’ were substituted for ‘has’, the translation of Aux
would contain different relations between the events. In the case of ‘had’,
we would have precedence, and not overlap, between the the reference event
𝑒0 and the speech event of the context. In the case of ‘will_have’, the speech
event of the context would precede the reference event, and the events satis-
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fying the conditions of the participle would precede the reference event as
well. Moreover, there is no relation of result in these cases, and no contex-
tually salient event (but see the comment on page 133).
The differences between the present perfect and other perfects, i.e. the
preterite perfect and the future perfect, are seen in the following translations.
I have chosen not to write out the tree structure and the compositional
translations for each expression, but that could easily be done by following
the rules and translations above.
(114) IFK had won Allsvenskan.
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(i, 𝑒)∧win(𝑒)∧𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(a, 𝑒)∧𝑒0 ≺ 𝐶𝑠𝑒∧ℛ(𝑒0)∧𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0]
(115) IFK will_have won Allsvenskan.
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(i, 𝑒)∧win(𝑒)∧𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(a, 𝑒)∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0∧ℛ(𝑒0)∧𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0]
Finally, the perfects are distinguished from the preterite (116), the past fu-
turate (117), and the future tense (118) below. As is seen in the translations,
the preterite locates the reference event anterior to the speech event, but the
event of winning overlaps with the reference event. In the past futurate, the
reference event is located anterior to the speech event as well, but the event
of winning is located after the reference event. In the future tense example
below, the reference event is located after the speech event, and the event
of winning overlaps with the reference event.
(116) IFK won𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑡 Allsvenskan.
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(i, 𝑒)∧win(𝑒)∧𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(a, 𝑒)∧𝑒0 ≺ 𝐶𝑠𝑒∧ℛ(𝑒0)∧𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0]
(117) IFK would_win Allsvenskan.
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(i, 𝑒)∧win(𝑒)∧𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(a, 𝑒)∧𝑒0 ≺ 𝐶𝑠𝑒∧ℛ(𝑒0)∧𝑒0 ≺ 𝑒]
(118) IFK will_win Allsvenskan.
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(i, 𝑒)∧win(𝑒)∧𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(a, 𝑒)∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0∧ℛ(𝑒0)∧𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0]
In the tree structures for these sentences, ‘won𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑡 ’, ‘would_win’ and
‘will_win’ occur under the phrase labels Preterite, P.Futurate and Future
respectively. The phrase labels occur, in turn, under TP. The type of the
translation of both the preterite, P.Futurate and Future phrases, on the
one side, and the TP phrase, on the other side, is ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩. In other
words, the translations of Preterite, P.Futurate and Future phrases, contain-
ing ‘won𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑡 ’, ‘would_win’, ‘will win’ or possibly other expressions, have
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the same type as the translations of ‘has won’, ‘have won’ and ‘will_have
won’, when these expressions occur as TP phrases.
3.4.1 Saturation, modulation and the present perfect
It is instructive to discuss the distinction between saturation and modula-
tion in relation to the meaning of the present perfect, and the tenses gen-
erally. Recall that the distinction between saturation and modulation, cen-
tral to Recanati’s truth-conditional pragmatics, was introduced in Chapter
1.3.1. In short, saturation is mandatory, dependent on the meaning of
words, whereas modulation is optional, dependent on pragmatic factors.
In Chapter 2, we considered quantifier domain restriction, transfer, colour
adjectives, etc. In these cases, modulation was the relevant pragmatic pro-
cess.
The following question now arises: is the pragmatic process involved in
the intuitive truth conditions of sentences in the present perfect (and tenses
generally) modulation or saturation?
In the case of the present perfect, and tenses generally, the exploitation of
context seems, indeed, to be highly conventional. It is not the case that we
can distinguish between two kinds of case: one where temporal expressions
are used conventionally without contextual adjustment and one where they
are contextually adjusted on pragmatic grounds. Reichenbach’s points of
speech are inherently context-dependent, and so are the result states of Jes-
persen, Moens & Steedman and Higginbotham. This reflects the inherent
context dependence of tense.
Thus, in contrast to cases of modulation, where there is a distinction be-
tween the conventional and the pragmatically modulated contributions to
truth conditions, contributions to truth conditions of temporal expressions
have their context dependence by convention. This motivates my choice to
anchor the truth conditions to the speech event by the mechanism of sat-
uration, more specifically by using the indexical 𝐶𝑠𝑒 in the translations. It
also motivates the indexical treatment of result events: the relation of result
has an argument whose value is determined by saturation (the expression
𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 is used for that purpose).12
12Recanati (2010b, p. 181-218) discusses the phenomena of context-shift, i.e. when the
context assigning meaning to indexicals is not the context in which the speech act is
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3.4.2 Consequent states, meaning postulates, and lexical denotation
Moens & Steedman (1988, p. 17) distinguish between events on a two-
dimensional scale. One axis concerns the presence or absence of result state
(“consequent state” in their terminology), one axis concerns extension in
time. Four event types are thus distinguished on the basis of these dimen-
sions: points/culminations, which are both punctual and not extended but
differ with respect to the presence of result state, and processes/culminated
processes, which are both extended in time but also differ from one another
with regards to result.13
According to their account, events of reaching are culminations contain-
ing a transition from the event of trying to reach some location or object
to the state of having the object or being at the location. The same holds
of events of winning: they contain a transition between the event of be-
ing about to win and being a winner (think about a runner passing the
finishing-line). In contrast, events of hiccupping are points that do not
contain a change. The same is true of events of tapping.
On the account of Moens & Steedman (1988), the present perfect is a
function that yields the consequent state. As we noted above, on one way
of understanding the proposal, sentences in the present perfect have conse-
quent states, and only consequent states, as their reference. There are two
potential problems with this view. First, a sentence like ‘IFK Norrköping
has won Allsvenskan’ does not seem to only have a consequent state as its
meaning. Intuitively, it concerns the event of IFK Norrköping winning
Allsvenskan as well. Secondly, it shares several logical properties with ‘IFK
Norrköping won𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑡 Allsvenskan’. For instance, we can draw the conclu-
sion that IFK Norrköping has won a competition and that some team has
won Allsvenskan from both sentences. The account of Moens & Steedman
performed. This is relevant for cases of historical present. In such examples, the present
tense is used for describing an event in the past. Theoretically speaking, the context, in
a technical sense, seems to be shifted to a context where the past event is present. The
present perfect then relates to the speech event of the past context (e.g. ‘Olof Palme is
shot. His wife, Lisbet Palme, has just arrived at the hospital, when she is interviewed
about the murder.’). But note that the phenomenon of context-shift does not imply that
there are cases where the context is irrelevant for the truth-conditional contribution of
tense.
13Cf. Ryle (1949) and Vendler (1967).
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(1988) is, accordingly, not an obviously better candidate than my proposal.
In particular, their idea does not show that the suggestion I have put for-
ward is mistaken.
Their suggestion highlights, however, an important question and a dis-
tinction important for our inquiry. It may be warranted to distinguish be-
tween two semantic mechanisms where the question of consequent states
(i.e. result states or result events) can arise. First, the lexical elements ‘win’,
‘reach’ etc. may be associated with a lexically internal event structure, along
the lines of (Moens & Steedman, 1988) above. In this structure, there may
well be a transition from the event of being about to win to the state of be-
ing a winner, or whatever transition is natural for the verb in question. This
idea about lexical elements could bemademore precise by incorporating the
notion of ‘meaning-postulates’, introduced by Carnap (1952). A meaning
postulate states a logical relation between nonlogical expressions (i.e. expres-
sions that are not in the category of logical constants). Adapted to our prob-
lem, one meaning postulate could state something along the following lines:
∀𝑒∀𝑥∀𝑥0[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ win(𝑒) ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒) → ∃𝑒0[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒0) ∧
being-winner(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0]].14
But, in my proposal, the contribution of the result state meaning comes
from the lexical denotation of ‘has’. ‘Has’ contributes a meaning contain-
ing the indexical 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 , denoting the contextually salient event. Now, impor-
tantly, the contextually salient event denoted could be, but does not have to
be, the same as in the internal event structure of the participle (in the case of
‘won’: the event of being a winner). It could be any event that the speaker
reasonably could intend to connect to the event of winning. Pragmatic the-
ory will have to map out the various constraints regarding this matter. But
just to make my point more concrete: it could be an event of being happy,
an event of being tired, an event of being angry (if the wrong team won),
etc.
There is thus a contrast between the consequent state (result state/event)
in the lexically internal event structure, associated with ‘won’, ‘reach’, etc.,
and the the consequent state (result state/event) of ‘has’, which is a contri-
14See also Dowty (1979, p. 37-132), where the lexicon, verb aspect in particular, and its
relation to syntactic constraints, is discussed in the context of Montague grammar and
the research program ‘generative semantics’.
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bution from the lexical denotation of the auxiliary.
3.5 Context dependence I: Result States
The difference in meaning between the two utterances of “IFK Norrköping
has won Allsvenskan”, illustrated in the beginning of this chapter, on page
121, is accounted for by the translation on page 136 above. More specifi-
cally the fact that the predicate 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 takes two event arguments, 𝑒 and
𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 , where 𝑒 is bound by an event quantifier and 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 is an indexical de-
noting the contextually salient event of the context, provides a semantic
account compatible with the empirical facts. How the right context is cho-
sen is, however, a question for pragmatic theory and beyond the scope of
the present investigation.
Higginbotham (2009) treats this context dependence differently. As we
noted on page 128, he proposes a translation of present perfect sentences
where the result event 𝑒 ′ is bound by an existential quantifier and related
to the event described by the participle (‘solved’ in example 104) by the
relation 𝑅. Furthermore, he assumes that there are two kinds of results as-
sociated with the present perfect: resultants and result states, as we also saw
on page 128. It is not fully clear in (Higginbotham, 2009) how this distinc-
tion is related to the translation, where the relation of result is expressed by
𝑅. A natural and quite simple way of developing Higginbotham’s proposal
would be to postulate an ambiguity: either 𝑅 appears in the translation,
standing for the relation of being a result state, or 𝑅𝑒𝑠 , standing for the
relation of being a resultant, appears.
A possible pragmatic explanation, which could be combined with Hig-
ginbotham’s translation and truth conditions, could be put in terms of
implicatures (Grice, 1975). Mittwoch (2008) suggests that result state-
readings could be explained in that way, but argues against the alternative
to account for them in terms of Grice’s conversational implicatures. The
example in (93) is crucial to this conclusion: conversational implicatures
are cancellable but the result state-meaning is not always possible to cancel.
Mittwoch’s alternative is that the result state-meaning is a conventional im-
plicature. She admits, however, that a treatment of the result state-meaning
in terms of conventional implicature is at odds with common taxonomies
of such implicatures. Standardly, expressions associated with implicatures
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of the conventional variety are either individual lexical and morphologi-
cal items, like ‘but’ and gender distinctions, or so-called ‘supplements’, e.g.
non-restrictive relative-clauses loosely attached to the main structure of the
sentence (often marked by a comma) (Mittwoch, 2008, p. 338). Mittwoch
concludes that the result state-meaning poses a challenge to existing theo-
ries of conventional implicatures. An alternative conclusion is to look for
other explanations.
Another possible pragmatic approach, which also would be coherent
with Higginbotham’s account, could be put in terms of presupposition.
Portner (2003) proposes that result state-meanings be accounted for in
those terms. The semantic account in (Portner, 2003) is not a result state-
account; it is not consistent withHigginbotham’s semantics or the approach
I have adopted in this chapter. But it is in principle possible to com-
bine Portner’s pragmatic suggestion about result state-meanings with the
account of Higginbotham.
According to Portner’s proposal, result state-meanings are yielded by a
presupposition that the event described by the participle has a relation that
somehow resembles causality to an answer to a question under discussion. It
is not clear in Portner’s paper, however, what relation he postulates between
the event described by the participle and the result state. Consider the
following example, discussed by Portner but here somewhat abbreviated:
(119) A: We need to get an explanation of George Eliot’s style. Who can
we ask?
B: Mary has read Middlemarch.
Portner’s proposal seems to be as follows. The proposition that there is
an event in the past where Mary reads Middlemarch is here related to the
answer that Mary can be asked about George Eliot’s style. The result state-
meaning is, accordingly, that Mary can be asked about the author in ques-
tion. These two propositions are related by a relation closely related to
causality but not really causality. Portner states the precise formulation of
the presupposition as follows:
A sentence S of the form 𝑃 𝐸𝑅𝐹 𝐸𝐶𝑇 (𝜙) presupposes:
∃𝑞[𝐴𝑁𝑆(𝑞) ∧ P(𝑝, 𝑞)]
(Portner, 2003, p. 499)
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The relation between the answer, in our case that Mary can be asked about
George Eliot’s style, and the proposition that Mary read Middlemarch in
the past, which is explicitly referred to in (119), is denoted by P. Portner
provides the following elaboration:
The treatment doesn’t exactly say that reading Middlemarch
caused Mary to understand Eliot’s style; rather, it says that,
given what we know about the relation between reading and
understanding, the fact that she read Middlemarch provides
evidence that she understands the style. Since the relation be-
tween reading and understanding is one of causation, however,
in fact the latter state is a result of her reading the novel. (Port-
ner, 2003, p. 500)
This passage is a bit puzzling. It is clear that Portner doesn’t intend to say
that ‘Mary has read Middlemarch’ in (119) presupposes that Mary’s read-
ing Middlemarch caused her understanding Eliot’s style. This seems true
enough. It is common knowledge that reading a book of some author or
other does not necessitate an understanding of the style of the chosen au-
thor. Portner then moves on to claim that the relation between Mary’s
reading Middlemarch and understanding Eliot’s style is evidential. But the
passage ends with the conclusion that there is a causal relation between read-
ing and understanding and that understanding the style therefore is a result
of reading the novel. This sounds inconsistent or not sufficiently elaborated.
What relation Portner intends as denotation of P is unclear to me.
Let’s take stock. It is not my intention to argue that Mittwoch’s or Port-
ner’s accounts are impossible to develop or that it would be unreasonable
to do so. I claim, however, that the accounts are underdeveloped as they
stand. It is not the case that pragmatic accounts in terms of conventional
implicature and presupposition, together with Higginbotham’s translation
and truth-conditional account, constitute an obviously correct and simple
explanation. These possible combinations of accounts do not constitute
clear reasons against trying out alternative routes. In particular, they give
no reasons against developing an explanation in terms of contextual effects
on truth conditions.
My suggestion above is that the result state (or result event, since I don’t
make the distinction between events and states) is the contextually salient
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event, denoted by the indexical expression 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 . The proposal is in terms of
truth-conditional effects and does not assume that non-truth-conditional
meaning plays a key role for the intuitions under discussion. This sugges-
tion is at least equally reasonable as a combination of Higginbotham’s pro-
posal and pragmatic proposals in terms of conventional implicature or pre-
supposition.
3.6 Context dependence II: Thematic Roles
Let us now turn to the sentence in (80), repeated as (120) below, and its
intuitive truth conditions (taken as an answer to the question stated on page
122):
(120) I have eaten.
Recanati attempts to capture the intuitive truth conditions by the following
translation (Recanati, 2010b, p. 124):
(121) (∃𝑒 ∶ 𝑇 𝐻𝐼𝑆 𝐸𝑉 𝐸𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺)(∃𝑡)[𝑃 𝐴𝑆𝑇 (𝑡) ∧ 𝑇 𝐼𝑀𝐸(𝑒, 𝑡 ) ∧
𝐸𝐴𝑇 𝐼𝑁𝐺(𝑒) ∧ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑇 (the speaker, 𝑒) ∧
𝑇 𝐻𝐸𝑀𝐸(dinner, 𝑒)]
Two semantic mechanisms are appealed to in Recanati’s proposal. First,
there is contextual domain restriction. The event quantifier does not quan-
tify over every event in the domain but over a restricted set of events: the
events temporally located to the evening of the utterance. Secondly, the
literal meaning of ‘eat’, which on Recanati’s account does not have a lexical
meaning that includes a thematic role of theme, is enriched to mean ‘eat
dinner’. Technically, variadic operators denoting variadic functions are do-
ing this job. In the case of ‘eat’, they operate as follows. The event of eating
has the thematic role of agent but no further thematic roles. A thematic
variadic function is applied to the event of eating, yielding an event with a
richer thematic structure, where there is also a thematic role of theme. The
thematic role of theme takes, moreover, ‘dinner’ as argument. (This is the
same kind of implementation as the one for ‘It’s raining’, cf. Chapter 2.7.)
Below, I will first extend the indexicalist formal account, in order to ac-
count for example (80) and its intuitive truth conditions. This possibility
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has not been discussed by Recanati or, as far as I know, by indexicalists. Sec-
ondly, I will extend the truth-conditional pragmaticist semantic account.
The purpose of that is to modify and develop Recanati’s sketch reviewed
above.
3.6.1 Indexicalist extension
We already have the lexical items, syntactic rules, and translations needed
in order to spell out an indexicalist version of (80), if we substitute ‘Kim’
for ‘I’ in that sentence (see the previous sections in this chapter and Chapter
2, especially page 64):
M.Clause
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(k, 𝑒) ∧ eat(𝑒) ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥1, 𝑒)∧
𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Pn
Kim
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
VP
𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ eat(𝑒) ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥1, 𝑒)∧
𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
𝑒𝑡
TP
𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ eat(𝑒) ∧ 𝑄(𝜆𝑥.𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒))
∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
Aux
has
𝜆𝑒.[𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0)∧
𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
𝑣𝑡
Participle
eaten
𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ eat(𝑒)∧
𝑄(𝜆𝑥0 .𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒)) ∧ 𝑓 (𝑒)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩
NP
𝜆𝑋0 .𝑋0(𝑥1)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Pn
𝑃1
𝜆𝑋0 .𝑋0(𝑥1)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
The indexicalist lets the variable 𝑃1 appear in the tree structure, and gives it
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a translation according to the definitions (see page 64). In contrast to Reca-
nati’s truth-conditional pragmaticist proposal, there is no modification of
the participle ‘eaten’ and its meaning. In the translation at the top node
(i.e. the translation of the whole expression), there is a free variable 𝑥1 that
can take any semantic value of the right type (i.e. any entity). Assuming
that dinners are entities, the sentence could thereby have the intuitive truth
conditions that Kim has eaten dinner, but it could also mean that Kim has
eaten some other meal.15
A reading additional to the one accounted for in the tree above is also
readily available. An utterance of (80) could also mean that the speaker has
eaten something. Suppose that Kim has been ill and hasn’t eaten for two
days. The following dialogue occurs:
(122) Robin: Are you better today?
Kim: Much better. I have eaten.
A natural reading in this case is that Kim has eaten something. How can
it be accounted for by the indexicalist? The answer is straightforward. The
indexicalist can postulate further object language variables available for log-
ical forms. Let 𝐽 , 𝐽0 , 𝐽1, … be these variables, and 𝐽 ∈ 𝐵𝑁 . Now let 𝐽𝑡 𝑟 =
𝜆𝑋.∃𝑥𝑋(𝑥). In a tree like the one above, 𝐽1 can then occur instead of 𝑃1. If
that were the case, the translation of the NP would be 𝜆𝑋.∃𝑥1𝑋(𝑥1). Then
the variable 𝑥1 would be bound by an existential quantifier in the translation
at the top node:
(123) ∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(k, 𝑒)∧eat(𝑒)∧∃𝑥1𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥1, 𝑒)∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0∧ℛ(𝑒0)∧𝑒 ≺
𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
Paraphrased, this means that there is an event 𝑒 such that k is the agent of
𝑒 , 𝑒 is an event of eating, there is an object 𝑥1 with the role of theme of 𝑒 , the
speech event of the context overlaps with the reference event 𝑒0 , 𝑒 is ante-
rior to 𝑒0 , the contextually salient event is a result of 𝑒 , and the contextually
15One could argue that, in the case at hand, there is no reference to any particular entity
but rather to a kind of meal. A possible theoretical approach is to introduce a new basic
type: kinds. But I will not discuss this possibility any further here, since the question
does not seem relevant to the claims here. I will thus assume that dinners are entities,
even in cases where there intuitively is reference to kinds.
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salient event overlaps with the speech event of the context. The truth con-
ditions do, accordingly, not state that a particular object is the theme, but
that some object has that thematic role.
3.6.2 Extension: truth-conditional pragmatics
In Chapter 2.7.3 I developed and modified Recanati’s account of weather
reports. I provided a compositional implementation of the idea of variadic
functions, and made the translation more general, in order to avoid a pro-
liferation of such functions. In this section, I will elaborate on the ideas in
Chapter 2.7.3 and adapt them to the linguistic phenomena under discus-
sion.
A difference between ‘It’s raining’, intuitively meaning that it is raining in
Paris, and ‘I have eaten’, intuitively meaning that the speaker has eaten din-
ner, is that whereas ‘rain’ is not associated with the thematic role of location
in the lexicon, according to our discussion above, ‘eat’ is plausibly lexically
associated with the thematic role of theme. Intuitively, eating events have
agents, i.e. participants that perform the eating such as humans, as well has
themes, i.e. objects of eating such as apples or tofu (or meals like dinners).
This intuition about the thematic roles associated with the expression in
question is related to the fact that ‘eats’, ‘has eaten’ and ‘ate’ could be used
transitively, as in (124) below:
(124) Kim eats/has eaten/ate tofu.
The mentioned lexical intuition and syntactic fact give us a reason for trans-
lating ‘eaten’ to an expression containing the thematic role of theme, as will
be done below.
The choice of letting the thematic role of theme be a part of the transla-
tion may differ from Recanati’s intended analysis. I say ‘may’, because this
aspect of the proposal in Recanati (2010b, p. 123-125) is not explicit. In a
discussion of (80), Recanati writes:
In this context ‘eat’ means eat dinner, just as, in certain con-
texts, ‘to drink’ means to drink alcohol. Again, this is conven-
tionalized, at least in the ‘drink’ case, but what has got conven-
tionalized is a meaning shift that makes the sense conveyed by
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the expression more specific than the literal sense. (Recanati,
2010b, p. 124)
On one way of understanding Recanati, the thematic role of theme is not
lexically associated with ‘eat’. According to this understanding, ‘eat’ some-
how acquires the thematic role of theme, and fills it with the value dinner,
in the compositional process. Alternatively, ‘eat’ is lexically associated with
the thematic role of theme, but the value could be specified implicitly by
some contextual mechanism, or explicitly by a noun like ‘tofu’. The for-
mer alternative is more coherent with Recanati’s discussion of ‘It’s raining’,
and with my implementation and modification of Recanati’s proposal in
2.7.3. It suffers, however, from the problem that it is not consistent with
my conclusions regarding lexical intuitions and syntax facts relating to ‘eat’
discussed above. Therefore, I will choose the second alternative.
It should be mentioned that this second alternative, just like the first
one, provides a theoretical alternative to analyses in terms of “unarticulated
constituents” (Perry, 1986), which Recanati intends to avoid. In the imple-
mentation below, every part of the meaning corresponds to an expression
in the sentence (cf. page 98).
Recall that we postulated a locational variadic function 𝐿𝑜𝑐 in Chapter
2.7.3. Here, we will have a thematic function 𝑇 ℎ𝑚, whose impact in the
compositional process is related to but different from the locational vari-
adic function. The similarity between 𝐿𝑜𝑐 and 𝑇 ℎ𝑚 is that both are intro-
duced by separate translation functions accounting for the optionality of
the meaning shifts, or contextual adjustments, in question. Furthermore,
they are formally similar, in ways that will become apparent below; for in-
stance, they both take a variable of type 𝑒 and a translated expression as
arguments. The difference consists in the changes of adicity. Whereas the
change of adicity is central to 𝐿𝑜𝑐 (it adds the thematic role of location),
𝑇 ℎ𝑚 does not yield a difference in adicity. Its primary purpose is rather
to provide a free variable – not in the logical form but in the translation –
that could have dinners as its contextual value.
The following holds of 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 :
• 𝑇 ℎ𝑚 is a constant of type ⟨𝑒, ⟨⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩
Nothing will be added to the translations of basic expressions in Section 3.4
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above. But there is need for one extra syntactic rule and some additional
clauses regarding the translations of phrasal expressions.
Syntax
• If 𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑇 𝑃 , [VP 𝛽] ∈ 𝑃𝑉 𝑃 .
The following postulate holds by stipulation:
(125) 𝑇 ℎ𝑚(𝑥)([TP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑇 ℎ𝑚 ) = [TP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑇 ℎ𝑚 (𝜆𝑋1.𝑋1(𝑥))
Now the ordinary truth-conditional pragmaticist translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐
is just like 𝑡 𝑟 for the translations presented in Section 3.4, except that the
truth-conditional pragmaticist translation provides a modulation variable
at each step, allowing for, but not necessitating, massive modulation. The
procedure is familiar from Chapter 2, and I will not repeat the basic truth-
conditional pragmaticist strategy here. In the case at hand, however, the
truth-conditional pragmaticist employs a separate translation function, al-
lowing for the implicit supplementation of themes. This translation func-
tion is called 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑡ℎ𝑚 and is introduced below:
Translations of phrasal expressions
• For almost all cases: 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑡ℎ𝑚 = 𝑡𝑟𝑐
• The only exception: [VP 𝛽]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑇 ℎ𝑚 = 𝑇 ℎ𝑚(𝑥)(𝛽𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑡ℎ𝑚 )
(type 𝑒𝑡 )
Accordingly, the following part of a tree structure and translations are avail-
able to the truth-conditional pragmaticist account of (80) (I only show the
part where there is a difference from the indexicalist account of the same
sentence):
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M.Clause
∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(k, 𝑒) ∧ eat(𝑒) ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥1, 𝑒)
∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
𝑡
NP
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
Pn
Kim
𝜆𝑋.𝑋(k)
⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩
VP
𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ eat(𝑒) ∧ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥1, 𝑒)
∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
𝑒𝑡
TP
has eaten
𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑒) ∧ eat(𝑒) ∧ 𝑄(𝜆𝑥.𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑥0 , 𝑒))
∧𝐶𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑒0 ∧ℛ(𝑒0) ∧ 𝑒 ≺ 𝑒0 ∧ 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡(𝑒, 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ) ∧ 𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝐶𝑠𝑒 ]
⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩
I have eliminated all modulation variables, since they are not having any
semantic effect in the case at hand. The implicit theme is added in the step
from the translation of the TP to the translation of the VP. Following the
added clause on translations above, as well as the postulate in (125), the
translation of the TP will take 𝜆𝑋1.𝑋1(𝑥1) as argument on the VP level. By
beta-reduction, the translation stated in the tree under the VP node is then
given. Accordingly, we have the same translation as the indexicalist arrived
at in Section (3.6.1) at the top node.
The truth-conditional pragmaticist should also account for the alterna-
tive existential reading discussed on page 147 (that Kim has eaten some-
thing). The following line of reasoning is available. In addition to the vari-
adic function 𝑇 ℎ𝑚, a function adding specific themes, there is another vari-
adic function 𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃, which adds existentially quantified themes. 𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃ is
introduced in the compositional process by the translation function 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃
(which could be used instead of 𝑡 𝑟𝑐 , 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑇 ℎ𝑚 or 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑐 , on pragmatic grounds).
𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃ has a different type from 𝑇 ℎ𝑚:
• 𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃ is a constant of type ⟨⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩.
The following holds by stipulation:
(126) 𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃([TP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃
) = [TP 𝛽 𝛾 ]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃
(𝜆𝑋1.∃𝑥1𝑋1(𝑥1))
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In this case, 𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑡ℎ𝑚∃ = 𝑡𝑟𝑐 , with the following exception:
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [VP 𝛽]𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃
= 𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃(𝛽𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑡ℎ𝑚∃
) (type 𝑒𝑡 )
The variadic function 𝑇 ℎ𝑚∃ thus introduces an existential quantifier that
will end up binding the object argument of 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒 in the translation. The
reading that some object has the role of theme of the event of eating is
thereby yielded, without postulating variables in logical form but by the
use of variadic functions.
3.6.3 Temporal restriction
Recanati’s translation on page 145 contains a restriction to the evening of
the utterance. In my proposal, the adjustment of the temporal dimension
is carried out differently. The predicate 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 relates the event of eating
talked about to some contextually salient event. The semantics does not
constrain which event, but it could be, for instance, that Kim is full and sat-
isfied. That event is only plausibly related to events of eating closely located
in time. The relation 𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 therefore only holds between events/states
where a given agent is full and satisfied and events where that agent eats
closely located in time. This solution is not specifically indexicalist or truth-
conditional pragmaticist, but consistent with both accounts.
3.6.4 The present perfect and negation
The sentence in (80) could be negated:
(127) I have not eaten.
A parallel discourse to the one discussed in relation to example (80), where
the questionWould you like to have dinner? preceded the imagined utterance
of (80), could proceed along the following lines. Suppose that Kim shows
up at Robin’s apartment one evening, and this dialogue occurs:
(128) Robin: Would you like to have dinner?
Kim: Thanks, that would be great. I have not eaten.
152
tense, the present perfect and saturation
In a discourse context like the one in (128), the intuitive and natural reading
is that B has not eaten dinner, or a meal relevantly similar to dinner, during
the evening of the utterance. It is neither intuitive nor natural to give the
paraphrase that the speaker has never eaten dinner or, a fortiori, that the
speaker has never eaten anything at all.
In the dialogue below, another reading is intuitive. Here, the natural
reading is not that Kim has not eaten dinner but that Kim has not eaten
anything, on the day of the utterance:
(129) Robin: Are you better today?
Kim: No. I have not eaten.
In this section, I will show that the natural readings of (128) and (129) can
be accounted for by a minor development of the formal semantic accounts
presented above. This development does not involve variadic functions or
covert expressions in logical form. In other words, the development is avail-
able for both indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics.
Some minor syntactic developments are stated below. In the formal se-
mantic accounts presented so far, the lexical element ‘not’ occurs in two
separate phrasal expressions (see page 103). Here, it will occur in yet an-
other phrasal expression, used for participle negation. And as is seen below,
the concatenated form of a participle phrase and a participle negation in
combination forms a participle phrase. Therefore, the syntax already shown
is not in need of modification. We have the following syntactic rules:
Syntax
1. If 𝛼 ∈ 𝐵𝑁𝑒𝑔 , then [𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝛼]  ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡 .
2. If𝛽 ∈ 𝑃𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡 and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 , then [𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝛽 𝛾 ]
∈ 𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 .
Furthermore, we have the following translation (the variables 𝑗 , 𝑗0 , 𝑗1, …
are used for functions of type ⟨⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩ from now on).
Translations of phrasal expressions
1. [𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡 not]𝑡 𝑟 = 𝜆𝑗 .𝜆𝑓 . 𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.¬𝑗 (𝑓 )(𝑄)(𝑥)
(type ⟨⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩, ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩⟩)
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Accordingly, the following subpart of a full tree structure for ‘I have not
eaten’ is available:
Participle
𝜆𝑓0 .𝜆𝑄0 .𝜆𝑥0 .¬∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥0) ∧ eat(𝑒)∧
𝑄0(𝜆𝑥1.𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥1)) ∧ 𝑓0(𝑒)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩
Neg𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑡
not
𝜆𝑗 .𝜆𝑓0 .𝜆𝑄0 .𝜆𝑥0 .
¬𝑗 (𝑓0)(𝑄0)(𝑥0)
⟨⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩, ⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩⟩
Participle
eaten
𝜆𝑓 .𝜆𝑄.𝜆𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑒, 𝑥) ∧ eat(𝑒)∧
𝑄(𝜆𝑥1.𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒(𝑒, 𝑥1)) ∧ 𝑓 (𝑒)]
⟨𝑣 𝑡 , ⟨⟨𝑒𝑡 , 𝑡 ⟩, 𝑒𝑡 ⟩⟩
We end up with either the reading that there is not an event of eating where,
say, Kim is agent, and the theme is dinner (etc.), or the reading that there
is not an event of eating where Kim is agent and there is some entity with
the role of theme (etc.). The difference between these two readings is not,
however, yielded by the syntax or translation of negation but depends on
the covert variable chosen at the object noun phrase node, in the indexical-
ist case (cf. Section 3.6.1), or the thematic variadic function chosen, in the
truth-conditional pragmaticist case (cf. Section 3.6.2).
3.7 Conclusion Chapter 3
In this chapter, I have presented a development of the formal semantic ac-
counts introduced in Chapter 2. The development accounts for tense. In
particular, it accounts for the (English) present perfect. It does so by a com-
bination of Reichenbach’s ideas about tense and the result-state approach,
associated with e.g. Jespersen, adapted to compositional event semantics.
The meanings of utterances of sentences including the present perfect
are contextually adjusted. The parameters of contextual adjustment with re-
gards to the present perfect have been explored in the chapter. In particular,
I have focused on the context dependence of result states and enrichments
of thematic roles. Furthermore, I developed both truth-conditional prag-
maticist and indexicalist approaches to the latter phenomenon, and have
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thereby provided further support of the claim that there is an empirical
equivalence between these two accounts.
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4 Discussion
The main conclusion from the previous chapters is that indexicalism and
truth-conditional pragmatics are empirically equivalent, at least for the
main examples that have been discussed in the literature. In this final chap-
ter, I will elaborate further on this claim. We begin by a discussion about the
difference between non-linguistic acts and assertions, focusing on whether
the choice between indexicalism or truth-conditional pragmatics bears on
this matter (as proponents of indexicalism have previously assumed). We
continue by discussing the notion of simplicity: if the conclusion is ac-
cepted, it can still be asked whether or not one alternative is simpler than the
other. The chapter continues with a discussion about consequences for al-
ternative accounts of context dependence in philosophy, notably relevance
theory, radical contextualism and semantic minimalism. It is suggested
that there are central aspects of these alternatives that are not in conflict
with the tenets of indexicalism or the main ideas of truth-conditional prag-
matics. We also discuss pragmatic constraints on modulation and review
relevance theoretic, coherence theoretic and frame theoretic accounts. Sev-
eral earlier discussions in this area assume that indexicalism and semantic
minimalism are incompatible with these theories of pragmatic constraints,
but I will draw a different conclusion. In the end of the chapter, it is sug-
gested that an interesting topic of further research would be to develop
accounts of semantic context dependence and modulation in relation to
recent developments in linguistics.
4.1 Non-linguistic and linguistic acts; saturation and
modulation
In Chapter 1.2.1, we observed that the notion of indexicalism is associated
with three claims in the literature:
• Contextual effects on truth conditions are traceable to logical form.
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• There is a truth-conditionally relevant pragmatic process of satura-
tion, but there is no truth-conditionally relevant pragmatic process
of modulation.
• There is a fundamental difference between the interpretation of lin-
guistic and the interpretation of non-linguistic acts.
From the results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we can draw the conclusion
that it does not follow from the indexicalist formalism that there is a funda-
mental difference between the processes involved in understanding acts of
assertion and the processes involved in understanding non-linguistic acts,
such as taps on the shoulder or kicks under the table (cf. Chapter 1.2.1
and Stanley 2000, p. 396). We can draw this conclusion, since indexical-
ism, given an empirically informed and theoretically reasonable explication
of the notion, postulates phonologically covert free variables, in some sen-
tences, which could be semantically vacuous. For indexicalism, there is, ac-
cordingly, a contrast between indexical expressions, on the one hand, and
contextual effects dependent on free variables in logical form, on the other
hand. This distinction corresponds to the truth-conditional pragmaticist
distinction between saturation, a mandatory process driven by the linguistic
material, and modulation, an optional process not dependent on linguistic
expressions and their context-dependent meaning but rather on pragmatic
factors. And these pragmatic factors could be the same factors as the ones
involved in understanding non-linguistic acts: e.g. coherence, relevance,
maxims of cooperation, etc.; in fact, it is reasonable to assume that they
are (cf. Section 4.4 below). Thus, the second claim above, that there is no
legitimate and reasonable distinction between saturation and modulation,
does not follow from the first about the indexicalist formalism. And once
we have accepted that there is a distinction between modulation and sat-
uration, the determinants of modulation are in need of explanation. To
assume that the third tenet is false, and to seek explanations in similarities
and overlaps in linguistic and non-linguistic interpretation processes, seem
to be natural initial hypotheses.
A proponent of Stanley’s dictum that there is a fundamental difference
between understanding non-linguistic acts and understanding ordinary ver-
bal assertions, and that truth-conditional interpretation is relevant for the
latter kind of understanding but not to the former one, could, however,
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grant that my criticism of Stanley’s conclusion is correct (it does not follow
from the formalism that there is a fundamental difference), but try to argue
that it does not follow from the indexicalist formalism that there is not a
fundamental difference either. The proponent of a fundamental difference
could argue that other considerations than the choice of formalism are more
likely to be relevant for issues of this kind.
I would partly agree with this view, and partly disagree with it. It seems
reasonable to say that other considerations than the chosen formalism could
potentially be relevant for the question of whether there is a fundamental
difference between the processes involved in understanding non-linguistic
acts and the processes involved in understanding ordinary verbal assertions.
But it is also reasonable to hold that the choice of formalism is also relevant.
Recall the explication of the notion of indexicalism with respect to quan-
tifier domain restriction (Chapter 2.2) and colour adjectives (2.5). The ex-
amples are paradigm cases of indexicalist data, and a detailed review and dis-
cussion of previous indexicalist analyses of these phenomena, warranted the
formal suggestion in terms of free variables in logical form, on the one hand,
and free variables in the translation into the simply typed lambda calculus,
on the other. Given this explication, the free variables are only semantically
constrained with respect to type. They could, accordingly, denote functions
that render them semantically vacuous. In the case of quantifier domain re-
striction, the free variable could be assigned𝑀 , i.e. the set of entities in the
model, or rather its characteristic function (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). And then
we have a distinction between mandatory and optional contextual effects.
The optional effects are constrained or determined somehow. It seems to be
a natural hypothesis that they are constrained by pragmatic factors pertain-
ing to understanding or interaction generally: such mechanisms are already
needed for other aspects of communication (cf. 4.4).
I do not mean to say, of course, that it is impossible to block this line
of reasoning. But the proponent of Stanley’s dictum owes us an account
of why free variables cannot be assigned values that render them vacuous
in the semantics, without postulating constraints in an ad hoc manner, or,
alternatively, an account of optional contextual effects that are neither deter-
mined semantically nor by pragmatic factors pertaining to communication
generally.
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But do I read the indexicalist’s texts like the devil reads the bible?
Couldn’t they replace the specific implementation using variables in log-
ical form by letting instead phonologically covert indexicals, i.e. a kind
of constants, appear in logical forms? Perhaps the indexical expression
𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑀 , where ‘DOM’ stands for domain restriction, could be added, and
𝐹0(𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑀 ) could be the domain of the context, just like 𝐹0(𝐶𝑐𝑠𝑒) is the
contextually salient event of the context (see page 135). Although such a
maneuver is possible, it is not obvious how it would help. Because, even if
𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑀 technically would be an indexical, with a denotation depending on
the formal notion of context 𝑐 , the indexical could still pick out𝑀 , the set
of entities in the model, and thereby be rendered vacuous.1
4.1.1 Optional variables and modulation
Finally, consider the indexicalist account in Martí (2006), which was put
aside in the introductory discussion (see Chapter 1.7.2).2 In that account,
there is a distinction between mandatory and optional variables in logical
form. Martí’s proposal was not the point of departure for the dissertation,
but it is, however, interesting to discuss how the three claims, formulated
in the beginning of this section, fit Martí’s specific variant of indexicalism.
In contrast to Martí’s concluding remarks about modulation, where it is
claimed that “there is no reason to assume that there are pragmatic processes
like free enrichment” (p.164), it seems to me that she, by accepting optional
variables, which may or may not be generated in the logical form associated
with a sentence, does not provide an alternative to modulation, but rather a
possible alternative route to the one taken in this dissertation: the contours
of an indexicalist formal account of modulation are outlined (cf. Recanati
1In the case of colour adjectives, this maneuver is not available for empirical reasons. As
we saw in Chapter 2.5, Szabó presents the following logical form of ‘green’:
• (Green(𝐶 , 𝑃 ))(𝑥)
Perhaps 𝐶 and 𝑃 are not variables but indexicals? Theoretically, that is a possibility,
but empirically, the account is not viable and fruitful: there are several scenarios where
the intuitive truth conditions are not accounted for, if this proposal is accepted (see the
discussion in Chapter 2.5.2).
2As was pointed out there, we thereby avoid a discussion of how to disambiguate between
several different logical forms for each sentence, a problem noted by Carston & Hall
(2017).
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2010b, p. 141). The main claim of the dissertation, that there is an em-
pirical equivalence between indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics,
is therefore not challenged by Martı’s ideas: on the contrary, they seem to
support the equivalence claim.
4.2 Context dependence and simplicity
It could be argued that indexicalism is less simple than truth-conditional
pragmatics. In many cases, indexicalism posits extra syntactic structure
in the logical form of sentences, whereas the truth-conditional pragmati-
cist uses a simpler syntax. In Chapter 2, this is clearly true in the case of
quantifier domain restriction, transfer, colour adjectives and meaning litiga-
tion. In all these cases, the indexicalist and the truth-conditional pragmati-
cist offer similar translations, but the indexicalist’s syntax contains more
rules and phonologically covert variables. One could thus argue that truth-
conditional pragmatics provides a simpler syntax and is therefore simpler
than indexicalism.
However, the truth-conditional pragmaticist’s proposal is more compli-
cated than the indexicalist’s, in other respects. Remember that the former
posits one modulation variable, which technically could take the value of
any function of the right type, for every syntactic operation. As we have
noted, this allows for massive modulation. But it does not necessitate that
the translation of every syntactic constituent is assigned a meaning that
differs from its literal meaning. The trick is to allow that the modulation
variable is assigned the identity function as value. In that case, it can be
eliminated (cf. page 49). Now this is, indeed, a possible and viable truth-
conditional pragmaticist solution. But in this respect, the truth-conditional
pragmaticist’s mahinery is intuitively less simple than the indexicalist’s.
The notion of variadic functions is relevant here as well. One could argue
that the indexicalist’s toolkit is simpler, because it employs one theoretical
notion, the notion of covert variables in logical form, whereas the truth-
conditional pragmaticist makes use of two notions: modulation functions
and variadic functions. But, it could be answered, the notions of modu-
lation functions and variadic functions are not as different as it may seem
at first sight. In fact, modulation functions can, in principle, do the job
of variadic functions. But the latter notion allows for a more precise char-
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acterization of common modulations. Another, related point, is that the
distinction between modulation functions and variadic functions allows for
a more flexible treatment of context dependent phenomena.3
I therefore conclude that there are aspects of the indexicalist explanation
that are more complex than the truth-conditional pragmaticist, but there
are other aspects of the truth-conditional pragmaticist explanation that are
more complicated than the indexicalist. This conclusion about simplicity
seems to hold, regardless of the choice of a theoretical or a practical no-
tion of simplicity. Informally explained, theoretical simplicity concerns the
number and complexity of the concepts and hypotheses involved, whereas
practical simplicity concerns a framework’s usefulness for researchers in cal-
culations, predictions, discussions, etc., over an extended period of time
(cf. Ludlow 2011, p. 152-173). If the notion is used theoretically, it is
not the case, as we just saw, that indexicalism is clearly simpler than truth-
conditional pragmatics, or vice versa. And if the notion is used practically,
it does not at present seem to be the case that indexicalism is easier to use or
learn for researchers in formal semantics. The processes of working out the
truth conditions do not, at present, seem to differ in practical complexity,
and it is not clearly the case that the two notions of modulation function
and variadic function result in a less useable account: on the contrary, there
may be an increase in flexibility that researchers will find convenient.4
4.3 Alternative variants
I have been arguing for the claim that indexicalism and truth-conditional
pragmatics are empirically equivalent. Below, it will be suggested that the
same basic techniques can be applied to the alternative accounts mentioned
in Chapter 1, i.e. relevance theory, radical contextualism and semantic min-
imalism.
The alternatives will be set in the event semantic framework developed
earlier. I will try to make plausible that central aspects of the alternatives
are compatible with indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics. A con-
3I owe the last point about flexibility to Paul Kindvall Gorbow (p.c.).
4On Ludlow’s explication of the notion of practical simplicity, which we use here, a frame-
work will survive over time, if it is practically simple. But we cannot know beforehand
what researchers will find convenient and useful (cf. Ludlow 2011, p. 158-159).
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sequence of that claim is that well-known taxonomies of philosophical ac-
counts of context dependence are oversimplified.
4.3.1 A relevance theoretic variant
In Chapter 1.5.1, we noted that relevance theory postulates a conceptual
representation over and above the logical form of a sentence. This concep-
tual representation is called lf*. As was explained in 1.5.1, the input to
truth-conditional semantics is not, for relevance theorists, the logical form
but lf*.
A natural implementation of the idea within the general framework of
compositional event semantics, presented in Chapter 2, is in terms of two
translation functions. Instead of directly translating the logical form into
the simply typed lambda calculus, the logical form is translated into lf*,
which, in turn, is translated into the calculus. However, the lf* of a sentence
in context is supposed to depend on context. The translation function will
therefore take two arguments: a logical form and a context. For illustration,
consider the following (simplified) logical form:
(130) [M.Clause Let’s stop in [NP every bar]]
Let 𝑡 𝑟lf* be a function from logical forms and contexts to lf*s such that e.g.:
• 𝑡 𝑟lf*([M.Clause Let’s stop in [NP every bar]], 𝑐)
=[M.Clause Let’s stop in [NP every bar in Ireland]]
Suppose furthermore that a different lf* is the value, if 𝑐0 is substituted for
𝑐 :
• 𝑡 𝑟lf*([M.Cause Let’s stop in [NP every bar]], 𝑐0)
=[M.Cause Let’s stop in [NP every bar in Gothenburg]]
Then we can proceed as usual, and translate the lf* into the simply typed
lambda calculus, as we did in the previous chapters.
We can put relevance theory to work by considering example (1)-(3)
again, repeated below as (131)-(133).
(131) Let’s go to Ireland. We’ll stop in every bar and have a drink.
(132) The leaf is green.
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(133) She took out the key and opened the door.
The approach has the resources for (131)-(133). In these cases, the intu-
itive pieces of information acquired when hearing or reading the sentences
can be made explicit by, as it were, filling in some missing linguistic mate-
rial. In a sense, the role of lf*s is to fill in material, although we have tried
to formulate that intuition in more precise terms above.
Relevance theory, on this understanding of the view, has, however, alter-
native ways of accounting for (131)-(133). One possibility is to let 𝑡 𝑟lf* map
logical forms onto conceptual structures (lf*s) that possibly contain free vari-
ables. The conceptual structures could then be translated like the indexical-
ist’s logical forms. Relevance theory would thereby account for modulation
in the same way as indexicalism, except for the further level of conceptual
representation. Alternatively, relevance theory could assume that the con-
ceptual structures are interpreted along the lines of truth-conditional prag-
matics. Modulation variables would then be added in the simply typed
lambda calculus, which translates the conceptual representations.
Because of the possibility of combining relevance theory with indexical-
ism or truth-conditional pragmatics, the relevance theoreticmachinery does
not have the unwanted consequence that only those modulations that can
be easily paraphrased (without changing the syntactic structure of the sen-
tence) are accounted for. That unwanted consequence would leave out the
meaning litigation in (11), repeated as (134) below, where it is difficult to
find suitable paraphrases that make the differences in modulation (between
A’s intended meaning of ‘planet’ and B’s intended meaning) explicit:
(134) Astronomer 1: Pluto is a planet.
Astronomer 2: Pluto is not a planet.
Furthermore, the assumption that the approach does not have the un-
wanted consequence is in line with some formulations of relevance theory.
In the relevance literature, a star notation often marks expressions used with
a modulated meaning. Consider (135) below, discussed by Sperber & Wil-
son (2012, p. 109-115):
(135) This surgeon is a butcher.
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In their discussion of the example, Sperber & Wilson claim that an under-
standing of the intuitive meaning of (135) “involves an evocation of the
way butchers treat flesh, and the construction on that basis of an ad hoc
concept BUTCHER*, denoting people who treat flesh in the way butchers
do” (Sperber &Wilson, 2012, p. 115). As I understand Sperber &Wilson,
BUTCHER* has a modulated meaning, which is not easily paraphrasable
(without changing the syntactic structure of the sentence).
It would be a minor adjustment of the theory to substitute the star for a
variable in the conceptual structure, in line with indexicalism, or an inter-
pretation function that maps ‘butcher’ to a predicate in the simply typed
lambda calculus fronted by a modulation variable of suitable type, as truth-
conditional pragmaticists prefer.
4.3.2 A radical contextualist development
We saw in Chapter 1.5.2 that radical contextualism (in Ludlow’s version)
is the view that speakers interactively construct local micro-languages on
the fly in conversation. A first approximation of a formal account could be
to allow for a variation in the choice of interpretation function. Recall that
we ended up with the following formulation of truth conditions in Chapter
3 (page 135) (𝐹0 is an interpretation function from constants in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 to
functions from contexts to extensions):
Truth and denotation in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
1. If 𝜒 is a constant then J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 is 𝐹 0(𝜒)(𝑐).
A preliminary formal version of the radical contextualist proposal can let
the symbol J K be superscripted with not only a symbol for model, variable
assignment and context, but also a symbol displaying which interpretation
function for constants that is subsumed. Then, J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐,𝐹0 is the same de-
notation as above, but J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐,𝐹1 is possibly different:5
5In the radical contextualist development, a modelℳ is a tuple ⟨𝑀,𝐸,𝐷 , 𝐶𝑈 ⟩, i.e. as
defined on page 135 except for 𝐹0 .
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Truth and denotation in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 for radical contextualists
1. If 𝜒 is a constant then J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐,𝐹0 is 𝐹 0(𝜒)(𝑐),J𝜒Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐,𝐹1 is 𝐹 1(𝜒)(𝑐), etc.
This implementation would do justice to the radical contextualist dictum
that interpretations are highly context-dependent and, furthermore, that
there is no privileged or more central meaning of any word.
The radical contextualist’s semantics could, however, preserve the con-
trast between saturation and modulation. Themeanings of indexicals could
still depend on 𝑐 . Saturation would then be implemented as in the account
of Chapter 3 (see 3.4). And modulation could be accounted for by postu-
lating phonologically covert variables in logical form, like the indexicalists
do, or by allowing for modulation variables in 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 , in accordance with
the proposal of truth-conditional pragmatics.6
To illustrate, consider examples (131) and (134) above. In the case of
(131), the radical contextualist could choose to employ the basic techniques
from truth-conditional pragmatics or indexicalism. In this case, it could be
argued, there is a variable for domain restriction in the logical form of the
noun phrase ‘every bar’ (cf. Chapter 2.2.1) or, alternatively, a modulation
variable in the translation (cf. Chapter 2.2.2). The radical contextualist
might choose to keep the interpretation function fixed in this case, and
account for the intuitive truth conditions by other components of the avail-
able semantic machinery. The radical contextualists do not have to deal
with the examples in this way: it is within the scope of their approach to
let changes of interpretation function account for these cases. But they also
have the choice to keep the interpretation function fixed, if they find that
intuitive or motivated.
In the case of (134), however, the radical contextualist might prefer to use
the notion of a change of interpretation function between contexts. That
would, in a sense, preserve the intuition that there is no privileged meaning
in the litigation: A and B use different interpretation functions and none
6Ludlow (2014, p. 87-95) discusses closely related issues. What I say here is, however,
different from his remarks. Ludlow claims that the question of variables in logical form
is a different question from the question about meaning underdetermination (cf. 1.5.2
above) and that relevance theory could in principle subsume his radical contextualism.
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of the functions is more basic or privileged than the other.7
4.3.3 A semantic minimalist modification
In the semantic minimalist literature, we find proponents of scepticism to-
wards the possibility of a systematic account of modulation, notably Cap-
pelen & Lepore (2005). Borg (2004, 2012, 2017) has a more constructive
perspective and attempts to develop an alternative to indexicalism, truth-
conditional pragmatics, relevance theory and radical contextualism. In this
section, we will discuss Borg’s approach.
Borg suggests that there are cases where a sentence can be uttered in
a context to convey a cluster of propositions (Borg, 2017, p. 9). When
some expression is uttered with a metonymical meaning, as in example (32),
repeated below as (136), the minimal proposition, without the semantic
transfer, is expressed in addition to the intuitive one.
(136) (Elevator repairman on phone:) I don’t know what to do with that
order. I’ll send André street over to you.
How can this semantic minimalist idea be formulated in the framework of
compositional event semantics? It is commonly assumed that the speech act
notion of utterance is closely related to, although clearly distinct from, the
semantic notion of a sentence in context (cf. Kaplan, 1979, p. 91). But on
the way of understanding Borg’s minimalist account that I will suggest, the
speech act notion of utterance should rather be thought of as related to an
n-tuple of sentences, or logical forms of sentences, taken in context, relative
to a variable assignment. Thereby, a single utterance can be associated with
several distinct truth conditions.
But note that this setup does not impose constraints on logical forms.
It is compatible with the minimalist approach, understood as above, to al-
low for phonologically covert variables in some logical forms. Moreover,
this minimalist machinery provides no restrictions on translations or inter-
pretations of logical forms. It is, accordingly, possible to adopt the mini-
malist approach and to claim that modulation variables can appear in the
translations at suitable places, for some logical forms, contexts and variable
7Proponents of radical contextualism have put a lot of emphasis on cases of meaning litiga-
tion (e.g. Ludlow 2014, p. 1-71), which they consider a motivation for their approach.
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assignments. In other words, there are aspects of semantic minimalism,
which could be combined with indexicalism or truth-conditional pragmat-
ics. (This is probably not what Borg wants, since she clearly opposes truth-
conditional pragmatics and indexicalism; but it is, it seems, a theoretical
option.)
The minimalist claims, according to the proposed explication, that utter-
ances are associated with tuples of pairs of logical forms and variable assign-
ments. An indexicalist development of minimalism can argue that it might
be the case that some, but not all, logical forms associated with a given
utterance contain phonologically covert variables. A modification in the
the direction of truth-conditional pragmatics will let the logical forms be
identical to one another, since context dependence is not determined syn-
tactically, but let some utterances be associated with pairs of logical forms
and variable assignments, where the variable assignments are not identical.
To illustrate the idea, consider (136). The intuitive reading is that ‘André
street’ denotes an order concerning an elevator in a house located on André
street. The first logical form contains no modulation whatsoever. This log-
ical form is associated with the so-called ‘minimal proposition’ (cf. Borg,
2017). It expresses the absurd proposition that the speaker will send the
actual street to the addressee. In addition to this first logical form, there is a
second logical form, which contains phonologically covert variables, like the
indexicalist’s logical forms. Alternatively, the second logical form does not
contain such variables, but the variable assignments differ, so that its con-
stituents may be interpreted with modulation, as in the truth-conditional
pragmaticist’s approach. The second logical form thereby has the intuitive
truth conditions about an order concerning an elevator in a house located
on André street.
An implementation along these lines would do justice to the minimalist
dictum that several distinct propositions can be expressed simultaneously.8
8See Borg (2004, 2012, 2017), Cappelen & Lepore (2005) and Lepore & Sennet (2010)
for arguments and motivations for the thesis that minimal propositions (i.e. non-
modulated truth conditions) are expressed by utterances in addition to the intuitive
ones. It is not my intention to criticize, defend or elaborate on that claim here. It
should be noted, however, as a preliminary remark, that the notion of a minimal propo-
sition, and the implementation suggested here, at present seem to result in a less simple
account, both from a theoretical and a practical viewpoint, compared to indexicalism
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Digression: further notes on minimalism
Elaborating on a line of thought from Cappelen & Lepore (2005, p. 17-52),
discussed and developed by Lepore & Sennet (2010), Borg (2012, p. 16-
47) argues that truth-conditional pragmatics and relevance theory lead to
a regress of context dependence.9 The idea is as follows. Take the sen-
tenceThe apple is red (cf. Chapter 2.5 and page 72). The truth-conditional
pragmaticist, relevance theorist and indexicalist argue that this sentence is
semantically context-dependent. The reason for this thesis is that we can
find two contexts where the truth conditions intuitively differ. In context
1, an utterance of the sentence intuitively means that a given apple is red on
the inside (suppose that it has a disease that colours the pip red). In context
2, an utterance of the same sentence intuitively means that the apple is red
on the outside (it has a red skin). In minimalist terminology, the method
is called ‘context shifting arguments’ (abbreviated CSA).
Now the minimalist’s objection is as follows: the claims that the apple is
red on the inside and that the apple is red on the outside are context-dependent
as well, given the methodology just appealed to, where we considered two
contexts and the sentence’s intuitive meanings in these two contexts. We
could consider further pairs of contexts, where these sentences, e.g. the ap-
ple is red on the inside, have intuitively different truth conditions. We can
make these truth conditions explicit bymore elaborated sentences, but these
will in turn have context-dependent truth conditions, if the same method is
pursued. And so on. Accordingly, truth-conditional pragmatics, relevance
theory and indexicalism lead to a regress and are therefore theoretically prob-
lematic accounts.
The proponent of truth-conditional pragmatics, relevance theory or in-
dexicalism can answer this argument, however. Truth conditions state the
conditions under which a sentence is true by reference to e.g. basic entities,
events, truth values, and functions constructed from these basic types in a
model. When the proponents of truth-conditional pragmatics, relevance
theory and indexicalism claim that some expression is context-dependent,
this should be understood as a claim pertaining to the entities, events and
or truth-conditional pragmatics without multiple logical forms (cf. Section 4.2).
9This holds for indexicalism as well, according to Cappelen & Lepore, as I understand
their criticism.
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functions referred to: they differ between contexts.
To make the point more concrete: suppose that ‘the apple’, taken in
context 1, denotes a function that we, for the sake of exposition, label
𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑜𝑛1 and that ‘is red’, taken in the same context, denotes a function
that we label 𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑜𝑛2. In context 2, ‘the apple’ denotes the same func-
tion as it does in the first, but ‘is red’ does not denote the same function
as it does in context 1: in context 2, the expression denotes 𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑜𝑛3 .
It is difficult to see that there is a regress here. The objection from Borg
and the semantic minimalists seems to presuppose that the thesis that ‘the
apple is red’ is associated with different truth conditions in different con-
texts somehow implies that there is a representation appealed to that can
be further interpreted. But in the case of truth-conditional pragmatics and
indexicalism, this is not the case. It is, of course, not meaningful to say that
the different functions associated with ‘is red’ are somehow further inter-
pretable.
Relevance theory might seem to be in trouble, because it does, in fact,
postulate an intermediate level of representation in addition to the logical
form: lf* (cf. Chapters 1.5.1 and 4.3.1). But the problem is a chimera.
In a given context, each logical form has exactly one translation into an lf*.
And each lf* will have exact truth conditions, given a context and a variable
assignment.10
4.3.4 A discussion of taxonomies
In Section 4.3, I have pursued the claim that there are central aspects of rel-
evance theory, radical contextualism and semantic minimalism, which are
not in conflict with either indexicalism or truth-conditional pragmatics. In
fact, the aspects of the accounts elaborated on above, are perfectly compat-
ible with the indexicalist’s or the truth-conditional pragmaticist’s approach.
It does not follow, of course, that all aspects of relevance theory, radical
contextualism and minimalism are compatible with the views in question.
But a consequence is that previous taxonomies of the debate over seman-
tic context dependence, notably the ones in (Borg, 2012) and (Recanati,
2010b, p. 12-14), ought to be somewhat modified.
10The minimalist could argue that it is always unclear which function to choose, but that
is not an obvious consequence of the reviewed criticism of context shifting arguments.
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Borg (2012, 18-29) distinguishes between the following accounts of se-
mantics and context dependence:11
• Minimalism
• Indexicalism
• Contextualism
• Occasionalism
“Minimalism” is, of course, the view I call ‘semantic minimalism’. “Con-
textualism”, for Borg, seems to refer to both truth-conditional pragmatics
and relevance theory. “Occasionalism”, finally, is the view labelled ‘radical
contextualism’ here.
According to the survey of the theoretical landscape in Borg (2012, 18-
29), minimalism, indexicalism, contextualism and occasionalism offer
sharply distinct and deeply incompatible accounts of examples like (131)-
(133) (see page 163). First we have the (semantic) minimalist proposal,
according to which there is a clear distinction between semantic content,
on the one hand, and pragmatic meaning, on the other. For the mini-
malist, the syntactic structure is as simple as possible, and phonologically
covert variables are avoided, in these cases. Secondly, on Borg’s picture of
the landscape, we have the indexicalist, who attempts to account for the
examples by positing extra syntactic structure. Thirdly, we have the con-
textualist (the truth-conditional pragmaticist and relevance theorist), who
supposes that pragmatic factors can influence the truth-conditions of the
uttered sentence, but holds that such influences are optional. And finally,
we have occasionalism (radical contextualism), according to which it is im-
possible to abstract or idealize from context; according to occasionalism,
“there is simply no such thing as determinate content outside of a context”
(Borg, 2012, p. 26).
As I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3, the distinction between indexical-
ism, on the one hand, and truth-conditional pragmatics (one of the views
labelled ‘contextualism’ by Borg), on the other, is sharp but empirically in-
significant. In addition, in Section 4.3, I have tried to make it plausible that
11In addition to the approaches mentioned above, Borg also discusses “semantic relativism”.
I leave it aside here, since relativism is not a topic of this dissertation.
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central aspects of (semantic) minimalism and radical contextualism (‘occa-
sionalism’) should not be seen as deeply incompatible with indexicalism
and what Borg labels ‘contextualism’. These conclusions are not accounted
for by Borg’s taxonomy.
Recanati (2010b, 1-26) distinguishes between the following accounts of
semantic context dependence:
• S*-Minimalism
• I-Minimalism
• Truth-conditional pragmatics
• Radical contextualism
“S*-Minimalism” refers to, as I understand Recanati’s description, the view
I label ‘semantic minimalism’. “I-Minimalism” is the same view as ‘indexi-
calism’.
Recanati notes that there are aspects of S*-Minimalism (semantic mini-
malism) that in principle could be combined with truth-conditional prag-
matics (“TCP”):
Though it conflicts with some forms of Contextualism, S*-
Minimalism is still compatible with TCP: for the level of
meaning it posits [...] need not be the same level of mean-
ing as that which concerns TCP, namely the intuitive truth-
conditions of the utterance [...] (Recanati, 2010b, p. 13)
This is similar to the view I have presented. On the other hand, Reca-
nati sharply distinguishes between I-Minimalism (indexicalism) and truth-
conditional pragmatics: “[t]he disagreement here is genuine empirical dis-
agreement” (Recanati, 2010b, p. 14). As I have argued, the disagreement
is in fact not empirical.
Furthermore, he is quite explicit about the allegedly clear difference be-
tween truth-conditional pragmatics and radical contextualism. The dis-
tinction between saturation and modulation is central to truth-conditional
pragmatics, but for radical contextualism, Recanati claims, “the distinction
between saturation and modulation collapses” (Recanati, 2010b, p. 22). I
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have tried to show, in Section 4.3, that this is not necessarily so: radical con-
textualism can be formulated in terms that allow for a difference between
these two pragmatic processes.
In the introductory overview of (Recanati, 2010b), where the theoretical
landscape is presented, relevance theory is not mentioned. But the account
is discussed later on (Recanati, 2010b, p. 127-142). I take this to mean
that relevance theory is not considered to be a view clearly opposed to truth-
conditional pragmatics. This is, accordingly, a further point of agreement
between us.
To take stock, Borg’s taxonomy does not do justice to the possible empir-
ical and theoretical overlap, which becomes evident when the frameworks
are developed formally (albeit with different degrees of detail). Recanati’s
taxonomy is, in this sense, more viable, since it recognizes possible overlaps
between truth-conditional pragmatics and semantic minimalism, and, in-
directly, between truth-conditional pragmatics and relevance theory. Still,
his taxonomy does not go far enough: there are also possible overlaps be-
tween truth-conditional pragmatics and radical contextualism, and, most
importantly, truth-conditional pragmatics and indexicalism are empirically
equivalent accounts, or so I have argued.
4.4 Pragmatic constraints
In the dissertation, I have been concerned with properties of sentences, or
their logical forms, and their interpretations. We have seen that interpre-
tations are often, in subtle and complex ways, context-dependent. But we
have not discussed in detail howmodulation and saturation are constrained,
i.e. how the right context and variable assignment are chosen, but only
touched upon the subject indirectly. In contrast to our perspective on sen-
tences and their syntactic and semantic properties, a focus on constraints
on modulation and saturation would be concerned with broader notions
of communication and understanding, including non-linguistic aspects of
interaction, cooperation, perception, associations, etc.
But there are accounts of constraints on modulation in the literature.
These views do not add anything to semantic theory but are formulated
as separate pragmatic approaches. There is, however, a tendency in the
literature to think of well-known accounts of constraints, described below,
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as somehow more compatible with truth-conditional pragmatics, radical
contextualism and relevance theory than with indexicalism and semantic
minimalism.
In the subsection below, I review three kinds of accounts of pragmatic
constraints: relevance theoretic, coherence theoretic and frame theoretic
approaches. I then discuss the compatibility between these accounts and
truth-conditional pragmatics, indexicalism, relevance theory, radical con-
textualism and minimalism.
4.4.1 Relevance, coherence and frames
For relevance theorists, modulation is constrained by expectations of maxi-
mal relevance (Sperber &Wilson, 2012, p. 103).12 The notion of relevance
is, in turn, spelled out in terms of cognitive effects and processing effort: 1)
the greater the cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater
its relevance, and 2) the smaller the processing effort required to achieve these
effects, the greater the relevance. As we noted in Chapter 1.5.1, examples
of cognitive effects are, for instance, an answer to a question, the raising of
a doubt, a confirmation or refutation of a hypothesis, and a suggestion of a
course of action. This was illustrated by the intuitive interpretation of (1),
repeated above as (131) and provided again as (137) below, in a context
where the speaker addresses a potential fellow traveller: the intuitive inter-
pretation suggests a course of action, in contrast to many other possible
modulations:
(137) Let’s go to Ireland. We’ll stop in every bar and have a drink.
Hall (2009, 2014) develops the framework of Sperber & Wilson (1995,
2012) in an attempt to provide further pragmatic constraints on how the
intuitive truth conditions are constrained. The proposal is, in short, that
in hearing an utterance, the hearer constructs an argument pattern, where
contextual assumptions, the utterance, and implicatures form an argument.
The implicatures function as conclusions and the contextual assumptions
and utterance as premises, in the argument pattern. The utterance, in our
12In Section 4.3.1, we discussed the assumptions about semantics and context dependence
apparent in relevance theory. Those assumptions should be separated from their ac-
count(s) of pragmatic constraints on modulation.
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terminology the logical form of the uttered sentence, is interpreted with
pragmatic constraints that eliminate all possible contextual modulations
that do not fit in the argument schema.
To exemplify, take the following dialogue:
(138) Peter: What do you think of Martin’s latest novel?
Mary: It puts me to sleep.
On Hall’s relevance theoretic line of explanation, the concept of ‘being put
to sleep’ is modulated to mean something like ‘being bored’. This mod-
ulation is constrained by the expected implicature, which is an evaluative
judgment of some sort. The concept of being bored is more relevant than
being asleep, with regards to this expectation, and the modulation is con-
strained accordingly.
Another proposal of howmodulation is constrained is put forward by Pa-
gin (2013), who appeals to a mechanism of coherence raising. In relation
to conversational topic, previous discourse or perceptual focus, some mod-
ulations raise the level of coherence more than others, Pagin argues, and
provides a hierarchy of coherence relations.13 Closeness in time or space
raises coherence, but resemblance relations raise it even more, and necessity
relations like causation and logical entailment constitute the highest form
of coherence.
The idea of coherence relations as constraints on modulation can be illus-
trated by the following example, discussed in previous chapters as example
(73) but repeated as (139) below.
(139) Mary took out the key and opened the door.
The intuitivemodulation, thatMary opened the doorwith the key, is yielded
by the coherence relation of possibility, on Pagin’s account. The first propo-
sition, thatMary took out the key, enables or makes possible the second one,
that the door is opened.
Yet another idea about constraints is found in Recanati (2004, p. 23-
37), where it is argued that frames, intuitively abstract schemas of typical
situations, associated with the concepts referred to by the use of a sentence,
13Pagin develops the ideas about coherence in e.g. Hobbs (1985) and applies them to the
current debate.
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constrain the likely modulation.14 Consider the following case, discussed
on page 55 as example (35), but repeated here as (140):
(140) The ham sandwich left without paying.
In this case, the verb phrase ‘left without paying’ evokes a frame of a typical
situation of leaving without paying. The noun phrase is therefore expected
to refer to an animate agent; the transferred interpretation where ‘the ham
sandwich’ refers to the ham sandwich orderer is thereby more accessible
than the alternative literal interpretation of the subject noun phrase.
4.4.2 Pragmatic constraints and the semantics of
context dependence
A formal approach to modulation, and the choice of context or variable as-
signment generally, which also matters for saturation, could take as its start-
ing point one of the accounts of pragmatic constraints mentioned above
(the relevance theoretic, coherence theoretic or frame theoretic approach)
or a combination of them. But, importantly, if the theory of pragmatic
constraints is intended as a complement to a compositional event semantic
approach, an indexicalist or truth-conditional pragmaticist formal seman-
tic account could be chosen, and the chosen account could be combined
with central aspects of relevance theory, radical contextualism or semantic
minimalism. Crucially, the choice of semantic variant does not bear on the
compatibility with accounts of pragmatic constraints: all mentioned pro-
posals, understood as above, are compatible with relevance theoretic, co-
herence theoretic and frame theoretic approaches to pragmatic constraints.
This is the case, since the notions of variable assignment and context are
crucial and central to all mentioned variants of compositional event seman-
tics. Somehow, the right variable assignment and context are chosen: a
theory of pragmatic constraints attempts to provide adequate pictures or
explanations of that kind of processes.
This conclusion can be compared to the different outlook of e.g. Hall
(2009, 2014), where the relevance theoretic approach to pragmatic con-
straints is elaborated in an attempt to provide alternatives to indexicalism,
14Cf. Atkins & Fillmore (1992).
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and to Pagin (2013, p. 66, footnote 6), where the coherence theoretic ap-
proach is contrasted to the indexicalist approach of Stanley (2000).
4.5 Empirical equivalence: how far can we go?
A central purpose of the dissertation has been to discuss whether indexi-
calism and truth-conditional pragmatics are empirically equivalent frame-
works. I have attempted to show that this is the case for the main exam-
ples discussed in the debate, in particular examples (1)-(11), on pages 1-4.
More specifically, I have defended the empirical equivalence claim, prelim-
inarily formulated on page 51, and in its final form on page 136. A further,
stronger hypothesis, is that the equivalence also holds for all sentences an-
alyzable in the same fragments. Are there cases where context dependence
is best explained in terms of idiosyncratic properties of individual lexical
items or syntactic rules? Is indexicalism better suited to account for the
idiosyncratic aspects, in that case, or vice versa? If not, the following claim
seems to be supported:
Empirical Equivalence Claim (hypothesis)
For all sentences 𝑆 , analyzable in the respective fragments, if
the indexicalist translation of 𝑆 is 𝜙 and the truth-conditional
pragmaticist translation is 𝜓 — i.e. if 𝜙 and 𝜓 are 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 -
formulas obtained by our translation functions applied to the
analysis of 𝑆 in the respective fragments — then for all mod-
els ℳ, there is an assignment 𝑔 and a context 𝑐 such thatJ𝜙Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 = J𝜓 Kℳ,𝑔,𝑐 .
The next question is whether extensions or variants of the fragments
could yield examples where the two frameworks differ in their predictions:
are there linguistic phenomena that are better accounted for by truth-
conditional pragmaticists than indexicalists, or the other way around? The
diversity and disparate quality of the data that support the weaker hypoth-
esis is a reason to assume that the Empirical Equivalence Claim holds for
all reasonable fragments of English. A pertinent question, at this stage, is
whether the burden of proof lies with the proponent or the opponent of
the stronger hypothesis. For the opponent, the challenge would be to find
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linguistic counter-examples. My belief is that this would be difficult, since
the choice to postulate a variable in logical form or to let it appear elsewhere
in the system, e.g. in the 𝐿𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 -translation, appears not to be an empirical
issue but a theoretical one.
4.6 Further topics for research
The determinants of modulation are difficult to define. This is noted by
Pagin & Pelletier (2007, p. 53), who claim that modulation depends on
“general pragmatic skill, taking into account the topic of conversation, the
current focus, the established conversational score, and perhaps further fea-
tures of speaker psychology”.
An interesting topic of future research would be to develop this remark,
and the accounts of pragmatic constraints above, in relation to the frame-
work of conversation-oriented semantics, KoS, put forward by Jonathan
Ginzburg in Ginzburg (2012). Ginzburg develops ideas from among others
Stalnaker (1978) and Lewis (1979), but also draws on more data-oriented
research in informal sociolinguistics (e.g. Schegloff, 2007), with the aim
to provide a formal semantics suitable for dialogue and linguistic interac-
tion. Accordingly, an important desideratum for Ginzburg is to account for
clarification requests, misunderstandings, conversational repair, and meta-
communication generally.
The aspect of Ginzburg’s proposal most relevant to us here is the idea of a
dialogue gameboard, which is a development of Lewis’s notions of conversa-
tional score and scoreboard, which in turn generalize Stalnaker’s well-known
account of assertion and common ground (in terms of eliminations of pre-
supposed possible worlds) to amultitude of conversationally important phe-
nomena, such as definite descriptions, vagueness and performatives.15 For
Ginzburg, conversational gameboards have components for speaker and ad-
dressee, and, importantly, an ordered set of questions under discussion. At
a given stage of a conversation, there will be one question that is most rel-
15Lewis’s metaphor relates conversation to baseball, whereas Ginzburg, alluding to the later
Wittgenstein, relates conversation to games generally. For a Scandinavian, Ginzburg’s
choice is perhaps easier to understand. At a given stage of a game, e.g. football/soccer,
there is a score, but also constraints, on varying degrees of strictness and laxity, pertaining
to the players’ admissible actions.
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evant, and several other questions that are salient and thereby available to
the participants of the conversation.
The speaker/addressee-component can be extended to include speech
and reference event, and other salient events. Thereby, indexicals crucial
to the approach to tense, and the present perfect in particular, presented
in Chapter 3, can be assigned a contextual meaning. The component for
questions under discussion is apt for the (first) relevance theoretic pragmatic
constraint, discussed above in Section 4.4.16 A further component of the
dialogue gameboard could be a set of frames, associated with the expres-
sions used, the conversational topic, etc. Moreover, one could postulate a
component for salient coherence relations.
The variable assignment operative in the context, could then be thought
of as a result of several components on the dialogue gameboard. Prelimi-
nary, a function taking three arguments – a frame, a question and a coher-
ence relation – yields a variable assignment, which is then used for truth
conditions. A question worth further attention is how to think of these
arguments semantically. One could think of them in terms of basic types:
like entities, events, and numbers. Questions could quite naturally be basic
types as well, and, as a first approximation, so could frames and coherence
relations.17
One further reason for why semantic context dependence would be inter-
esting to account for in the framework of KoS is that meta-communication
is central to this framework, as mentioned above. On Ginzburg’s account,
each speaker in a conversation somehow represents a private and a pub-
lic aspect of the gameboard; but a conversational participant’s take on the
public aspect may differ from her interlocutor’s conception of the publicly
available gameboard. Themechanisms of meta-communication, e.g. clarifi-
cation requests, are thereby expected to be used frequently, and careful and
detailed data analysis of naturally occurring speech shows that such phe-
nomena are ubiquitous in conversation (Ginzburg, 2012, chap. 4). Now
16The relevance-theoretic approach to pragmatic constraints is not explicitly formulated in
terms of questions, but it involves the notion of ‘cognitive effects’ (see page 18), which in
turn is elaborated in terms of answers to questions, raising of doubts, and suggestions of
courses of actions. The latter two cognitive effects could quite naturally be reformulated
in terms of questions or answers.
17Cf. the discussion of frames and formal semantics in (Cooper, 2015).
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meta-communication is also expected to occur frequently, if modulation is
a common phenomenon. Even though the dialogue gameboard has com-
ponents that determine the right modulation, according to the preliminary
hypothesis mentioned above, two interlocutors may differ in their concep-
tion of frames, coherence or relevant questions. This point holds for all vari-
ants of compositional event semantics mentioned in the dissertation (truth-
conditional pragmatics and indexicalism, which could be combined with
central aspects of relevance theory, radical contextualism and semantic min-
imalism). And if we pursued the project of radical contextualism, which was
illustrated above in terms of contextual shifts in the interpretation function,
the theoretical point of expecting ubiquitous meta-communication would
become even clearer. This is because the context dependence of meaning is,
for radical contextualism, potentially more prevalent than the alternatives
suggest.18
It seems worthwhile to try to map these ideas out in more detail. That
would be interesting not only because of the more fine-grained notion of
context that would then hopefully emerge, but also because of the interdisci-
plinarity of the suggested approach. The perspective in Ginzburg’s method-
ology and theory is that of a linguist rather than that of a philosopher. Fur-
ther investigations in this area could, accordingly, have an impact on theory
construction and methodological choices in philosophy and linguistics.
18Recanati (2010b, p. 6-9) discusses the semantic minimalists’ worry that contextual effects
on truth conditions, in particular modulation or similar notions, make communication
a miracle. As a response, Recanati refers to the interactive nature of conversation, which
include mechanisms for negative and positive feedback, and, typically, “a tolerance for
misunderstanding” (see Recanati 2010b, p. 6-9). This is very much in line with the
outlook on conversation in Ginzburg’s approach.
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Sammanfattning
I debatten om semantiskt kontextberoende har ett flertal ramverk utvecklats.
Bland de ramverk som antar att en central aspekt av mening är sannings-
villkor, finner vi exempelvis indexikalism och sanningsvillkorspragmatik.
Det första ramverket, som brukar förknippas med Jason Stanley, redogör
för kontextuella effekter genom en rik, fonologiskt ohörbar, syntax. Det an-
dra ramverket, där François Recanati är tongivande, antar inte attmekanism-
erna har med ohörbar syntax att göra, utan utvecklar istället en mer kom-
plicerad semantik. I denna avhandling utforskas hypotesen att indexikalism
och sanningsvillkorspragmatik är empiriskt ekvivalenta. Konklusionen att
denna hypotes är hållbar ter sig klar, när påståenden och argument i de-
batten görs formellt precisa med modellteoretisk semantik. Slutsatsen står
i bjärt kontrast till välkända påståenden i debatten, där oenigheten antas
vara just empirisk.
Avhandlingen inleds med en systematisk översikt över indexikalism och
sanningsvillkorspragmatik. Därefter utforskas hypotesen. Ramverken
tillåter utvecklingen av två liknande, men klart åtskilda, formella semant-
iker för en uppsättning språkliga exempel som är centrala i debatten. De
formella semantikerna, som är modellteoretiska, i den händelsesemantiska
traditionen, tillämpas på följande lingvistiska fenomen: domänrestriktion
hos kvantifikatorer, överförda betydelser (metonymi), bindning, färgadjekt-
iv, meningsförhandling, och berikning av tematiska roller. Varje fenomen
behandlas på följande sätt: först diskuteras forskningsbakgrunden, och
huvudidéerna i den relevanta litteraturen summeras, kritiseras eller utveck-
las. Därefter presenteras en indexikalistisk formell semantik och en sannings-
villkorspragmatisk formell semantik. Slutsatsen är att indexikalism och
sanningsvillkorspragmatik är empiriskt ekvivalenta ramverk (i en precis
mening).
De formella semantikerna utvecklas även för att hantera andra lingv-
istiska fenomen. Mer precist utforskas de kontextberoende dimensionerna
hos engelskans presens perfekt. Återigen ges både en indexikalistisk och
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en sanningsvillkorspragmatisk formalisering. Avhandlingen utvecklar även
en tidigare svagt utforskad kombination av Reichenbachs och Jespersens
tidiga redogörelser för presens perfekt. Analyserna som läggs fram ger yt-
terligare evidens för att indexikalism och sanningsvillkorspragmatik är em-
piriskt ekvivalenta, men de fördjupar även vår förståelse av presens per-
fekt samt testar fruktbarheten hos de modellteoretiska, händelsesemantiska
formaliseringarna.
I den avslutande diskussionen argumenteras det för att centrala aspekt-
er av andra ramverk som utvecklats för att hantera kontextberoende, t.ex.
relevansteori, radikal kontextualism och semantisk minimalism, faktiskt är
kompatibla med indexikalism och sanningsvillkorspragmatik. Diskussion-
en tar även upp frågor kring enkelhet och hur långt hypotesen om empirisk
ekvivalens kan generaliseras.
Ett övergripande syfte med avhandlingen är att omstrukturera och vi-
talisera debatten om semantiskt kontextberoende. Som kontrast till den
språkfilosofiska diskussionen inom detta område, där lingvistiska fenomen
nästan aldrig ges detaljerade formella (kompositionella) syntaktiska och se-
mantiska formaliseringar, har avhandlingen som målsättning att visa hur
detaljerade formaliseringar, som inte alltid är uppenbara eller självklara, kan
ge nya insikter.
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